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I. Introduction 
 
This dissertation illustrates perspectives that allow cross-fertilization between 
law and experimental economics. It does so in three separate research articles. 
Commonly law and economics is understood as a discipline applying (micro) 
economic methodology to legal questions. These questions can either be policy 
questions or questions of interpretation. The three Chapters reported below 
show that legal scholarship and economic research can indeed mutually inspire 
each other in both directions. That means that apart from answering legal 
questions by means of economics (Chapter II), legal scholarship (Chapter III) 
as well as knowledge about legal practice (Chapter IV) can nudge economic 
thinking into directions economic theory seems reluctant to go.  
 
Chapter II sets out where one would expect law and economics to be fruitful-
ly applied: answering legal questions with economic methodology. In antitrust, 
the legal question arose whether target rebates can foreclose markets ineffi-
ciently because they exploit non-standard preferences of consumers. Chapter 
II is answering a part of this question by testing whether loyalty rebates can 
impose psychological switching costs on consumers.  
Loyalty consumer rebates are a common marketing device. The consumer loy-
alty rebates treated here (also referred to as ‘target rebate’ or ‘all unit discount’) 
are based on the following mechanism: A firm grants a significant price reduc-
tion on all units bought during a certain reference period if within that refer-
ence period the customer reaches a certain target in purchases close to his total 
demand. Thereby, the target is framed as a goal the consumer aims for.  
Loyalty rebates could induce consumers to adopt such goals. The goal may 
lead consumers to interpret foregoing the rebate as a loss inducing risk seeking 
behavior to assure reaching the rebate threshold. This may translate into psy-
chological switching costs (for the basic mechanism see Kahneman & Tversky, 
1979).  
The relevance of non-rational behavior in competition policy has been vividly 
discussed in the antitrust community under the label “behavioral antitrust” 
(Tor & Rinner 2011; Stucke 2007; Reeves & Stucke 2011; Tor 2002). This new 
direction of research received a lot of attention and support (see, e.g., a special 
issue of Competition Policy International in 2010; the conference web site 
http://behavioralantitrust.acle.nl; the speech by Federal Trade Commissioner 
Rosch, 2010), but it was also criticized for prematurely applying insights de-
rived from a student subject pool to firm behavior, for pursuing a paternalistic 
agenda, and for making welfare analysis impossible  (Werden, Froeb, & Shor 
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2011).  
The most promising applications of behavioral antitrust have dealt with con-
sumer behavior. Replacing a standard demand function with a more realistic 
model of consumer behavior often leads to very different predictions in situa-
tions highly relevant to antitrust (see the survey report to the British Office of 
Fair Trading by Huck et al. 2011). The criticism of extrapolating insights from 
observed behavior of participants in lab experiments (most of whom are stu-
dents) to corporate behavior cannot be leveled when thinking about consumer 
behavior because students are typically consumers in many markets. Addition-
ally, the paternalism argument has less bite in consumer protection contexts 
because consumer protection law specifically aims at protecting consumers 
where they cannot protect themselves. Finally, that behavioral antitrust makes 
welfare analysis impossible is not a convincing argument against behavioral 
antitrust per se. On the one hand, where one needs to predict agents’ behavior 
in markets one should certainly use the best performing model. In contexts 
where “behavioral” models outperform rational choice in predicting peoples’ 
behavior on should use “behavioral” models. On the other hand, even where 
normative inferences are derived from welfare analysis one cannot simply rein-
terpret mistakes people make (e.g. by responding to mere framing) as revealed 
preferences. Such a procedure would turn welfare analysis uninformative about 
agents’ well-being. Clinging to uninformative welfare analysis just because it is 
possible boils down to ignoring the problem. In fact the argument that behav-
ioral antitrust renders welfare analysis impossible merely urges the discipline of 
economics to meet the challenge of constructing welfare under endogenous 
preferences (Morell 2011 for more detail).   
 We predict psychological switching costs on the basis of cumulative 
prospect theory (CPT). Our experiment sets up a minimal rebate paradigm 
focusing on the very essentials. We do not use any factor, which improves the 
psychological attractiveness of a rebate beyond the pure conditional monetary 
payoff structure. We pursue this minimal rebate paradigm to generate reliable 
evidence that indeed the mere payoff structure suffices to generate the ob-
served effects.   
From the three experiments reported in Chapter II we conclude that 
loyalty rebates lead to non-rational buying behavior, amounting to an addition-
al psychological switching cost that can cause substantial financial losses for 
consumers. This effect increases the potential of loyalty rebates to be used as a 
tool to foreclose markets and provides an argument for a more restrictive posi-
tion towards loyalty rebates under consumer protection law. Previous argu-
ments and rulings concerning the regulation of loyalty rebates under antitrust 
law both in the EU and in the US were mainly based on the assumption of 
rational buying. Stickiness effects add to these existing problems. Therefore the 
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potential danger of loyalty rebates has been underestimated. The demonstrated 
stickiness effect backs the role psychological effects already play in European 
antitrust law today. It generally supports the greater scrutiny loyalty rebates 
have recently been subject to both in the EU and the US. Our results have 
been cited and confirmed by Bruttel (2013).  
 
Chapter III goes beyond the standard law and economics approach of answer-
ing a legal question employing methods from economics. It illustrates that the 
reverse direction of inspiration is possible too. This chapter deals with “guilt 
aversion”, a theory postulating second order beliefs to induce action (Battigalli 
& Dufwenberg, 2007; Charness & Dufwenberg, 2006). The paper answers the 
question whether second order beliefs induce action stronger across low social 
distance than across large social distance. This question is genuinely economic. 
It arises from a branch of literature postulating and testing second order belief 
dependent preferences with mixed empirical results. The lab-career of guilt 
aversion started promising (Charness & Dufwenberg, 2006) further tests of the 
theory of guilt aversion in the lab led to mixed results. Vanberg (2008) con-
ducted a dictator game experiment where he does not observe any causal effect 
of second order beliefs on action. Reuben et al. (2009) conduct an experiment 
in which they elicit investors’ beliefs in a trust game and report them to trustees. 
They do find evidence in favor of guilt aversion. Ellingsen et al. (2010) conduct 
a series of dictator game and investment game experiments where receivers 
report their beliefs on the amount sent to the experimenter and the experi-
menter reports these beliefs to the senders, inducing second order beliefs. They 
find evidence that second order beliefs do not determine action but that ac-
tions induce second order beliefs. Lately even prominent promoters of guilt 
aversion, Charness and Dufwenberg (2010), merely found “limited support” 
for guilt aversion. And finally, in a trust game with an investor, a trustee, and 
two inactive players Bellemare et al. (2011) found trustees to have a positive 
willingness to pay to avoid guilt vis-à-vis the investor only. At first glance, the 
literature could lead the reader to believe that the correlation between second 
order beliefs and actions is an instable phenomenon that tends to be revealed 
as a confound – either with a preference to keep a promise (Vanberg, 2008) or 
with a (false) consensus effect (Ellingsen et al., 2010). 
Here legal thinking facilitated fruitful amendments of economic theory. The 
literature of guilt aversion has been applied to answer the question why people 
hold promises to a stranger. Lawyers have been immensely interested in why 
and when people hold promises because in legal history the moral obligation of 
holding a promise in canon (i.e. religious) law an important root of modern 
continental contract law. Lawyers have long seen promises to change the rela-
tionship (mostly and vaguely understood as a complex set of norms an indi-
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vidual perceives to connect her to another person) between people. Lawyers 
do speak of “contractual relationships” and mean what they say when using 
the term relationship. In Germany many obligations US law treats under torts 
have been reinforced by moving them into contracts by arguing contractual 
parties would assume a special obligation to care for they partner’s private in-
terests. This focus on relationship facilitates seeing the significance of social 
closeness in the existing economic literature triggering the theoretical amend-
ments and the experimental test set out in chapter III. Re-analyzing the exper-
iments against this legal backdrop with regard to the intensity of the relation-
ship between subjects reveals the hunch that indeed experiments using a pro-
tocol that allows for social closeness generate results in favor of guilt aversion 
while those experiments using a protocol of anonymity do not (see Charness 
and Dufwenberg (2006), Reuben et al. (2009), Bellemare et al. (2011) on the on 
hand and Vanberg (2008), Ellingsen et al. (2010) Charness and Dufwenberg 
(2010) on the other). 
I assess the impact of social closeness on guilt aversion in a dictator game by 
systematically varying it using a minimal group paradigm. I find that indeed in 
interactions between members of the same group second order beliefs induce 
action more strongly that in interactions of members of different groups.  
My findings are relevant for long studied unresolved questions: They suggest 
that people may keep unenforceable promises because the promise establishes 
a closer relationship between the parties. This may reconcile or amend the two 
competing explanations discussed in the literature so far (Gary Charness & 
Dufwenberg, 2006; Vanberg, 2008). Maybe it is not astonishing that the sole 
other paper proposing a similar two step mechanism of promise keeping was 
co-authored by a lawyer-economist. 
My results also suggest that different levels of second order beliefs alone can-
not explain ingroup favoritism (Güth, Ploner, & Regner, 2009; Ockenfels & 
Werner, n.d.). Rather second order beliefs matter more in ingroup interactions. 
My main finding that shared identity induces the influence of second order 
beliefs on action explains why guilt aversion has been rejected in anonymous 
experiments while it has been confirmed in experiments allowing for some 
form of relationship between participants. Thereby it structures the so far in-
conclusive literature on guilt aversion, contradicts conclusions that guilt aver-
sion has been rejected in its entirety (Ellingsen, Johannesson, Tjøtta, & 
Torsvik, 2010), and specifies the realm of application of guilt aversion to social 
interaction across small social distance.  
 
 
In chapter IV I exploit a different trait of legal scholarship to inspire econom-
ic reasoning. Some consider law to be more of an artisanry than a science. 
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Chapter IV exploits the advantages of legal artisanry for economic science to 
produce insights beyond the scope of contemporary economic theory. Eco-
nomic literature has investigated in why and when economic agents organize in 
partnerships splitting the proceeds earned. With the notable exception of 
Bornstein et al. (2002, 2008) they ignored the question of oligopolistic pricing 
of these partnerships. And even Bornstein et al. ignored crucial features of 
oligopolistic competition of partnerships. For a legal artisan these features are 
obvious because they characterize the oligopolistic competition between elite 
law firms. This provided the motivation of an experiment that consciously 
goes beyond testing existing theory because no theory predicted our treatment 
manipulations to make any difference. But the professional hunch of a legal 
artisan let these manipulations seem promising.  
Agents in economic models are typically modeled as monolithic decision mak-
ers. While this is a useful simplifying assumption, it is in contrast with the ob-
servation that many real world economic decisions are made by groups or 
teams. Boards of directors determine the behavior of firms, and self-monitored 
profit-sharing teams characterize many industries for artistic and professional 
services, e.g., lawyers, consultants, or music bands.  
Modeling economic agents as teams is important because team dynamics and 
decisions, and subsequently the outcomes of inter-team interactions and mar-
kets in which teams operate, can be crucially influences by the teams’ internal 
organization. In this paper we experimentally study how team’s internal organ-
ization, operationalized as the way profits are divided among team members, 
affects the unfolding of duopoly Bertrand competitions.  
Suppose that a state agency wishes to sue a construction company, claiming 
back aid granted for the construction of a power plant. The state decides to 
auction off the mandate in a public procurement auction, where the applicant 
who submits the lowest asking price wins the auction. Applicants need to bring 
in expertise in dispute resolution because it is a court case; the embeddedness 
of the case in the energy sector requires expertise in energy law; and finally the 
core of the case certainly lies in the law of state aid. Since such a wide array of 
qualifications is beyond the scope of any single lawyer, a team of lawyers sub-
mits a joint tender, competing against other teams, and the team with the low-
est asking price wins the project and is paid its asking price. 
A straightforward way to model the pricing decision in the above scenario is to 
assume that each expert in the team states a personal asking price and the joint 
bid is the sum of these asking prices. Clearly, team members have a joint inter-
est in winning the project by asking for prices that are lower, in sum, than 
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those of the competitors. However, depending on the way profits are divided 
among members of the winning team, they can also have conflicting interests; 
given the public good flavor of low joint bids, if team members  receive their 
own personal bids when the team wins, then each one would prefer her team-
mates to bid low while bidding high herself to maximize her profits. 
We consider two ways of dividing profits among members of the winning team 
in a Bertrand price competition: (1) each member of the winning team receives 
her personal asking price; and (2) each member of the winning team receives 
the average personal asking prices in the team (an equal share of the team’s 
profit). It is clear that the internal conflict within the team is pronounced in (1) 
and absent in (2). Relating these two incentive structures to the example above 
and to real teams in the legal domain, two (stylized) types of competitors can 
apply to take the mandate: consortia and partnerships. Both consortia and partner-
ships are composed of a number of lawyers, each with one of the required 
specializations. In a consortium it is common that each lawyer fixes her own 
hourly rate, and is paid – in case the consortium gets the mandate – according 
to this rate. On the other hand, in partnerships the usual practice is that all 
partners agree on identical hourly rates for all partners, and some even place 
yearly profits in a pot to be distributed equally or at least at fixed ratios among 
all partners at the end of the year.  
We experimentally examine both homogeneous duopolies composed of either 
two consortia or two partnerships, and heterogeneous duopolies composed of 
one consortium and one partnership. Additionally, we vary the transparency of 
the profit sharing arrangements, i.e., whether team members have information 
about the profit sharing method of the other team or not. In summary, our 
results show that (1) Homogenous consortia markets yield substantially higher 
prices than homogeneous partnership markets, both when profit sharing ar-
rangements are transparent and when they are intransparent. (2) When profit 
sharing arrangements are transparent, prices in heterogeneous markets are as 
low as prices in homogenous partnership markets. (3) When profit sharing 
arrangements are intransparent, prices in heterogeneous markets are (almost) 
as high as prices in homogenous consortia markets. (4) Transparency of profit 
sharing arrangements leads to higher prices in homogeneous markets but to 
lower prices in heterogeneous markets. 
Our results can assist teams in forming preferences about their own profit 
sharing rule and transparency policy and about the types of markets they 
choose to compete in, as well as inform market regulators in the design of 
trading institutions (as all determinants of price levels are relevant for the effi-
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cient distribution of goods) or in forecasting (tacit) collusion, which is usually 
thought of as being attained by coordination on prices, but may also be at-
tained by coordination on less competitive internal structures. 
In the next section we relate our work to existing literature. Then we present 
our experimental design and procedures. Subsequently we derive testable hy-
potheses. Section four presents the results of the experiment. Section five con-
cludes the paper and provides recommendations for market participants and 
policy makers. 
 
So while chapter II represents an example of the well-established interdiscipli-
nary cooperation between law and economics where law turns to economics in 
search of answers to legal questions, chapter III and IV represent examples of 
economic research guided by legal knowledge or intuition. 
 
Chapter II is a joint paper together with Andreas Glöckner and Emanuel Tow-
figh. Chapter IV is a joint paper with Michael Kurschilgen and Ori Weisel. My 
contributions to the two papers are as represented in the following table.   
 
 
Table I: Personal contribution to co-authored Chapters  
 Chapter II Chapter IV 
Idea  Leading  Leading  
Experimental Design  Leading  Proportional 
Hypotheses  Leading Leading 
Literature Review  Leading Leading 
Data Collection  Proportional Leading  
Data Analysis  Proportional  Proportional 
Writing  Leading  Leading 
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II. Sticky Rebates: Loyalty Rebates Impede Rational 
Switching of Consumer 
 
1. Introduct ion 
Loyalty consumer rebates are omnipresent. The average US household is re-
ported to participate in 6.2 loyalty programs (Dreze & Nunes 2011). Many of 
these loyalty programs imply a conditional element. Retailers (e.g., Best Buy, 
Anson’s, Peek & Cloppenburg), hotel chains, and airlines offer discounts, pref-
erential service, premiums, or extra bonus miles conditional on the consumer 
purchasing a certain minimum per year. This paper shows that these condi-
tional loyalty rebates are prone to creating psychological switching costs in 
consumers, rendering them a potential threat to competition.  
The consumer loyalty rebates treated here (also referred to as ‘target rebate’ or 
‘all unit discount’) are based on the following mechanism: A firm grants a sig-
nificant price reduction on all units bought during a certain reference period if 
within that reference period the customer reaches a certain target in purchases 
close to his total demand. Thereby, the target is framed as a goal the consumer 
aims for. A couple of years ago, Lufthansa, the largest German airline, offered 
its customers a particularly clean example of a consumer loyalty rebate scheme. 
Customers received a discount (i.e., further bonus miles) on all purchases with-
in a year (i.e., reference period), if they reached a threshold close to their ex-
pected demand during that year.1 The first sentence Lufthansa wrote to its 
customers when introducing the new conditional rebate was: “Dear Mr./Mrs. 
X, do you know the marvelous feeling of having reached a goal you set your-
self?” In the current paper we investigate whether loyalty rebates that induce 
consumers to adopt such goals, be they imposed or self-set, pose a threat to 
competition by imposing additional switching costs. Specifically, as explained 
in detail below it can be expected on theoretical grounds that goals shift refer-
ence points upwards so that foregoing the rebate is perceived as a loss. Ac-
cording to Prospect Theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979, details below), this 
should make individuals more reluctant to switch to a different supplier due to 
                                                
1 Here, heterogeneity of consumers posed a serious problem for setting a uni-
fied threshold close to expected demand, which Lufthansa solved by inciting 
consumers to set their own target for the year to come. Other suppliers solve 
the same problem by offering several targets that yield increasing rebates. 
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loss aversion, leading to a psychological increased switching cost. The switch-
ing cost can ultimately have detrimental effects on competition, which should 
be taken into account in the legal assessment and regulation of rebates. There 
is empirical evidence, for instance, that an airline dominating a hub airport can 
use frequent flyer programs to foreclose smaller but equally efficient competi-
tors from the market (Lederman 2007). The psychological switching costs that 
target rebates generate could reinforce or even cause this effect. The potential 
of target rebates to inefficiently foreclose markets makes loyalty programs a 
potential issue of antitrust law prohibiting dominant firms to abuse their mar-
ket power (Sec. 2 Sherman Act [ShA] and Art. 102 Treaty on the Functioning 
of the European Union [TFEU]). One may furthermore consider action under 
consumer protection laws, as the described psychological switching cost is to 
the detriment of consumers.  
The relevance of non-rational behavior in competition has been vividly dis-
cussed in the antitrust community under the label “behavioral antitrust”: Retail 
price maintenance (Tor & Rinner 2011) merger control (Stucke 2007; Reeves 
& Stucke 2011) and market entry (Tor 2002) for example, have been reevaluat-
ed using insights from behavioral economics. This new direction of research 
received a lot of attention and support (see, e.g., a special issue of Competition 
Policy International in 2010; the conference web site 
http://behavioralantitrust.acle.nl; the speech by Federal Trade Commissioner 
Rosch, 2010), but it was also criticized for applying insights derived from a 
student subject pool to firm behavior, for pursuing a paternalistic agenda, and 
for making welfare analysis impossible  (Werden, Froeb, & Shor 2011).  
The most promising applications of behavioral antitrust have dealt with con-
sumer behavior. Replacing a standard demand function with a more realistic 
model of consumer behavior often leads to very different predictions in situa-
tions highly relevant to antitrust (see the survey report to the British Office of 
Fair Trading by Huck et al. 2011). The criticism of extrapolating insights from 
observed behavior of participants in lab experiments (most of whom are stu-
dents) to corporate behavior cannot be leveled when thinking about consumer 
behavior because students are typically consumers in many markets. Addition-
ally, the paternalism argument has less bite in consumer protection contexts 
because consumer protection law specifically aims at protecting consumers 
where they cannot protect themselves. Finally, that behavioral antitrust makes 
welfare analysis impossible is not a convincing argument against behavioral 
antitrust per se. On the one hand, where one needs to predict agents’ behavior 
in markets one should certainly use the best performing model. In contexts 
where “behavioral” models outperform rational choice in predicting peoples’ 
behavior on should use “behavioral” models. On the other hand, even where 
normative inferences are derived from welfare analysis one cannot simply rein-
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terpret mistakes people make (e.g. by responding to mere framing) as revealed 
preferences. Such a procedure would turn welfare analysis uninformative about 
agents’ well-being. Clinging to uninformative welfare analysis just because it is 
possible boils down to ignoring the problem. In fact the argument that behav-
ioral antitrust renders welfare analysis impossible merely urges the discipline of 
economics to meet the challenge of constructing welfare under endogenous 
preferences (Morell 2011 for more detail).  
Rebates are high on the agenda of competition policy both in the US and the 
EU. In both jurisdictions, a tendency is emerging to consider the psychology 
of buying behavior in practice.   
US Courts used to take a rather lenient position towards loyalty rebates, in 
particular if they only concerned one product (see, for example, the case Con-
cord Boat v. Brunswick). Although single product rebates long seemed to be legal 
per se, recent cases like AMD vs. Intel or ZF Meritor vs. Eaton have shown that 
conditional rebates can lead to expensive settlements or even to antitrust liabil-
ity under Sec. 2 Sherman Act. American Courts start to worry about the poten-
tial of conditional rebates to serve as substitutes for exclusive dealing arrange-
ments and to foreclose markets inefficiently.  
Even though we are not aware of any US antitrust decision or opinion explicit-
ly referring to any psychological state of mind, we understand the Supreme 
Court’s distinction between ‘sophisticated’ and ‘unsophisticated’ consumers to 
point into a similar direction. Information cost can be both, organizational or 
cognitive. And psychological effects contribute greatly to cognitive costs of 
information. In Kodak, the Supreme Court treats behavior of unsophisticated 
consumers to be relevant insofar as it affects markets. Consumers who are 
prone to experience psychological switching costs could just be categorized as 
a subtype of unsophisticated consumers. 
Even in the single product case, European antitrust authorities have long been 
concerned about detrimental effects of loyalty rebates generating a discontinui-
ty in the pricing function that may cause a ‘suction effect’ (see below). But on 
top of these effects conditional rebates may have on rational buyers, European 
Authorities now worry about the “weak psychological position” rebates place 
buyers in (COMP/E-2/36.041/PO — Michelin, no. 224, a case concerning 
small professional buyers). For both, the standard and the psychological rea-
sons, the European Commission and the European Courts have suppressed 
loyalty and target rebates with a target close to total demand per se if they were 
applied by a dominant company unless their reference period was shorter than 
three months (Hoffmann-LaRoche v. Commission; Michelin v. Commission I.; British 
Airways v. Commission; Michelin v. Commission II.; Tomra v. Commission; Intel v. 
Commission). For the future, the European Commission included rebates among 
its enforcement priorities under Art. 102 TFEU (DG Competition 2005; Eu-
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ropean Commission 2009). Furthermore, in case the European Commission is 
correct in that loyalty rebates even put professional buyers in a weak psycho-
logical position, this should suggest that these rebates offered to consumers 
should a fortiori raise consumer protection concerns.  
The current paper seeks to provide empirical data for the key questions wheth-
er individuals indeed stick to loyalty rebate schemes, even when switching to 
an outside option (a competitor’s product) yields a higher expected payoff and 
less risk. It also intends to ascertain which factors influence the degree to 
which rebates create a psychological switching cost. 
For this purpose, we investigate the influence of loyalty rebates on consumers’ 
purchasing behavior. Applying Cumulative Prospect Theory (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1992) as a candidate model of consumer behavior, we predict and 
find that conditional loyalty rebates induce a psychological switching cost. By 
means of these switching costs, conditional rebates are a potential tool for inef-
ficient market foreclosure and may directly harm consumers. With regard to 
antitrust law and to consumer protection law, our findings provide an argu-
ment to intensify the scrutiny rebates are subject to. 
 
2. Effe c t s  o f  Loyal ty  Rebates 
Generally target rebates raise competition concerns because they create switch-
ing costs. Starting in the framework of rational choice theory we will first ex-
plain how these switching costs arise and how they can lead to detrimental 
effects on competition. Then we will explain what additional concerns they 
raise if psychological switching costs are considered.  
2.1 Predictions of Rational Choice Theory 
From a perspective of rational choice theory (RCT), rebates generate 
switching costs. If a rebate is granted under the condition of exclusivity, sourc-
ing parts of one’s demand from a competitor means foregoing the rebate. 
Switching therefore comes at a cost. To be attractive, a competitor’s offer has 
to outweigh these costs.  
This switching cost is higher per unit if the rebate is effectively distrib-
uted only over a small part of demand because either the rest of demand has 
already been sourced from the incumbent or because the rest will be sourced 
from the incumbent for sure (assured base of sales). This phenomenon some-
times has been coined “suction effect”: The more you have bought the more 
attractive the rebate — because the full rebate now strongly reduces the price 
of the small remaining volume of purchases (OECD, 2002; European Com-
mission, 2009).  
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A rebate’s suction effect also may increase as a function of completed 
purchases if there is uncertainty about the instances of buying opportunities. 
Purchases may reduce uncertainty about whether a buyer will actually get the 
rebate. Imagine the buyer may have two purchasing opportunities, each arising 
with 50% probability and reaching the rebate requires buying at both. Then at 
the outset the probability of reaching the rebate will be 25% (50% × 50%). 
Once the first purchase has been made the probability will be 50%. This may 
reinforce the “suction effect” and thus increase switching costs.   
Switching costs are not a problem per se. But they may lead to inefficient fore-
closure under certain market conditions. In analogy to exclusive dealing 
agreements (Gual et al. 2005) foreclosure by conditional rebates may for in-
stance require uncertainty about the entrant’s costs. If then the incumbent uses 
rebates to extract a “market entrance fee” from the entrant and if he calibrates 
the fee to the expected costs of an entrant some entrants may be efficient in 
principle but not efficient enough to afford the entrance fee. Thereby these 
efficient entrants are foreclosed (Bolton & Aghion, 1987). Also large econo-
mies of scale can enable inefficient foreclosure by rebates. Economies of scale 
may make entry impossible unless the entrant captures enough buyers to reach 
an efficient scale. Exclusive dealing agreements as well as target rebates can 
induce coordination failure among buyers preventing the entrant from reach-
ing the efficient scale and ultimately preventing efficient entry (Rasmusen et al. 
1991, Bernheim & Whinston 1998). Finally the European Commission (2009) 
has proposed a test that identifies an assured base of sales (“non contestable 
share”), which the competitor cannot realistically tackle as a condition to suc-
cessfully foreclose a market with the help of rebates.  
Common to all these approaches of modeling potential harmful effects 
of rebates is the strategic use of switching costs (penalty, foregoing a discount, 
forgoing very low prices), which the incumbent controls.  
2.2. Predictions of Cumulative Prospect Theory 
We argue that from a behaviorally informed perspective, namely from 
the perspective of Cumulative Prospect Theory (CPT; Tversky & Kahneman, 
1992), the switching costs of rebates should, however, go beyond the effects 
described so far on the basis of RCT. On top of the switching costs predicted 
by rational choice, rebates should also create psychological switching costs. In 
the approach of Bolton and Aghion (1987) higher, unpredicted psychological 
switching costs would unintendedly increase the entrance fee and lead to even 
more inefficient foreclosure. In the Commission’s framework psychological 
switching costs by which customers refrain from switching to a competitor 
although he does make attractive offers may stabilize a non-contestable share. 
While additional psychological switching costs will be relevant in most models 
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on rebates, in this paper we look at switching costs in isolation. Subsequent 
work may integrate what we find into market models. 
CPT is a theory that applies to decisions under risk. In fact rebates 
place buyers into a situation of risk. Commonly buyers cannot predict with 
precision whether they will reach the rebate target or not. Accordingly with 
some probability they may pay a high and with some other probability they will 
pay a low price. Buying outside a rebate scheme at a constant price per unit 
eliminates this risk. But it may increase the expected price in return. A rational 
risk neutral buyer would certainly switch out of a rebate scheme if the outside 
option offered a higher expected payoff. If the rational agent was also risk 
averse – as it is commonly assumed and found in reality (Holt & Laury, 2002) 
– he would have an additional reason to leave the rebate. In contrast, for a 
certain parameter space CPT would predict that even if the outside option 
offers lower risk and higher expected payoff, a buyer would keep buying in the 
rebate scheme. We will refer to this as the stickiness effect of rebates. Our exper-
iment will test these opposed predictions of RCT on the one and CPT on the 
other hand.  
According to CPT, rebates should induce irrational stickiness of con-
sumers due to reference point shifts – on top of the issues already discussed in 
the literature. Preferences should depend on reference points, which are influ-
enced by hopes (Thaler, 1985; Tversky & Kahneman, 1981; Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1979), goals (Heath, Larik, & Wu, 1999), and expectations (Abeler, 
Falk, Götte, & Huffmann, 2009). Buyers will hope to reach the rebate and 
adopt reaching the rebate threshold as their goal. Hence, they will consider a 
failure to reach the rebate as a loss. In the loss frame, individuals usually seek 
risk (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) and are therefore likely to prefer the risky 
option (i.e., stay in the rebate) over a safe outside option with equal expected 
value or even a higher expected value (i.e. purchase the outside option at a 
constant price).  
Using standard parameters and assuming that the rebate payoff is 
adopted as the reference point, in Appendix A we formally derive from CPT 
the prediction that irrational stickiness should be observed for all rebates for 
which not reaching the rebate is sufficiently likely (i.e., the probability of reach-
ing the rebate must be smaller than 76%; see the fourfold pattern of risk atti-
tudes, Tversky & Kahneman, 1992; see also Schmidt & Zank, 2008; Glöckner 
& Pachur, 2012). Furthermore, stickiness should increase with increasing mag-
nitude of the rebate, that is, the difference between the overall payoffs for 
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reaching vs. not reaching the rebate. Finally, when taking into account individ-
ual differences, stickiness should increase with increasing loss aversion.2 
2.3 Previous Findings 
 The predictive power of CPT for decision behavior has been supported 
by ample evidence using student participants (e.g., Glöckner & Betsch, 2008; 
Glöckner & Pachur, 2012; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Tversky & Kahneman, 
1992), but also using representative samples of the Dutch population (Booij, 
Van Praag, & Van de Kuilen, 2010) and “in the wild” (e.g., Camerer, 2005). 
However, some limitations have also been demonstrated: Using a critical prop-
erty approach, it has, for instance, been shown that CPT cannot account for 
several systematic effects in three-outcome gambles (Birnbaum, 2006, 2008a, 
2008b). Recent research also indicates that some effects predicted by CPT dis-
appear in decisions from experience (e.g., Erev, Ert, & Yechiam, 2008; 
Hertwig, Barron, Weber, & Erev, 2004; Hilbig & Glöckner, 2011). Further-
more, process analysis indicates that CPT should not be considered to be a 
process model for decision-making (Glöckner & Herbold, 2011). Nevertheless, 
many findings, including the ones mentioned above, suggest that CPT is a rea-
sonable paramorphic (as-if) model for choices in two-outcome prospects with 
stated probabilities, such as the ones considered in this paper. 
In contrast to the large literature on CPT, only a certain branch of marketing 
research has contributed specifically to empirically exploring the effect of re-
bates (Dreze & Nunes 2004; Nunes & Dreze 2006a; Nunes & Dreze 2006b; 
Kivetz, Urminsky, & Zheng 2006; Wirtz et al. 2007). This literature concen-
trates on optimizing loyalty programs. It lacks contributions showing what the 
minimum rebate design is that still can impede rational switching and imple-
ment substantial psychological switching costs. Our experiment sets up a min-
imal rebate paradigm focusing on the very essentials. We do not use any factor, 
which improves the psychological attractiveness of a rebate beyond the pure 
conditional monetary payoff structure. Given the results from the management 
                                                
2 It should be noted that behavioral effects that go beyond what is captured in 
CPT, such as routine effects (Betsch, 2005; Betsch, Brinkmann, Fiedler, & 
Breining, 1999; Betsch, Haberstroh, Glöckner, Haar, & Fiedler, 2001), sunk 
cost effects (Arkes & Blumer, 1985), or cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1957; 
Shultz & Lepper, 1996), might contribute to stickiness effects as well. We will 
focus our investigation on predictions by CPT, because of its prominence and 
because, in contrast to the other models, it is sufficiently well specified in 
mathematical terms to allow predicting choice behavior very accurately also on 
the individual level (Glöckner & Pachur, 2012). However, we partially take into 
account these effects to construct strong hypotheses for a critical test of CPT. 
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literature, our rebate scheme should have a hard time to seduce any participant 
not to maximize her expected payoffs. We pursue this minimal rebate para-
digm to generate reliable evidence that indeed the mere payoff structure suffic-
es to generate the observed effects.   
One sole experiment was conducted specifically to feed into the antitrust law 
and economics of rebates. It demonstrated non-rational attraction effects of 
loyalty rebates (Beckenkamp & Maier-Rigaud, 2006). For simulated retail mar-
kets, Beckenkamp and Maier-Rigaud showed that subjects stuck to a loyalty 
rebate scheme, even if maximizing the expected payoff suggested otherwise. 
Although this previous work was important, it addressed relatively complex 
decisions in retail markets only and had some further limitations that we would 
like to overcome in the current study.  
Regarding theory, Beckenkamp and Maier-Rigaud do not account for the mu-
tual offsetting effects of the value function and probability weighting function 
of CPT when deriving their hypothesis. And in their experiment, subjects in 
fact had to solve a newsvendor problem (see Khouja, 1999, for a survey), 
which most subjects must have considered extremely difficult to do. Because 
subjects started out in a rebate scheme by default, they may have stayed loyal 
merely because they wanted to avoid any decision (including the decision to 
switch) in a situation they felt they did not oversee.  
Our approach differs in four crucial respects from that of Beckenkamp 
and Maier-Rigaud. First, we focus on consumer decisions in contrast to retailer 
decisions; second, like many consumer environments our experimental tasks 
are simple, transparent, and easy to grasp and solve; third, we investigate fac-
tors possibly influencing the magnitude of the effect based on predictions of 
CPT; fourth, in our task consumers themselves decided whether to enter the 
rebate or not so that the rebate was not preset as a default.  
 
3. General  Method and Hypotheses  
In three experiments with a total number of 175 participants we inves-
tigate experimentally whether stickiness can be empirically observed and 
whether its size can be experimentally influenced. We therefore manipulate the 
realization of expected demand affecting the relative attractiveness of the re-
bate scheme vis-à-vis an outside option. We further manipulate the magnitude 
of the rebate (e.g., overall 10 € rebate instead of 5 € rebate) and investigate the 
influence of mere buying frequency in the rebate scheme (e.g., buying 10 in-
stead of 5 objects), while holding the differences in total payoffs (rebate magni-
tude) constant. We thereby stripped down the design to the very essentials of a 
consumer loyalty rebate scheme setting. In analogy to the abovementioned 
Lufthansa example, the situation we aim to capture is the following: a consum-
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er has the possibility to enter a loyalty rebate scheme for a product he intends 
to buy repeatedly in a certain time period. If he reaches the imposed3 target 
(e.g., buying 10 items), the rebate will be granted for all items bought and the 
overall price will be extremely low; if he does not reach the target, however, 
the rebate will not be granted and the price will be high. The price of the out-
side option is between these two prices. After some time, a random event (“ex-
ternal shock”) decreases the likelihood that he or she can reach the target, so 
that it becomes rational to switch. We measure whether persons switch or stick 
to the rebate. 
We realize this by consecutive buying decisions (rounds) concerning to-
kens connected by a rebate condition. Two chance moves that can lead to the 
omission of the critical round and of the last round represent the uncertainty 
about consumers’ demands. The critical round is omitted with a certain proba-
bility. Options are constructed so that according to RCT people should switch 
to a safe outside option if the critical round is omitted. The chance move in the 
last round is necessary to maintain uncertainty about consumers’ demand even 
after the consumer has learned whether the critical round takes place. We ma-
nipulate the number of repetitions (rounds) of buying and the magnitude of 
the rebate granted as between subjects’ conditions. 
In the experiments, we use rebate schemes with a sufficiently high 
probability for not reaching the rebate (after the critical round was omitted). 
As explained above, and as shown in Appendix A, CPT predicts: 
Stickiness Hypothesis (H1): subjects who have consistently bought tokens up to the 
critical round do not exit the rebate scheme even if exit yields a higher expected pay-
off.  
Beyond investigating the mere existence of the stickiness effect, we 
were interested whether CPT can also predict its severity. We thereby con-
structed our material to test two further hypotheses, including manipulations 
for which an effect was predicted and one for which a null-effect was predict-
ed. The second manipulation was also selected to test an assumption underly-
ing core arguments recently used in the regulation of rebates. 
                                                
3 In the experiment we do not face the difficulty of heterogeneous consumer 
demand because we can induce it. As we did not want to study the effect of a 
self-imposed target but that of the essential features of a target rebate we did 
not let subjects chose their target but imposed it. If anything, imposing the 
target should work against our hypothesis because participants could be ex-
pected to be more reluctant to regard an imposed target as their goal than they 
would to regard a self-set goal as their target.  
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According to CPT, the stickiness effect should increase with increasing 
difference between the total payoffs of reaching vs. not reaching the rebates 
(see Appendix A). We therefore predict: 
Magnitude Hypothesis (H2): A rebate of larger magnitude leads to greater sticki-
ness.  
 
According to CPT, the stickiness of rebates should mainly depend on 
magnitude, that is, the difference between high and low payoff (see Appendix 
A). It should not be influenced by the mere number of repetitions of previous 
buying. CPT therefore predicts the following null-hypothesis: 
Repetition Null-Hypothesis (H3): The stickiness of rebates does not increase with 
the mere number of repetitions of buying if the magnitude of the rebate is constant. 
Note that this is a strong null hypothesis. Previous findings indicate in-
creased routine effects with repeated buying (Betsch, et al., 2001), which speaks 
against the CPT prediction. Additionally, with more repetitions subjects “in-
vest” more money into the rebate. This may trigger a sunk cost effect (cf. 
Arkes & Blumer, 1985) that also works against the specific CPT prediction. 
This hypothesis is also particularly interesting for practical reasons, because it 
captures the claim by the Court of Justice of the European Union that a longer 
reference period of a loyalty rebate may lead to more market foreclosure (Mich-
elin v. Commission I. no. 82; Michelin v. Commission II. no. 85). Of course, in the 
situations referred to by the Court of Justice of the European Union, the num-
ber of rounds and the differences between total payoffs will most likely be 
confounded. It is nevertheless relevant to differentiate between effects of 
magnitude and repetition. 
4. Exper iment 1:  St i cky Rebates  and Indirec t  Comparison 
4.1 Method 
4.1.1 Participants and Design 
 Participants were recruited from the MPI Decision Lab subject pool 
using ORSEE (Greiner, 2004). The majority of participants were students of 
the University of Bonn, from a wide variety of subject backgrounds. A total of 
64 participants (mean age: 24, 37 female) took part in the 6 sessions. The study 
lasted between 60 and 90 minutes and participants received a performance-
contingent payoff (range: 0.94 € to 17.80 €; approximately USD 1.40 to 26.70)4 
in exchange for their participation. We use a 2 (negative shock on expected 
demand: critical round omitted vs. critical round is played) x 2 (repetition in 
                                                
4 These payoffs include the gains and losses subjects incurred when they chose 
and played the lotteries measuring their risk preferences and loss aversion. 
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buying: low vs. high) x 2 (rebate magnitude: low vs. high) mixed effects design. 
The within subject effect of the shock tests the stickiness hypothesis. The be-
tween subject effects of rebate magnitude and repetition test the hypotheses 
two and three respectively. While all subjects go through both demand shock 
conditions they are randomly assigned to one of the two repetition conditions 
and to one of the two magnitude conditions. 
 
 4.1.2 Procedure  
 First, participants read the experimental instructions and answered a 
control questionnaire (see Appendix for both) to ensure that they had under-
stood the instructions and were able to calculate the possible payoffs. Subjects 
were provided with pocket calculators they could use at any time during the 
entire experiment. The main instructions are given in Appendix B. Payoffs in 
the experiment were stated in Euro. In each round of the experiment, partici-
pants could buy either a rebate token or choose an outside option. In two of 
the rounds (the critical and the last round), however, buying a token was only 
possible with a certain probability, which induced uncertainty about whether a 
person would reach the rebate or not. Persons were informed about the prob-
abilities of both random events, which could turn out positive (i.e., decision 
between token or outside option possible) or negative (i.e., round omitted). 
The critical round took place with a probability of pC = .83. The last round 
took place with a probability of pL = .15. pC and pL were independent and this 
was common knowledge to all subjects. In order to receive the rebate for the 
tokens, the person needed to buy tokens in all but one round. Stated different-
ly, the rebate was still granted if one of the random draws turned out negative 
and the person had bought tokens in all remaining rounds. Hence, the prior 
probability of reaching the rebate was high (pR = pC + (1-pC)pL = .86). Never-
theless, if the critical round did not take place, this probability was reduced 
dramatically to pR
* = pL = .15.  
 The payoffs and probabilities were set in such a way that if the critical 
round was omitted (for a subject who bought tokens in every previous round), 
RCT and CPT would make contrary predictions about staying or quitting the 
loyalty rebate option: the expected payoff for continuing to buy tokens was 
lower than that for choosing the outside option. Hence, RCT predicts rational 
switching to the outside option (see Table 1, second-last row). In contrast, 
CPT predicts a stickiness effect of rebates and continued buying of rebate to-
ken (see Table 1, last row). As the main dependent measure we used buying 
behavior in the round after the random draw determining whether the critical 
round takes place or not. 
 Choice data in the following round was only informative if the critical 
round was indeed omitted. To avoid data loss for cases in which this was not 
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the case, we incorporated a strategy method: Prior to the realization of the 
random event determining whether the critical round would take place or not, 
subjects committed themselves to decisions in both potential states of the 
world, i.e., they decided what they would do if the critical round was omitted 
and what they would do in case it took place. If a round was omitted, it was 
neither possible to choose the outside option nor to buy a token. After it was 
randomly determined whether the critical round took place or not, the buying 
behavior committed to ex ante was implemented automatically. Then partici-
pants continued buying in subsequent rounds. 
 After subjects had gone through the experiment, we elicited risk prefer-
ences and the loss aversion parameter λ using the incentivized scales devel-
oped by Holt and Laury (2002) and Gächter, Johnson, and Herrmann (2007). 
The Holt-Laury scale measures risk aversion by letting subjects choose be-
tween 10 pairs of lotteries. Each pair contains a low-risk lottery yielding 2 € 
with probability π and 1.60 € with probability 1-π and a high-risk lottery yield-
ing 3.85 € and 0.10 € with the same probabilities (π = 0.1, 0.2, … ,1). The 
number of choices for the low-risk lottery is used as a measure for risk aver-
sion. If, for example, a participant chooses the low risk lottery in 7 (out of the 
overall 10) decisions, he has a risk-aversion score of 7 (which refers to a specif-
ic range of relative risk aversion scores; see Holt & Laury, 2002). The Gächter-
Johnson-Herrmann-scale is based on six choices between playing a lottery or 
rejecting it. Each lottery has a fifty-fifty chance of winning 6 € or losing be-
tween 2 and 7 €. For example, if the subject is not willing to play a lottery of-
fering a 50:50 chance of winning 6 € and losing 3 €, it is assumed that the per-
son has a λ > 2.  
 
4.1.3 Material 
In each round, participants had to decide whether to buy a token or to 
select an outside option while being provided with detailed information (Figure 
1). The outside option was to earn 0.44 € per round in which it was chosen. 
For each token they bought, participants received 1.30 € at the end of the ex-
periment. This value represented the consumption utility of the token. De-
pendent on condition, the buying price before the rebate was either 1.10 € or 
1.25 €. Hence, without a rebate, the payoff of the outside option was much 
higher than that of the tokens. If the rebate threshold was reached, however, 
the effective buying price was substantially reduced, so that then the payoff for 
each token was higher than the outside option. We manipulated the number of 
rounds in which tokens could be bought from low (10 rounds) to high (15 
rounds). 
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Figure 1: Information display in the decision tasks. 
 
 
 
 
To make the results comparable between conditions, we held the in-
centives for leaving the rebate scheme after the first random draw, as well as 
the number of remaining rounds after the critical round, constant across condi-
tions. Consequently, in the low repetition condition the critical round was 
Round 5, whereas it was Round 10 in the high repetition condition. Further-
more, for all conditions the difference in expected payoffs for remaining in the 
rebate scheme vs. quitting was held constant (except for small rounding differ-
ences).  
 
 
 
 
Round 3
You can either purchase a token or choose a direct payment.
Rebate: buy at least 
14 tokens
The value of your
tokens is 2.60 €
Exchange price:
1.30 €/token
You have 2
tokens
Your Balance
-2.2 €
Price of token:
1.10 €
Price of token, if rebate is
reached:
0.75 €
Direct payment:
0.44 €
Buy token Don‘t buy token
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Table 1: Manipulations and Expected Payoffs. 
 Rebate Magnitude 
 Low High 
 Repetition in Buying 
 Low High Low High 
Rebate Magnitude in € (after criti-
cal round omitted) 
5.06 5.10 9.05 9.01 
Repetitions in Buying (rounds) 10 15 10 15 
x1 (price per token w/o rebate) 1.10 € 1.10 € 1.25 € 1.25 € 
x2 (price per token with rebate) 0.56 € 0.75 € 0.25 € 0.61 € 
Prospect of staying in rebate (after 
critical round omitted) 
(6.66€; .15; 
1.60€) 
(7.70€; .15; 
2.60€) 
(9.45€; 
.15;.40€) 
(9.66€; 
.15;.65€) 
Prospect of quitting rebate option 
(after critical round omitted) 
(2.56€; .15; 
3.00€) 
(4.00€; .15; 
3.56€) 
(2.40€; .15; 
1.96€) 
(2.65€; .15; 
2.21€) 
EV for staying / quitting in € 2.36/2.63 3.36/3.63 1.76/2.03 2.00/2.28 
CPT V for staying / quitting  
(see Appendix A) 
-6.13/-7.53 -6.17/-7.60 -10.22/-13 -10.18/-12.93 
 
Note. Prospects are given in the format (payoff 1; probability 1; payoff 2). 
 
 
 
 
4.2 Results 
Out of 64 subjects, eleven switched back and forth between the rebate 
and the outside option at least once before the critical round. For these sub-
jects, both RCT and CPT predicted to leave the rebate after the critical round 
was omitted. Four subjects did not buy a token in round one and kept choos-
ing the outside option consistently until the last round. This behavior of avoid-
ing a rebate scheme can be explained by a strong aversion to risk (see Table 3 
below). The remaining 49 subjects (76%), which we will call target persons (be-
cause they are most informative for testing our hypotheses), entered the rebate 
scheme and started buying rebate tokens constantly until the critical round.  
In line with previous findings (e.g., Holt & Laury, 2002), our partici-
pants were mainly risk-averse with an average score of 6.03 (SD=1.79), which 
corresponds to a relative risk aversion of 0.41< r < 0.68. Moreover, the 
Gächter-Johnson-Herrmann-scale showed that the subjects displayed loss 
aversion to a normal degree (λ = 2.18, SD= 0.65; cf. Appendix A). Four per-
sons answered inconsistently (i.e., did not show a unique switching point, but 
switched back and forth between accepting and not accepting) and for them 
no loss-aversion score could be calculated. 
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4.2.1 Stickiness of Rebates 
Our main dependent measure was subjects’ choices after the random 
draw determining whether the critical round took place or not. In case the crit-
ical round had taken place, for target persons it yields a higher expected payoff 
to buy a rebate scheme token than choosing the outside option and CPT 
makes the same prediction. If the critical round is omitted, however, the out-
side option will yield a higher expected payoff and it would be rational to 
switch to the outside option. CPT, by contrast, predicts sticking with the re-
bate. For both situations (i.e., critical round omitted or not), we coded whether 
persons chose the option that maximized their expected payoff (expected value 
/ EV), that is, whether they decided in line with RCT or not. 
The results indicate a stickiness effect. The proportion of EV-
maximizing choices was much higher if the critical round took place as com-
pared to being omitted (Figure 2). In line with the CPT prediction, target per-
sons (Figure 2, left) continued to buy in the rebate even if the critical round 
was omitted and it was EV-maximizing to quit the rebate. The proportion of 
EV-maximizers, if the critical round was not omitted and RCT and CPT made 
the same predictions, is much higher. This difference in proportions turned 
out significant in an Exact McNemar test, χ2df=1 = 30.00, p < .001, N=49, and 
the result is robust to including all non-target subjects into the analysis.5  
Hence, we find strong support for our hypothesis H1, indicating that 
loyalty rebates are sticky. In accordance with the predictions of CPT, our sub-
jects opted for the choice that yielded greater risk and lower expected payoff.  
For the non-target persons (Figure 2, right), it was always rational not 
to buy the token, which the majority of them also did, regardless of whether 
the critical round was omitted or not. There was no significant difference in 
proportions, McNemar χ2df=1 = 2.67, p = .21.  
 
                                                
5 We include them in two ways into the four-cell test matrix of the McNemar 
test (the four cells are: always maximize expected value; maximize if critical 
round is played and not if it is omitted; maximize if critical round is omitted 
and not if it is played; never maximize). First, we included them by their actual 
maximizing behavior (for them, maximizing means not buying in the rebate 
scheme, irrespective of whether the critical round takes place or not). Thereby 
most, but not necessarily all, of them end up in the always maximize cell, 
McNemar test, χ2df=1 = 18.78, p < .0001, N=64. Second, we also included them 
assuming that they had entered the rebate scheme, but counter to our CPT-
Hypotheses had always maximized expected payoffs forcing all of them in the 
always maximize cell, McNemar test scores of χ2df=1 = 30.00, p < .001, N=64. 
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Figure 2: Choices after the critical round. 
 
 
 
4.2.2 Effects of Magnitude and Repetition on Stickiness 
To test our hypotheses H2 and H3, which state that stickiness increases 
with magnitude of the rebate, but not with mere repetition in buying, we ana-
lyzed choice behavior in the critical round separately for the four conditions, 
considering the target persons only (Figure 3). The stickiness effect was found 
in three of four conditions at a conventional and in one condition at a marginal 
level of significance (low magnitude & low repetition: Exact McNemar 
χ2df=1;N=16 = 9.00, p = .004; high magnitude & low repetition: Exact McNemar 
χ2df=1;N=8 = 5.00, p = .062; low magnitude & high repetition: Exact McNemar 
χ2df=1;N=11 = 10.0, p = .002; high magnitude & high repetition: Exact McNemar 
χ2df=1;N=14 = 8.00, p = .008). All results are robust to including the non-target 
subjects under the assumption they had maximized EV if they had entered the 
rebate scheme consistently. Including the non-target subjects according to their 
actual maximizing behavior leads to insignificant results in the high magnitude 
& low repetition condition and renders results in the low magnitude & high 
repetition condition marginally significant (see footnote 5, above). 
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Figure 3: Choices after the critical round by condition. 
 
 
 
For a regression-based analysis, we generated a sticky-buying score. 
The score was set to 1 if the person bought the token after the critical round 
was omitted and 0 otherwise. The score hence indicated whether persons per-
formed sticky-buying (1) or not (0). We conducted a logistic regression6 with 
this sticky-buying score as dependent variable and the two condition variables 
and their interaction as predictors and risk aversion, loss aversion, and gender 
as further control variables (Table 2).  
 
  
                                                
6 We estimated the equation  with logit. A value 
of Y=1 indicated the decision to keep buying in the rebate scheme, Y=0 indi-
cated the decision not to buy in the rebate scheme. The variables X1 to X7 are 
the variables and interactions listed in the regression Table 2. 
εβββ ++++= nn XXY ...110
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Table 2: Three Logistic Regression Models Predicting Stickiness. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Sticky-Buying Sticky-Buying Sticky-Buying 
Repetition high 0.772 1.142 1.141 
(0-no, 1-yes; centered) (1.01) (1.39) (1.19) 
    
Magnitude High -1.194 -1.413+ -1.955* 
(0-no, 1-yes; centered) (-1.59) (-1.77) (-2.06) 
    
IE Repetition*Magn. -2.850+ -3.356* -3.196+ 
 (-1.91) (-2.07) (-1.79) 
    
Gender  -1.576* -2.051* 
(0-female, 1-male)  (-2.28) (-2.53) 
    
Risk Aversion Score   0.280 
(0-10)   (0.79) 
    
Loss Aversion (λ)   -0.522 
   (-0.81) 
    
Constant 0.762* 1.578** 1.273 
 (1.97) (2.86) (0.58) 
Observations 49 49 45 
Pseudo R2 0.108 0.193 0.278 
 
Note. Raw coefficients for a logistic regression on sticky-buying (buying choic-
es after the critical round, i.e., when round 5 or 10 was omitted). Buying indi-
cates stickiness preventing subjects from maximizing expected payoffs. z-
statistics in parentheses. Robust standard errors were used. Model 3 includes 
four observations less due to missing loss-aversion scores. + p < 0.10, * p < 
0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. 
 
 
We find a significant effect of our magnitude manipulation on sticki-
ness. In contrast to the magnitude hypothesis H2, however, stickiness decreas-
es with increasing magnitude of the rebate (see Figure 3) and H2 has to be 
rejected. There was no significant effect of repetition on stickiness that allows 
maintaining the null-hypothesis H3. However, it has to be taken into account 
that the power of the analysis was relatively low (1 - β = .56; assuming: odds-
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ratio = 2, p(Y=1|X=1)H0=.5; two-sided test) (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buch-
ner, 2007). 
We also find a (marginally) significant interaction effect of magnitude 
and repetition, which was not predicted by CPT. High magnitude combined 
with high repetition frequency decreased the stickiness of a rebate and led to 
considerably more rational buying behavior. 
Additionally, we find a significant gender effect. Female subjects were 
more inclined to stick to the rebate than male subjects, once they had entered 
the rebate scheme. Risk aversion and loss aversion had no effect on stickiness 
(after the person entered the rebate), although CPT predicts that increasing 
loss aversion should lead to higher stickiness (see Appendix A).  
4.2.3 Individual Differences in Entering the Rebate 
We were further interested in the question whether there were individ-
ual differences in entering the rebate scheme in the first place, dependent on 
people’s risk aversion and loss aversion. One might expect more risk-averse 
and loss-averse persons to avoid entering rebate schemes altogether in the first 
place. As mentioned above, the large majority of participants entered the re-
bate scheme and bought in it until the critical round (N=49), but there was 
also a minority of persons who avoided the rebate altogether and chose the 
outside option from the beginning (N=4). We found higher risk aversion in 
these rebate avoiders (M=7.2, SE=1.18) compared to target persons (M=5.8, 
SE=0.17), which was marginally significant in a nonparametric test (Mann-
Whitney: p =.07; one-sided). Similarly, rebate avoiders had higher loss aversion 
(M=2.47, SE=0.53) compared to target persons (M=2.17, SE=0.08), which 
was also marginally significant (Mann-Whitney: p =.08; one-sided).  
 
4.3. Discussion 
 As expected, we show that loyalty rebates lead to non-rational sticki-
ness, in that consumers do not switch to outside options with higher payoff 
and lower risk. We did not find support for the magnitude hypothesis and 
there was no significant effect of repetition on stickiness that allows remaining 
the repetition null-hypothesis in line with CPT. We also found an unexpected 
interaction of repetition and magnitude of the rebate.  
 
 One of the potential weaknesses of the first experiment is that we show 
the stickiness effect only as comparison between a situation in which a critical 
round was omitted and one where it was not. Both situations, however, neces-
sarily differ slightly concerning expected payoff and risk, due to the different 
number of rounds played so far. Although we find a stickiness effect, we can-
not completely rule out further unexpected effects of these differences. Hence, 
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there remains some doubt whether the investigated rebate scheme was the sole 
cause of the observed stickiness effect. Therefore, in a second experiment, we 
compare the decision participants take in the experimental rebate scheme (re-
main in rebate vs. exit rebate) with a payoff-equivalent choice between two 
lottery tickets (risky low payoff vs. safe high payoff). In terms of payoffs and 
risk the lottery tickets are exactly equivalent to the respective two options our 
participants have in the rebate scheme (remain in rebate = risky low payoff; exit 
rebate = safe high payoff). If subjects choose the option with high risk and low 
payoff more often in the rebate scheme than in the lottery ticket choice, as we 
expect, we can identify the rebate scheme as the cause for the stickiness effect. As 
the decision in the rebate and the choice between the lottery tickets are equivalent 
in terms of risk and expected payoff, finding a difference between choices in the 
rebate scheme and the lotteries tickets could not be explained by RCT. CPT, how-
ever would predict this difference due to a reference point shift for rebates. 
 
5. Exper iment 2:  St i cky Rebates  in Direc t  Comparisons with 
Gambles  
5.1 Method 
 Participants were mainly students from the University Bonn, again re-
cruited from the MPI Decision Lab subject pool using ORSEE (Greiner, 
2004). We assured that individuals took part in only one of the rebate studies 
reported in this paper. A total of 68 participants (mean age: 24.9, 37 female) 
took part in the experiment. The study lasted between 60 and 90 minutes and 
participants received a performance-contingent payoff (range: 0 € to 29.69 €; 
approximately USD 41.27) in exchange for their participation. Procedure and 
design were essentially the same as in Experiment 1, except that participants 
did additionally choose between risky and safe lottery tickets, which were 
equivalent to the prospects that were involved in their sticky buying decision.  
Table 1 reveals that the choice between staying in a rebate scheme and leaving 
the rebate scheme is essentially a choice between two gambles. Take the treat-
ment with a low rebate magnitude and a low repetition of buying rounds (first 
column of Table 1) as an example. Here staying in the rebate (and consistently 
buying tokens for the remaining rounds) means choosing a risky gamble with a 
lower expected payoff yielding 6.66 € with 15% and 1.60 € with 85% probabil-
ity. Exiting the rebate scheme and never buying a token again means taking a 
less risky gamble with a higher expected payoff yielding 2.56 € with 15% and 3 
€ with 85% probability. In Experiment 2, additionally to buying in the rebate 
scheme participants had to choose one out of two lottery tickets that equaled 
these payoffs (i.e., lottery ticket 1: 6.66 € with 15% and 1.60 € with 85%; lot-
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tery ticket 2: 2.56 € with 15% and 3 € with 85%).  
Both the rebate scheme and the lottery tickets were played and paid. This de-
sign allows for a direct evaluation of the stickiness effect of rebates because 
according to CPT for lotteries no shift in reference point should occur.7 CPT 
predicts stickiness only in the rebate task and not in the choice between lottery 
tickets, whereas RCT would predict equal behavior in both situations. Thus 
Experiment 2 allows us to identify the rebate scheme as the cause of the sticki-
ness effect because the rebate scheme is present in one task and absent in the 
other while the choice between the gambles is identical in the two.  
 
5.2 Results 
 Again, the large majority of participants (i.e., N = 54, p = .79) entered 
the rebate scheme and started buying rebate tokens constantly until the critical 
round. For these target persons, we replicate the stickiness effect, in that the 
proportion of EV-maximizing choices was much higher if the critical round 
took place (p = .96), as compared to being omitted (p = .56), Exact McNemar 
χ2df=1 = 22.00, p < .001, N=54. Again, this result is robust to the inclusion of 
the non-target subjects.8 More importantly, we also find the stickiness effect in 
a direct comparison between persons’ behavior in the rebate scheme and in 
choosing between equivalent lotteries. In equivalent choices mimicking the 
situation after the critical round was omitted, target persons choose the EV-
maximizing, safe outside option in the lotteries (p = .72) significantly more 
often than when buying in the loyalty rebate (p = .56; see above), McNemar 
χ2df=1 = 4.26, p = .039, N= 54. This effect only proves robust to the inclusion 
of non-target subjects under the assumption that they would have always max-
imized if they had entered the rebate, McNemar χ2df=1 = 4.26, p = .039, N= 68. 
 The significant decrease of stickiness with magnitude and the interaction 
of magnitude and repetition could both not be replicated in a logistic regres-
sion that was conducted with the same predictors as before (cf. model 3; Table 
2). However, the coefficients are in the same direction as observed in Experi-
                                                
7 Models of expectation based reference points (Köszegi & Rabin, 2006) may 
also not predict a reference point shift by the lottery, because they assume that 
reference points are based on lagged expectations. But in our setting subjects 
chose immediately after they were presented with the choice between the two 
lotteries tickets.   
8 McNemar χ2df=1 = 16.67, p < .001, N=68 if they are included with their actual 
maximizing behavior; McNemar χ2df=1 = 22.00, p < .001, N=68, if they are in-
cluded under the assumption that they had always maximized had they entered 
the rebate scheme 
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ment 1 (magnitude: b = -.45, z = -0.76, p =0.45; IE magnitude x repetition: b = 
-.50, z = -0.40, p =0.69). The effect of gender on stickiness did not replicate 
either (b = .41, z = 0.70, p =0.48). Also, the differences in risk aversion and 
loss aversion between rebate avoiders (n = 4) and target persons could not be 
replicated, but were both in the previously observed direction (Mann-Whitney: 
for risk aversion p =.48; for loss aversion p = .13; one-sided). 
5.3 Discussion 
 In the second study, we replicate the stickiness effect observed in Exper-
iment 1 and also show that it can be found when directly comparing choices in 
loyalty rebate schemes with choices between equivalent lottery tickets. The 
second experiment is also informative concerning the stability of the other 
observed effects concerning the factors influencing the magnitude of stickiness 
and whether persons enter rebate schemes or not. The effects of these factors 
seem to be relatively weak and potentially unstable and should be interpreted 
with caution. 
 A classic argument in economics is that biases and irrationality in choice 
behavior should disappear in repeated market interactions. According to this 
view, loyalty rebates might be unproblematic because consumers will learn 
over time that they are detrimental and avoid them further on. We investigated 
this possibility and the stability of the stickiness effect in a third experiment. 
 
6. Exper iment 3:  St i ckiness  in Repeated Rebate  Scenar ios 
 In the third experiment, participants could decide whether or not to buy 
in rebate schemes in eight different scenarios. Each of them consisted of ten 
buying trials. As in the real world, the scenarios differed concerning conditions 
of the rebates on the goodness of alternative options. To mimic a common 
situation in reality, we induced uncertainty concerning the alternative option. 
That is, when making the decision whether or not to enter a loyalty rebate 
scheme, no information was provided whether an alternative option available 
later on would be good or bad. Half of the scenarios resembled situations as 
above, in which switching to an outside option was rational (switching scenarios), 
but stickiness should lead to continued buying. The other half were controls in 
which the alternative option appearing later on was bad and it was therefore 
money-maximizing to continue buying in the rebate scheme (non-switching scenar-
ios).  
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6.1 Method 
 Participants were again mainly students from the University Bonn re-
cruited from the MPI Decision Lab subject pool using ORSEE (Greiner, 
2004). A total of 43 participants (mean age: 24.6, 22 female) took part in the 
third experiment, which lasted about 90 minutes. Participants received a per-
formance-contingent payoff (range: 2.34 € to 19.54 €; approximately USD 3.25 
to USD 27.16) in exchange for their participation. The scenarios were manipu-
lated within subjects according to a 2 (switching vs. non-switching scenarios) x 
4 (versions) design. Presentation order was counterbalanced between subjects 
(i.e., eight different orders determined by Latin squares).  
 The procedure within each scenario was similar to that in the previous 
experiments, except that we tried to increase external validity in some respects. 
For 10 rounds, participants could buy the loyalty rebate option A, but rounds 5 
to 10 could all be omitted with a certain probability (e.g., each one of the 
planned buys could be cancelled). The loyalty rebate was granted if option A 
had been bought a certain number of times (i.e., 7 or 9 out of 10 times). It was 
common knowledge that an alternative option B (e.g., competing flight offer) 
would be available later on - but people had no knowledge concerning the 
specificities of this option until then. In each round, participants had the op-
tion to "do nothing", which was connected with a small cost. In the four 
switching scenarios, outcomes were constructed so that quitting the rebate 
scheme and changing to option B was EV-maximizing. Continued buying in 
the rebate, in contrast indicates stickiness. In the non-switching control scenar-
ios, continued buying was rational. We measured stickiness by the number of 
buying decisions for the loyalty rebate option A in the round after option B 
became available. After reading the instructions, all persons worked on a test 
scenario to assure understanding. 
 
6.2 Results and Discussion 
 In the majority of scenarios, participants started buying consistently in 
the rebate scheme (p = .64). Analyses were conducted for these cases only. In 
the switching scenarios, we found a strong stickiness effect. In the round after 
option B became available, almost two thirds of the persons who had entered 
the rebate scheme showed non-rational buying behavior and continued buying 
option A in the rebate scheme (p = .63, SE = .049).9 A similar proportion of 
continued rational buying option A was observed in the non-switching scenar-
ios (p = .65, SE = .068). A Wald test revealed that both proportions did not 
                                                
9 This and all following SEs are cluster corrected at the participant level to ac-
count for the repeated measurement design (Rogers, 1993).  
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differ significantly, F(1, 42) = 0.15, p = 0.70. This indicates a strong stickiness 
effect, and indicates that after entering a rebate scheme, consumer decisions 
seem to be rather uninfluenced by the payoff of the outside option available 
later on. This irrationality, of course, can lead to substantial financial loss.  
 Stickiness did not disappear after repeated buying in rebate schemes. 
Even in the switching scenario presented at the last position, we observed a 
majority of irrational buying (p = .60, SE= .16). Stickiness of loyalty rebates did 
not reduce with increasing experience, as indicated by a logistic regression pre-
dicting irrational buying by presentation order, b = .06, z = 0.68, p = 0.498. 
Hence, in the third experiment, we show the stability of the stickiness effect of 
loyalty rebates and find no support for the hypothesis that non-rationality re-
duces with experience. 
 
7. General  Discuss ion 
Psychological switching cost induced by loyalty rebates is an important 
topic for antitrust law and consumer protection law. However, there was a lack 
of empirical data investigating the effects of such rebates on consumers. Most 
arguments concerning regulation rested on the assumption of buyers who 
maximize expected surplus as implied in the standard rational choice theory 
(RCT). In this paper, we show that loyalty rebates impede rational switching of 
consumers, thereby inducing a psychological switching cost we call stickiness 
effect.  
We report results from three experiments that investigate loyalty re-
bates in comprehensive tasks mirroring the particularities of consumer pur-
chases. We used Cumulative Prospect Theory (CPT) to derive predictions con-
cerning buying behavior in rebates.  
The core finding of this paper is that, in line with CPT predictions, loy-
alty rebates induce a stickiness effect in that they impede customers’ switching 
from the rebate product to better (payoff-maximizing) outside options. Exper-
iment 1 establishes the general finding. Experiment 2 demonstrates the effect 
by comparing choices to continue buying in a rebate scheme to choices be-
tween payoff-equivalent lotteries made by the same persons. Finally, Experi-
ment 3 demonstrates the robustness of the stickiness effect by showing that it 
also holds in somewhat more realistic situations as well as for a medium degree 
of repeated exposure (i.e., over eight times).  
Our experiment was designed to exclude features of a rebate scheme, 
which would cause or reinforce a “suction effect” predicted by RCT (increas-
ing attractiveness or reduction of risk through successive buying). Rather we 
designed the decision task so that any form of maximizing expected payoff 
would predict switching to the outside option (assuming risk neutrality or risk 
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aversion) or no differences between choices in the rebate scheme as compared 
to the equivalent lotteries (Exp. 2). Nonetheless we observe considerable stick-
iness of the rebate in all our three experiments. Therefore we unambiguously 
showed that target rebates can create psychological switching costs that come 
on top of those switching costs, which rebates may create according to RCT.  
Used strategically, therefore, loyalty rebates have an underestimated po-
tential to foreclose markets inefficiently and to harm consumers. The stickiness 
effect seems to be strong and led between roughly half and two third of the 
(target) persons to choose the option with the lower expected value.  
 
7.1 Further findings 
As a side aspect, we also investigated the influence of rebate magnitude 
and buying repetition on the size of the stickiness effect. Overall, the effects of 
rebate magnitude and buying repetition seem to be a bit unstable. In the first 
experiment, stickiness significantly decreases with increasing magnitude of the 
rebate, although CPT predicts the opposite effect. However, the effect could 
not be replicated in the second study. A null-effect of repetition on stickiness 
observed in both Experiments 1 and 2 was in line with CPT predictions. Note, 
however, that the latter cannot be considered clear evidence in favor of the 
theory because the power of the analysis was relatively low. Furthermore, we 
found in both studies that people’s loss aversion had no effect on stickiness. 
CPT would have predicted a positive relation. A gender effect that was ob-
served in Experiment 1—as female participants showed a higher stickiness to 
rebates (even when controlling for differences in risk aversion and loss aver-
sion)—could also not be replicated in a second study. Finally, in the first ex-
periment, we found that individual differences could influence people’s will-
ingness to enter rebate schemes in the first place. Rebate avoiders seem to be 
more risk-averse and loss-averse, compared to persons entering a rebate 
scheme. We observe a similar tendency in Experiment 2, which was, however, 
not significant either. Further research is needed to test these effects. 
 
7.2 Implications for the Regulation of Loyalty Rebates 
The first and most important implication is that loyalty rebates induce a 
stickiness effect in consumers. Rebates generate a non-rational psychological 
switching cost that comes on top of the switching costs considered so far on 
the basis of RCT. The psychological switching costs increase the potential of 
loyalty rebates to inflict substantial harm on consumers because consumers will 
end up with less rent on average than they would end up with in the absence of 
the rebate scheme. The psychological switching costs may also increase the 
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potential of loyalty rebates to foreclose consumer markets to entrants: the en-
trant has to compensate the additional attraction of rebates that we call sticki-
ness by selling his product even more cheaply than he would do otherwise. In 
case the incumbent has market power, it can (ab)use the psychological switch-
ing costs of a rebate scheme to foreclose the market inefficiently to competi-
tors and entrants. The stickiness effect we find therefore provides an argument 
to treat rebates more restrictively both under antitrust law and under consumer 
protection law. 
We found no support for the Court of Justice of the European Union’s 
opinion that a longer reference period that would induce increased repetitions 
in buying increases the potential for market foreclosure. There was no effect 
on stickiness with regard to the instances of buying repetitions.  
We think our results can cautiously be extended to professional buyers 
– bearing in mind the problems of external validity arising when extrapolation 
results from lab experiments to firm behavior. Our experimental task shares 
some features with buying in rebate schemes in markets with professional buy-
ers. Therefore our findings provide converging evidence for the results by 
Beckenkamp and Maier-Rigaud (2006), who explicitly deal with professional 
buyers. The problems of external validity certainly are smallest when retail 
units are small and individuals take the relevant decisions. Here our results are 
likely to apply to professional buyers as well. Indeed, in the Michelin cases, the 
dominant firm Michelin sold to retailers apparently including a significant 
number of small car repair shops. Here, our findings could well apply. So, all in 
all, the Commission appears to be right not to have ignored the psychological 
state of (retailing) buyers in its decision. 
 
7.3 Implications for Modeling Choice Behavior for Loyalty Rebates 
 The stickiness effect predicted by CPT (with the additional assumption 
that reference points are shifted to the rebate payoff) was clearly supported by 
the data. However, we also find that the partially reversed effect of rebate 
magnitude, the sometimes observed interaction between magnitude and repeti-
tion, and the null effect for loss aversion on stickiness cannot be easily ex-
plained by CPT. So our experiment cannot identify the perfect behavioral the-
ory to apply to rebate cases in consumer markets. Other avenues for future 
modeling approaches could include the theory of routines (Betsch et al., 2001) 
or amending the rational choice framework by introducing some degree of 
inertia. For policy, however, it is more important to be aware of psychological 
switching costs that can be used to foreclose markets and harm consumers 
than finding the “true” model of consumer behavior when facing target re-
bates. 
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8. Conc lus ions 
Overall, we conclude that loyalty rebates lead to non-rational buying 
behavior, amounting to an additional psychological switching cost that can 
cause substantial financial losses for consumers. This effect increases the po-
tential of loyalty rebates to be used as a tool to foreclose markets and provides 
an argument for a more restrictive position towards loyalty rebates under con-
sumer protection law. Previous arguments and rulings concerning the regula-
tion of loyalty rebates under antitrust law both in the EU and in the US were 
mainly based on the assumption of rational buying. Stickiness effects add to 
these existing problems. Therefore the potential danger of loyalty rebates has 
been underestimated. The demonstrated stickiness effect backs the role psy-
chological effects already play in European antitrust law today. It generally 
supports the greater scrutiny loyalty rebates have recently been subject to both 
in the EU and the US.  
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10. Appendices  
10.1 Appendix A 
Let x1 and x2 be the possible monetary outcomes (payoffs) for a pro-
spect and assume p1 and 1-p1 to be the probabilities that the respective out-
comes realize. The expected value for this prospect is given by: 
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       (1) 
and, according to rational choice theory, persons should be indifferent between 
this prospect and any equivalent cash amount c:  
.         (2) 
According to CPT, the value V of a prospect with outcomes x1 ≤ … ≤ xk 
≤ 0 ≤ xk+1 ≤ … ≤ xn is given by: 
,      (3) 
with v as continuous and strictly increasing utility function satisfying v(0) = 0, and 
π+ and π– as decision weights, for gains and losses respectively. Decision weights 
result from rank-dependent transformation of the outcome probabilities, con-
sidering gains and losses separately. This means that the same probability can 
result in different decision weights, dependent on whether it belongs to a high 
or a low outcome. Decision weights are defined by: 
.   (4) 
with w+ and w- being the probability weighting function for gains and losses, 
respectively. Hence, the lowest negative outcome and the highest positive out-
come are transformed using the respective transformation functions described 
in the next section. The weights for probabilities of losses (i.e., i < k) concep-
tually represent the marginal contribution of the respective probability to the 
total probability of worse outcomes and the weights for probabilities of gains 
(i.e., j > k) represent the marginal contribution of the respective probability to 
better outcomes. 
For CPT, several functional forms of v, and w+/w- have been suggested 
(see Stott, 2006, for an overview). We use the classic one-parameter implemen-
tation of the value function and the weighting function suggested by Tversky 
and Kahneman (1992):  
        (5) 
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.      (6) 
The risk-aversion parameters α and β capture the curvature of the s-
shaped value function. The parameters γ and δ capture the inverted s-shape of 
the weighting function, in the domains of gains and losses, respectively. The 
loss-aversion parameter λ induces the increased steepness of the value function 
in the domain of losses. Tversky and Kahneman (1992) suggested the follow-
ing parameters: α = β = .88, γ = .69, δ = .61, λ = 2.25.  
 Let us assume that x2 is adopted as a reference point and payoffs are 
perceived as differences from x2. Consequently, x2 has a utility of zero and x1 
has a negative (or zero) utility and the value VP of the prospect is given by: 
.    (7) 
Choosing the cash equivalent c of the prospect (equation 2) will be considered 
a sure loss because it will also always be smaller than x2. According to core 
predictions of prospect theory, people will prefer a risky option over a sure 
loss with equal expected value which follows from the fact that the utility func-
tion v is convex for losses. Formally, this results in the following value of the 
cash equivalent Vc:  
      (8) 
And when substituting c by equations 1 and 2:  
.   (9) 
The difference between VP and Vc is given by: 
,  (10) 
which can also be written as: 
.    (11) 
The first term of equation 11 will be negative for all x2 > x1 and its 
magnitude increases with increasing difference between x1 and x2. Taking into 
account the values for parameters β = .88 and δ = .61, mentioned above, the 
second term is negative for all probabilities p1 > .24; which is where the func-
tions w-(p1) and p1
β intersect (Figure A1). Hence, for all p1 > .24 the value of the 
prospect is higher than its cash equivalent and (everything else being equal) the 
difference increases with increasing difference between x2 and x1.  
Choices between the prospect and the cash equivalent will most likely 
not be deterministic. It is more likely that they follow a probabilistic function 
such as a logistic-choice function in which the probability for choosing one 
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option over the other increases with its advantage in VP (i.e., the absolute dif-
ference between VP – Vc). 
Taking an individual differences perspective and considering only pro-
spects with sufficiently likely lowest outcomes to prefer the prospect over the 
cash equivalent, the degree to which the risky prospects are preferred over the 
cash equivalent should increase with increasing loss aversion λ. Increasing risk 
aversion β increases the magnitude of the first term, but decreases the magni-
tude of the second term in equation 11, and the overall effect is therefore 
complex. 
 
 
Figure A1: Difference in decision weights according to the second term in 
equation 11 as a function of probability of the lower outcome for the domain 
of losses.  
 
 
Relation to Rebates 
 If one accepts that rebates lead to adopting the payoff of reaching the 
rebate (i.e., x2 = the maximal payoff) as reference point, then, according to 
CPT, rebates should induce persons to continue buying in the loyalty rebate 
scheme, even if an outside option has the higher expected value. This, howev-
er, should only hold when considering rebates with sufficiently large probabil-
ity of failing to reach the rebate (p1 = 1 - pR > .24). Hence, in our paradigm, 
CPT predicts entering the rebate because 1 - pR = .14 and stickiness to the 
rebate after the critical round was omitted because 1 - pR
* = .85. The probabil-
ity to stick to the rebate (i.e., staying in the rebate although it does not maxim-
ize expected value) should increase with increasing difference between VP and 
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Vc which is a monotonously increasing function of the difference between the 
high and the low overall payoff that can be reached with the rebate option. It 
should be independent of the repetitions of buying when holding the differ-
ence in payoffs constant. From an individual-difference perspective, stickiness 
should increase with increasing loss aversion and might be influenced in a 
complex way by risk aversion. 
 
 
10.2 Appendix B: Instructions 
In the first part of the experiment, you can make a buying decision in each 
round. There are 10 buying decisions in total. The decision is whether or not 
to purchase a token. You will receive information about the repeated decision 
in the form presented below. [Figure omitted] 
Please read this information carefully now and during the experiment. In this 
situation, each token costs 1.10 € and has an exchange value of 1.30 €; that is, 
at the end of the experiment, you will be credited 1.30 € for each token that 
you purchased during the experiment. In each round, you may purchase one 
token for the price of 1.10 €. Alternatively, you can also decide not to purchase 
a token. For each round in which you decide not to buy a token, you will be 
credited 0.44 € immediately as direct payment. 
At the end of the experiment, you will be granted a rebate of 49% on all pur-
chased tokens, provided that you have purchased at least 9 tokens during the 
first part of the experiment. In this case, the purchase price that you spent on 
the tokens will be reduced by 49% to 0.56 €.  
[Figure omitted] Rounds 5 and 10 are omitted with certain probabilities. If a 
round is omitted, you can neither buy a token nor choose the direct payoff. 
Round 5 is omitted with a probability of 17% and Round 10 is omitted with a 
probability of 85%. [Figure omitted] Dependent on whether Round 5 is omit-
ted or not, the probability for your being able to play 9 rounds varies. Because 
the experiment can take different directions, depending on whether Round 5 is 
omitted, after Round 4 you will be asked how you will decide in Round 5 if it 
takes place, and how you will decide in Round 6 if Round 5 takes place. After 
these decisions, the computer will determine whether or not Round 5 takes 
place and you will make the decisions you indicated. If you decide not to buy 
in Round 5 and the round is played, the computer will only allow you to make 
this decision. If Round 5 is omitted, the computer will, for Round 6 also, only 
allow you to make the decision you indicated. In the following rounds, similar 
to Rounds 1 to 4, you can again choose between buying the token and the di-
rect payment. 
 
 43 
Your payment for the first part is calculated as follows: 
- If the rebate is granted: 
Rounds in which tokens were bought x (Exchange value of the tokens 
– Price of the tokens) + Rounds in which direct payment was chosen x 
Value of the direct payment + Price of the tokens x Rounds in which 
tokens were bought x Rebate 
- If the rebate is not granted: 
Rounds in which tokens were bought x (Exchange value of the tokens 
– Price of the tokens) + Rounds in which direct payment was chosen x 
Value of the direct payment 
 
[Instructions for measures of risk aversion and loss aversion and example cal-
culations are omitted.] 
 
 
 
 
10.3. Appendix C: Questionnaire, Experiment 1 and 2.  
[Subjects were only allowed to proceed with the experiment once all questions 
were answered correctly.] 
 
Please copy all the important parameters into the following list:  
 
Price of tokens       _____________ 
 
Value of tokens       _____________ 
 
Minimum number of tokens bought,  
required to attain the rebate.     _____________ 
 
Rebate        _____________ 
 
Value of the outside option     _____________ 
 
Probability that round 5 will be omitted 17 % = 0.17 (please 
calculate in decimal 
fractions in this 
questionnaire). 
 
Probability that round 10 will be omitted   _____________ 
 
Exercises: 
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1) How much do you earn in the first part of the experiment in case you buy 10 
tokens? 
 
 
2) How much do you earn in the first part of the experiment in case you buy 9 
tokens? 
 
 
3) How much do you earn in the first part of the experiment in case you buy 9 
tokens and choose the outside option once? 
 
 
4) How much do you earn in the first part of the experiment in case you buy 5 
tokens and choose the outside option five times? 
 
5) In the first part of the experiment, will you be able to buy 10 tokens for sure?  
 
 
6) In the first part of the experiment, is it certain that you will attain the rebate if 
you want to? If yes, why? If no, what does getting the rebate depend on? 
 
 
7) How many decisions will you at least take in the first part of the experiment? 
How many at most?  
 
 
8) How much will you earn in case you choose the outside option nine times?  
 
[questions omitted that elicited the willingness to pay for not participating in the experiment 
that are not relevant for the current study]  
 
9) At the beginning of the experiment, what is the probability that you will play 
ten rounds in the first part of the experiment?  
 
10) At the beginning of the experiment, what is the probability that you will play 
nine rounds in the first part of the experiment?  
 
11) At the beginning of the experiment, what is the probability that you will play 
eight rounds in the first part of the experiment?  
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If you find it difficult to solve exercises 12-14, consider the following tree diagram, 
which may help you to see what can happen in the game through omitted rounds.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 You play ten rounds 
Round 5 takes place. This happens 
with probability  83% = 0.83 
You play nine 
rounds 
You play nine 
rounds 
You play eight 
rounds 
Round 5 is omitted. This happens with 
probability  17% = 0.17 
Round ten takes 
place. This happens 
with probability  
15% = 0.15 
Round ten is omitted. 
That happens with 
probability  
85% = 0.85 
Round ten takes 
place. This happens 
with probability  
15% = 0.15 
 
Round ten is omitted. 
That happens with 
probability  
85% = 0.85 
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III. The Short Arm of Guilt: Does it only hit who is 
close? 
1. Motivat ion 
A couple of years ago, the motivational power of people’s desire to avoid guilt 
reached the economic literature and was called guilt aversion. Among other 
things, guilt aversion was used to explain why people keep their promises in an 
investment game (trust game) and it was modeled as a preference to choose 
actions conforming with another person’s expectation (Battigalli & 
Dufwenberg, 2007; Charness & Dufwenberg, 2006). Surprisingly, the econom-
ic model of guilt aversion has not granted a lot of attention to the relevance of 
social distance. Why should I feel guilty with regard to someone I do not care 
about? Or why should I feel guilty about letting someone down if I was not 
responsible for his well-being? Psychologists treat the sensitivity of people to 
others’ expectations as inherently context-dependent. And this context is 
shaped by relationships. In fact, Charness and Dufwenberg (2006) motivate 
their research on guilt by citing articles from psychology which deals with the 
impact of relationships on guilt and postulates a “communal relationship” as 
precondition to experiencing guilt vis-à-vis a person (as opposed to a mere 
exchange relationship), for instance Baumeister, Stillwell, & Heatherton (1994). 
Other psychological theories postulate the expansion of one’s own self to that 
of a relationship partner as a prerequisite to experience guilt (Aron, Aron, & 
Norman, 2003; Aron, Aron, Tudor, & Nelson, 1991). 
I assess the impact of social closeness on guilt aversion in a dictator game by 
systematically varying shared social identity using a minimal group paradigm. If 
even group identity induced in the lab changes how second-order beliefs (i.e., 
the sender’s expectations over the receiver’s expectations) induce actions, the 
effect is likely to be stronger by magnitudes in the field. 
In each session, I allocate half of the participants to one and the other half to a 
second group according to their respective stated preference for one of two 
modern painters. I further reinforce their respective group identity (Tajfel & 
Turner, 1979) by letting the two groups compete for a prize in a real-effort task 
and subsequently measure to what extent participants identify with their group. 
Then I randomly match participants in pairs, half of them with a partner from 
their own group (ingroup treatment) and the other half with a partner from the 
other group (outgroup treatment). These pairs play the following variant of a 
dictator game. From receivers I elicit their belief about what they expect the 
sender to send to a receiver in their situation (from the same group or from the 
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other group, respectively). Then, by means of the strategy method, I elicit what 
share of a pie of 100 “Talers” a sender wishes to send to the receiver condi-
tional on 11 possible second-order beliefs. I look at realistic second-order be-
liefs in isolation first. I speak of realistic second-order beliefs if the sender ex-
pects the receiver to expect the sender to send half of the pie at most because 
amounts sent that exceed half of the sender’s endowment are extremely rare 
(Engel, 2011). In the realm of realistic beliefs, I find that the influence of se-
cond-order beliefs on the amount sent in a dictator game is stronger if the re-
ceiver shares the sender’s group identity. For the analysis of exaggerated se-
cond-order beliefs, the reader is referred to Appendix A. I speak of exaggerated 
second-order beliefs if the sender expects the receiver to expect the sender to 
send more than half of the pie. 
In both treatments, about half of the senders remain unaffected by second-
order beliefs. If senders and receivers are from the same group, unaffected 
senders are characterized by lower degrees of group identification. This is not 
true for the treatment where senders and receivers are from different groups.  
My findings are relevant for certain questions that have been studied for a long 
time, yet remain unresolved. These findings concern promises, ingroup favorit-
ism and the theory of guilt aversion. 
The results of this experiment suggest that people may keep unenforceable 
promises because the promise establishes a closer relationship between the 
parties. My amendment of guilt aversion reconciles the contradicting results of 
Charness & Dufwenberg (2006; 2010), on the one hand, and those of Vanberg 
(2008), on the other. Charness & Dufenberg (2006; 2010) explained why peo-
ple keep a promise to a stranger by the fact that promisors know that the 
promise raises the promissee’s expectations. Vanberg (2008) found that promi-
sors keep their own promise, but did not respond to second-order expectations 
induced by a thirdparty’s promise. If guilt aversion depends on social integra-
tion, Vanberg’s result can be explained by a lack of social integration between a 
promisor with a third-party promissee. That lack of social integration in turn 
leads to a lack of influence of second order beliefs on action.  
Güth, Ploner & Regner as well as Ockenfels & Werner, theorise that partici-
pants favour fellow group members because senders know that recievers ex-
pect more in ingroup interactions than in outgroup interactions. According to 
my findings, this explanation is at least incomplete. Explanations along the 
lines of Güth et al. and Ockenfels & Werner should take into account that se-
cond-order beliefs also matter more in ingroup interactions than they do in 
outgroup interactions. If second-order beliefs have a stronger effect ingroup 
than outgroup one would predicts ingroup favoritism to arise even if receiver 
expectations are held constant. The only prerequisite would be that group iden-
tity is strong enough.  
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My main finding that shared identity induces the influence of second-order 
beliefs on action explains why guilt aversion has been rejected in anonymous 
experiments (i.e., Ellingsen, Johannesson, Tjøtta, & Torsvik, 2010), while it has 
been confirmed in experiments that allow for some form of relationship be-
tween participants (Charness & Dufwenberg 2006, Reuben et al. 2009). This 
finding structures the hitherto inconclusive literature on guilt aversion (for a 
review, see below). My finding also moderates conclusions that guilt aversion 
has been rejected in its entirety and specifies the realm of application of guilt 
aversion to social interaction across a small social distance.  
2. Literature  
This paper will investigate whether a model of guilt aversion, which is sensitive 
to the degree of social intergration between agents, leads to better predictions 
than the existing formulations of the theory. The blind spot of guilt aversion 
with regard to relationships seems to have led to inappropriate test beds when 
testing the theory. The beginnings of the lab career of guilt aversion were 
promising (Charness & Dufwenberg, 2006). However, further tests of the the-
ory of guilt aversion in the lab led to mixed results: Vanberg (2008) conducts a 
dictator game experiment where he claims to separate the effect of the mere 
promise and that of second-order beliefs. He reshuffles half of the sender-
receiver pairs after the promise, leaving only the receivers uninformed about 
whether their pair has been reshuffled. This leaves receivers’ beliefs constant 
across treatments. Treatments only vary by whether the sender is bound by a 
promise to the receiver or not. Vanberg finds an effect of the promise, alt-
hough second-order beliefs are constant over treatments. Although in his ap-
pendix he presents some evidence that second-order beliefs correlate with ac-
tion, he cannot show a causal effect of second-order beliefs on action. He con-
cludes that second-order beliefs cannot explain the effect of promises in trust 
games. Reuben et al. (2009) conduct an experiment in which they elicit inves-
tors’ beliefs in a trust game and report them to trustees. They do find evidence 
in favor of guilt aversion. Ellingsen et al. (2010) conduct a series of dictator-
game and investment-game experiments where receivers report their beliefs on 
the amount sent to the experimenter and the experimenter reports these beliefs 
to the senders, inducing second-order beliefs. Ellingsen and coauthors find 
evidence that second-order beliefs do not determine action, but that actions 
induce second-order beliefs. Lately even prominent promoters of guilt aversion, 
Charness and Dufwenberg (2010), merely found “limited support” for guilt 
aversion. And finally, in a trust game with an investor, a trustee, and two inac-
tive players, Bellemare et al. (2011) found trustees to have a positive willingness 
to pay to avoid guilt vis-à-vis the investor only. At first glance, the literature 
could lead the reader to believe that the correlation between second-order be-
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liefs and actions is an instable phenomenon that tends to be revealed as a con-
found – either with a preference to keep a promise (Vanberg, 2008) or with a 
(false) consensus effect (Ellingsen et al., 2010). 
However, re-analyzing the experiments just mentioned with regard to the in-
tensity of the relationship between subjects and the findings of guilt aversion, a 
correlation seems to emerge. Charness and Dufwenberg (2006) use pre-play 
communication by means of a one-page free text letter in a classroom experi-
ment where subjects can see each other. This protocol is apt to make partici-
pants feel closer to each other. They find second-order beliefs to correlate with 
actions. Vanberg (2008) claims to disentangle the effect of the promise from 
that of expectations by rematching half of the participants randomly after 
communication in an anonymous, computerized dictator game. However, this 
protocol does not merely destroy the promise of randomly rematched dicta-
tors; rather, it also destroys the social relationship participants may have built 
through the promise. Vanberg concludes that people have a preference for 
keeping a promise, independently of second-order beliefs. Reuben et al. (2009) 
use 56 subjects in one session, all of whom were MBA Students at the Kellogg 
Business School. This school does not have more than 650 students in total. 
Given that MBA programs are meant to establish close networks among their 
students, it is not unlikely that there was some esprit de corps connecting the sub-
jects in this setting. Accordingly, Reuben et al. (2009) find evidence of guilt 
aversion. Ellingsen et al. (2010) use an anonymous double blind protocol. The 
only contact amongst participants is that beliefs elicited from the receiver are 
reported to senders – a procedure specifically meant to exclude any social inte-
gration of participants. Reuben et al. do not find any correlation between se-
cond-order beliefs and action. Charness and Dufwenberg (2010) adopt a pro-
tocol enabling senders either to make a promise to receivers by sending a pre-
formulated sheet of paper or not to make a promise by sending an empty sheet 
of paper. This procedure does not allow for any personalized contact between 
participants, but involves a promise. The anonymity of this procedure may be 
the reason why Charness and Dufwenberg (2010) do not find clear support for 
guilt aversion in their experiment. Bellemare et al. (2011) only find guilt aver-
sion of the trustees vis-à-vis the investors. But the trustees have no willingness 
to pay to avoid guilt vis-à-vis the inactive players. In fact, although the setup of 
the experiment is anonymous in that subjects participated online from their 
homes, the contrast between the investor who actually does act with effect on 
the trustee and the inactive players who does not may have induced the trus-
tees to feel closer to the investors. 
Of course, this juxtaposition of six experiments is far from being conclusive 
evidence for guilt aversion only to play out if agents are socially integrated. But 
it may be a hint. And given that the psychological theories from which the 
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economic theory of guilt aversion was originally derived accord a prominent 
role to relationship, the hint merits to be taken seriously. A serious test of this 
hint seems all the more warranted as some parts of the literature fit the pattern 
found in the six cited papers less well. Dufwenberg and Gneezy (2000) find 
that the trustees’ second-order beliefs correlate with actions in a trust game, 
although they apply a double blind and thus very anonymous procedure.10  
There is a large literature showing that decreasing social distance (Charness & 
Gneezy, 2008; Frey & Bohnet, 1999; Hoffman, McCabe, & Smith, 1996; 
Leider, Möbius, Rosenblat, & Do, 2009, 2010; Rankin, 2006), increasing social 
integration (Brañas-Garza et al., 2010), or inducing a common group identity 
(Chen & Li, 2009; Dawes, Van de Kragt, & Orbell, 1988) between participants 
leads social preferences to play out more strongly in dictator games. But none 
of the cited studies treats belief-dependent preferences.  
The literature studying the relevance of second-order beliefs has not produced 
an answer either to the question whether guilt aversion requires some form of 
social closeness. Rankin (2006) studies whether receivers’ demands in a dicta-
tor game have different effects if receivers and senders communicate face to 
face or anonymously. I study the effect of second-order beliefs and not of de-
mands. In contrast to outright demands, the beliefs I work with do not have 
any normative or imperative appeal. Bicchieri and Chavez (2010) study the 
impact of first- and second-order beliefs on transfers in an ultimatum game. In 
the ultimatum game, however, second-order beliefs are strategically relevant. 
Guilt aversion claims an influence of strategically irrelevant beliefs. Therefore 
the study does not provide evidence on whether people have a preference to 
act in accordance with second-order beliefs. Recently the idea arose that in-
group favoritism is caused by changes in second-order beliefs. Güth et al. 
(2009) as well as Ockenfels and Werner (in press) hypothesize that senders 
treat ingroup receivers preferentially because they know that ingroup receivers 
expect them to send more. Güth et al. do not find clear support for this hy-
pothesis. Ockenfels and Werner find that indeed senders treat ingroup receiv-
ers better if the latter know that they share the sender’s group identity. This 
effect is attenuated if the receiver does not know of the sender’s group identity. 
I am not interested in the effect of changing levels of second-order beliefs on 
action. I ask for the effect of shared group identity on the capacity of second-
order beliefs to induce action. 
                                                
10 They neither control for the false consensus effect, nor can they claim cau-
sality of second-order beliefs. So causality could also run from action to beliefs 
or there could be a confounding variable.  
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3. Exper iment 
I run an experiment with two treatments, an ingroup treatment and an out-
group treatment. The on-screen experiment is programmed in z-tree 
(Fischbacher, 2007). Group membership is induced, conditional on the sub-
jects’ preferences for paintings (Chen & Li, 2009), and reinforced by letting 
groups compete in a real-effort task (Rockenbach, Böhm, & Weiss, 2013). 
Each of the 15 sessions conducted in the Bonn EconLab comprises 16 partici-
pants recruited via ORSEE (Greiner, 2004). Each subject receives a show-up 
fee of 4 €. In the experiment, the subjects play for the experimental currency 
“Talers”. Participants are paid in Euros. 1 Taler converts to 0.11 €. The exper-
iment proceeds as follows. 
All participants are seated in front of a computer terminal, separated by cubi-
cles. They are first asked to compare paintings by Klee and Kandinsky (group 
segregation stage); then, they compete in a real-effort task (group reinforce-
ment stage) and fill out a pre-experiment questionnaire (questionnaire stage); 
and finally, they play a dictator game (game stage). 
3.1 Group Segregation Stage 
In the group segregation stage, each participant is assigned to one of two 
groups according to his/her preference for one of two painters – Klee and 
Kandinsky. The procedure is adapted from Chen and Li (2009): For five pairs 
of paintings by Klee and Kandinsky (the same paintings as in Chen and Li 
(2009)), subjects are asked to state how much they prefer one painting to an-
other. To answer this question, participants use a slider bar (labeled in three 
steps [L=left, R=right]: I strongly prefer L, I like both paintings equally, I 
strongly prefer R). The position of the slider bar is translated into a distribution 
of 10 points between the two paintings (I strongly prefer L = 10 points to L, I 
like both paintings equally = 5 to L and 5 to R, etc.). Then, for each participant, 
the points allocated to Klee are summed up. The same is done for the points 
allocated to Kandinsky. Subsequently the computer labels that half of partici-
pants who allocated the highest amounts of points to Klee the “Klee group” 
and labels the other half the “Kandinsky group”. Participants then are in-
formed about their group membership.11 
                                                
11 Ties were resolved by the order of the randomly assigned subject ID. Sub-
jects could allocate fractions of points, so that virtually an infinite number of 
possible sums of points for Klee paintings were possible. The slider bar did not 
have a scale beyond the three labels mentioned in the text. Therefore it was 
virtually impossible to set it to precise integers (other than 10.0; 5.5; 0.10). Be-
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3.2 Group Reinforcement Stage 
In the group reinforcement stage, the two groups compete against each other 
in a real-effort task to intensify the perception of belonging to a group by ex-
periencing interdependence and a common fate. The task subjects compete in 
is the following (Rockenbach et al., 2013). Participants receive a 15-page text. 
Then, on their screens, I ask them for letters in the text that I define by page, 
line, word, and position. Participants have four minutes to identify as many 
letters as they can. The group that jointly accumulates the larger number of 
correct answers wins. Each participant of the winning group receives 26 Talers. 
If the groups tie, all participants receive 13 Talers. Participants do not receive 
any feedback on the between-group competition until the very end of the ex-
periment, which is why independence of observations is preserverd.  
3.3 Questionnaire Stage 
The computer randomly assigns half of each group to the role A (sender) and 
the other half of each group to the role B (receiver). Then the computer ran-
domly pairs each sender with a receiver. Half of the senders will be paired with 
a receiver from their own group (ingroup treatment) and half of the senders 
will be paired with a receiver from the other group (outgroup treatment).  
In the questionnaire stage, the senders (A) are not informed about their role. 
They answer a questionnaire on how much they identify with their group 
(Doosje et al. 1995; see appendix B.3.2b. for questions). 
The receivers (B) are informed about their role and the group membership of 
the participant in role A they have been paired with. On their screens they are 
informed that in the subsequent stage they will be paired with a sender, which 
group this sender belongs to, and that the sender can freely split 100 Talers 
between himself and the receiver. They are then asked to predict the average 
amount a person in their situation – i.e., a receiver paired with a sender from 
the same [the other] group – would receive in the experiment. The responder 
can enter any guess, which can be expressed in a full amount between 0 and 
100 Talers. It is announced that each subject who predicts an average amount 
(which is no more than 1 Taler off the actual average amount received by re-
ceivers in their situation during the session) will receive an extra payment of 
125 Talers = 13.75 € (see Appendix B.3.2.a for details). After all participants 
have completed their respective questionnaires, the questionnaire stage ends. 
                                                                                                                       
cause ties thus were extremely unlikely, the tie-breaking rule was not included 
in the instructions. However, a tie occurred twice. 
Of 120 senders, ten ended up in the Kandinsky group although they had 
awarded more points to Klee. Two who had given exactly the same amount to 
Klee as they gave to Kandinsky ended up in the Kandinsky group.  
 53 
3.4 Game Stage 
Subjects play a sender-receiver game (dictator game). On the first screen, all 
participants are informed about their role. Also, all participants are reminded 
about their own group membership and informed about the group member-
ship of the participant they have been paired with. Senders receive a pie of 100 
Talers. They can send any share to their respective receiver, which can be ex-
pressed in full Talers. The amount sent is elicited by means of a strategy meth-
od. Senders are asked what they would like to send, conditional on their re-
spective receiver’s belief. They express the amount they wish to send for the 
receiver’s beliefs of 0, 10, 20, 30, 40, 50, 60, 70, 80, 90, and 100 Talers. It is 
explained to them that the computer will activate the choice closest to the re-
ceiver’s actual stated belief.12 After the senders have filled in the strategy vector, 
a screen will reveal the true stated belief of the sender, and the computer will 
put into effect the allocation for the case closest to that belief.  
The use of the strategy method described does not confound the treatment 
effect with an experimenter demand effect, because the experimenter’s “de-
mand” to condition the amounts sent on second-order beliefs remains con-
stant over treatments.  
Apart from my treatment manipulation (ingroup vs. outgoup) and computeri-
zation, the design described amends that of the paper that mainly motivated 
this work (Ellingsen et al., 2010) merely in that I use the strategy method to let 
senders condition their amounts sent on different second-order beliefs instead 
of just one. Generally, this method of letting senders condition their amounts 
sent on receivers’ previously stated beliefs seems to be standard in the litera-
ture on guilt aversion (Bellemare, Sebald, & Suetens, 2013; Ellingsen et al., 
2010; Reuben et al., 2009). 
Finally, in a posttest, I measured perceived closeness between the sender and 
the receiver, using a one-item test by Aron et al. (2003), and I ask participants 
for some demographic data, such as  gender, age, and occupation. 
4. Theory and Hypothes i s  
To illustrate my theoretical point, I use the simplest formulation of guilt aver-
sion. It can be found in Charness and Dufwenberg (2006). I will extend their 
model to include social distance as a driving force of guilt aversion. I will justi-
fy my amendment with the help of psychological and economic theory. Finally 
I will derive and specify the hypothesis of my experiment. For conjectures 
                                                
12 Receivers’ stated beliefs are rounded to 0 or the closest multiple of 10 ac-
cording to general rounding conventions. 
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about what could plausibly be expected to happen in the realm of exaggerated 
beliefs, see Appendix A.  
4.1 Theory 
For a simple two-strategy dictator game, Charness and Dufwenberg (2006) 
propose a simple definition of the utility uS of the outcome given the sender S 
choses A (the selfish option) over B (the generous option): 
 
uS = πA - γS · πB · τS 
 
The sender’s utility is increased by his money payoff of choice A, but it is re-
duced by a guilt term. The sender’s money payoff of option B is denoted by πB,. 
The sender’s sensitivity to guilt is γS ∈ [0,1]. Finally, τS ∈ [0,1] denotes the 
sender’s second-order belief about how likely he thinks the receiver believes 
the sender to choose the generous option. The guilt term increases in all of 
these variables. 
This utility function claims second-order beliefs influence the attractiveness of 
the selfish choice. Senders therefore should always respond to information 
from which they derive their second-order beliefs by being more or less prone 
to act more selfishly. We have not observed this consistently in experiments. 
Ellingsen et al. (2010), in particular, conducted a high-powered experiment that 
could not show any reactions of senders to second-order beliefs. The hunch 
derived from the literature above was that possibly people only condition their 
action on second-order beliefs if they interact with somebody to whom they 
feel close. Accordingly, I propose to let the guilt term in the utility function 
also depend on a measure of social closeness. Multiplying the guilt aversion 
part of the utility with αS ≥ 0, where αS is the sender’s appreciation of how 
close his relationship with the receiver is, would express this dependence. The 
larger αS, the closer the relationship. An αS that is equal to 1 expresses guilt 
aversion as Charness and Dufwenberg (2006) defined it. αS equal to 0 would 
indicate a social distance too large to trigger any feeling of guilt.  
 
uS = πA - γS · πB · τS · αS 
 
The justification of this extension lies in a recombination of the psychological 
theory of how closeness translates into empathy with the theory of reference-
dependent preferences. In economics, other-regarding preferences à la Char-
ness and Rabin (2002) or Fehr and Schmidt (1999) have been modeled to in-
clude the other’s payoffs into the self’s utility function. Guilt aversion goes a 
step further including the self’s beliefs about the other’s expectations into the 
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utility function. Why do beliefs about expectations matter at all? Guilt aversion 
does not take a clear position on this question. One answer is that beliefs are 
important because we know the other’s expectations matter for the other’s 
utility. According to reference-dependent utility, expectations shift reference 
points (Abeler, Falk, Götte, & Huffman, 2009; Köszegi & Rabin, 2006). And 
outcomes below the reference point are coded as losses, while those above are 
coded as gains. Losses loom larger than gains so that any outcome short of the 
expectation would have a strong negative impact on utility. Writing the impact 
of expectations on the other’s utility into the self’s utility would mean including 
second-order expectations in the self’s utility function. In fact, the self’s utility 
would include parts of the other’s (reference-dependent) utility (instead of just 
plugging the other’s payoff into the self’s utility function). Economists seem 
reluctant to integrate the other’s utility (as opposed to the other’s payoffs) into 
the self’s utility function because this would yield complex interdependence of 
agents’ utility, rendering these utility functions difficult to use. Psychology has 
been bolder and has developed theories that are equivalent to the self integrat-
ing the other’s utility into her utility functions. Psychologists frame the integra-
tion of the other’s utility function into the self’s as “self expansion”, meaning 
the extension of one’s own self to encompass other individuals’ selves (Aron et 
al., 2003, 1991; Hewstone, Stroebe, & Jonas, 2008). In particular “participants 
in a close relationship include each other into their psychological selves” (Aron 
et al., 2003). Other authors describe that same thing, saying that “oneness” 
increases among ingroup members (Brewer, 2007). In a slightly different ap-
proach, focused on norms rather than utility, Baumeister et al. (1994) claim 
that guilt only arises due to a violation of norms induced by a “communal rela-
tionship”. “Communal relationships are defined by the existence of implicit 
rules that the individuals must be concerned about each other's welfare (…). 
As a result, communal relationship partners do things simply to benefit each 
other without expecting equal or immediate benefits in return” (Baumeister et 
al., 1994). Psychological theory predicts that with a sufficiently close relation-
ship between the self and the other comes the self’s concern for the other’s 
welfare. Accordingly, in my experiment, senders of the ingroup treatment 
would be expected to experience the utility they cause in receivers of their own 
group as their own utility to some degree. If the receivers’ utility depends on 
their expectations, as reference-dependent utility suggests, this means that, 
according to self-extension theory, senders should behave in line with receivers’ 
expectations to a larger extent if receivers are from their own group than if 
they are from a different group. 
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4.2 Hypotheses 
H1: In the range of reasonable beliefs, second-order beliefs influence actions 
positively. 
H2: This influence is stronger if the sender and the receiver are from the same 
group. 
 
In the dictator game played, the range of reasonable beliefs goes from the 
sender sending 0% of the pie to the sender sending 50% of the pie on average. 
Shares sent that exceed this range are extremely rare (Engel, 2011) and, accord-
ingly, it is extremely unlikely for receivers to expect the sender to send more 
than half of the pie.  
5. Resul t s  
Of the 120 senders, 61 were female and 59 male. 114 senders were students, 
while 6 were not. The mean age was 24.15, the median age was 23, and the 
standard deviation 5.18 years.  
After briefy exposing my empirical strategy, I test H1 and H2. For the explora-
tion of the interaction effect of second-order beliefs and group identity on 
action in the realm of exaggerated beliefs, the reader is referred to Appendix A. 
At the end of this section, I analyze some additional findings on ingroup favor-
itism, the persistence of group identity, and participants unaffected by second-
order beliefs. 
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5.1 Empirical Strategy 
I analyze the decisions that 120 senders took for eleven possible second-order 
beliefs. 60 senders took their decisions in the outgroup treatment and 60 in the 
ingroup treatment.  
I expect a main effect of the ingroup treatment, which is due to the famous 
phenomenon of ingroup favoritism (Tajfel, 1979). This effect has to be sepa-
rated thoroughly from the interaction effect of the ingroup treatment with 
second-order beliefs, which tests my hypothesis. Therefore I will estimate a 
linear regression model of the following form with random effects on the par-
ticipant level. The regression predicts amounts sent using second-order beliefs 
(sobelief), a dummy for the treatments (ingroup), and the interaction of both 
(sobelief*ingroup) as independent variables. The ingroup dummy is equal to 1 
if the sender and the receiver are from the same group and 0 otherwise. I use a 
random-effects estimator instead of a fixed-effects estimator, insofar as it does 
not bias the results away from the result of the fixed-effects estimator. Using a 
fixed-effects estimator, one of my two main effects (ingroup) would drop out 
because of a lack of within-subject variance. Therefore the purpose of using 
random effects is merely to make all effects visible in one model.  
 
Amount Sent = β0 + β1*sobelief + β2*ingroup + β3*sobelief*ingroup + error 
(participant random effects) + error (residuals) 
 
The coefficient β1 should pick up any effect of second-order beliefs which 
does not depend on the treatment manipulations. A positive and significant β1 
in the real of realistic beliefs is evidence in favor of H1. β2 should pick up the 
level effect induced by in-group favoritism. And finally, β3 should pick up 
whether the ingroup vs. outgroup manipulation reinforces and attenuates the 
effect of second-order beliefs on action. If β3 is positive and significant in the 
realm of realistic beliefs, this is evidence in favor of H2 this paper set out to 
test.  
On top of the simple linear regression model, I will report results from a Tobit 
regression with random effects at the participant level. It has been shown in 
the literature that if the experimental design allows not only sending to receiv-
ers, but also taking from them, some senders do actually “steal” from receivers’ 
endowments (Engel, 2011). In my experiment, senders cannot transfer nega-
tive amounts. Therefore the data may be censored at zero. Tobit is a common 
approach to take this censoring into account.  
For all random-effects linear regression models, the Hausman test is insignifi-
cant. In fact, all coefficients in the linear random effects model are virtually 
identical to those of the linear fixed effects model. 
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5.2 Testing the Predictions of Guilt Aversion over Reasonable 
Beliefs 
Graph 1 shows that, in the realm of realistic second-order beliefs (0-50%), the 
latter influence the amount sent positively in both the ingroup (IN) and the 
outgroup (OUT) treatment. It is also clearly visible that this influence is 
stronger ingroup than it is outgroup. Both results are confirmed by the regres-
sion analysis summed up in table 1. 
 
Table 1 
Data for second-order beliefs from 0 to 50% 
Dependent variable: 
Amount sent 
Model 1: 
Linear regression 
Model 2: 
Tobit regression 
Second-order belief 0.100*** 
(0.0266) 
0.141** 
(0.0431) 
Ingroup (dummy) -1.155 
(3.039) 
-5.756 
(6.172) 
Ingroup x Second-order belief 0.104** 
(0.0377) 
0.207*** 
(0.0623) 
Random effects at participant 
level 
Yes Yes 
Constant 10.66*** -2.321 
N 720 720 
Number of Groups 120 120 
*=p<0.05; **=p<0.01; ***=p<0.001 
Standard errors in parenthesis 
 
The number of total observations is 720. “Number of groups” refers to the 
observations grouped by individual participants. The regressions consider 
amounts sent for six different second-order beliefs per sender (0, 10, 20, 30, 
40, 50).  
The null hypothesis that in the realm of realistic beliefs second-order beliefs do 
not influence actions positively has to be rejected. But I am reluctant to inter-
pret this result as general evidence in favor of guilt aversion. By using the strat-
egy method, I basically asked senders to condition their amount sent on se-
cond-order beliefs, so it is hard to be surprised that they did.  
More importantly, the null that the influence of second-order beliefs is not 
stronger if the sender and the receiver are from the same group has to be re-
jected. The “demand” to condition amounts sent on second-order beliefs was 
constant over treatments, so the positive and significant interaction effect of 
second-order beliefs and group identity remains valid evidence for the influ-
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ence of shared identity on guilt aversion. Accordingly, I derive results one and 
two. 
 
Result 1: In the realm of realistic beliefs the effect of second-order beliefs on action is positive. 
(Random effects regression, p<0.001, β1=0.1).  
Result 2: This effect is stronger if senders and receivers share a common group identity. (Ran-
dom effects regression, p<0.01, β3=0.103).  
 
My results can also be shown by a Tobit random-effects regression which ac-
counts for the possibility that senders would actually have taken money from 
receivers if I had let them (Model 2, tobit random effects: β1=0.14, p<0.01; β3=0.2, 
p<0.001).  
Ex post, the fact that 97.5% of receivers stated beliefs below or equal to 50% 
of the pie can be regarded as a justification for generating hypotheses only for 
the realm of realistic beliefs (mode of elicited receiver beliefs: 0% in both 
treatments; mean overall: 22.30; mean ingroup: 25.35; mean outgroup: 19.26. 
The difference is marginally significant: Wilcoxon ranksum, N=120, p=0.073). 
5.3 Additional Results on Ingroup Favoritism, Unaffected 
Participants, and the Persistence of Group Identity 
It seems striking that the expected level effect of shared group identity is nei-
ther visible in the graph nor in the regression analysis. Even searching for dif-
ferences between the levels of amounts sent by treatment and by second-order 
beliefs does not provide any statistically significant results (ranksum, all p>.22). 
For very low second-order beliefs (0% and 10%), senders even tend to send 
less on average to ingroup receivers than to outgroup receivers, although this 
difference is not statistically significant. Accordingly, the treatment coefficient 
in the regression is negative.  
 
Result 3 (Null result): The results are inconsistent with general, i.e., belief-independent, 
ingroup favoritism. For no single level of second-order beliefs do ingroup senders send signifi-
cantly more than outgroup sender (ranksum, all p>.22). 
 
The results also show that in both treatments slightly less than half of the 
senders are completely unaffected by second-order beliefs. I call a sender “un-
affected” if she/he intends to send the same amount for all eleven second-
order beliefs offered in the strategy method. Of these participants, there are 29 
of 60 in the ingroup treatment and 26 of 60 in the outgroup treatment. One 
may have expected the amount of unaffected participants to be smaller in the 
ingroup treatment than in the outgroup treatment because the theory says that 
second-order beliefs have more effect on action ingroup. But as the utility 
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function set out above also contains a parameter for individual sensitivity to 
guilt, the slightly higher amount of unaffected participants in the ingroup 
treatment could easily be explained by a slightly greater number of insensitive 
participants who were randomly allocated to the ingroup treatment. In any 
event, the difference between treatments in unaffected participants is very 
small and statistically insignificant (Chi-squared test, Chi2=0.3021, p>.58). 
I also find that in the ingroup treatment unaffected participants identify less 
with their group than the affected senders (Wilcoxon ranksum, p<.04). I meas-
ured the degree of group identification as the average score in the four ques-
tions of group identification presented to senders in the questionnaire stage 
(appendix B.3.2b.) In the outgroup treatment, unaffected participants do not 
distinguish themselves from the affected participants by the degree of group 
identification (Wilcoxon ranksum, p>.55). The finding that affectedness and the 
degree of group identification correlate (only) in the ingroup treatment is in 
line with the theory set out above: In the outgroup treatment, the identification 
with one’s fellow group members is irrelevant as the senders do not interact 
with their fellow group members. So only in the ingroup treatment should the 
degree of identification matter for what senders do. The stronger the identifi-
cation with one’s group in the ingroup treatment, the more second-order be-
liefs should determine action and the less likely it is that a sender does not re-
act to second-order beliefs at all.  
 
Result 4: In the ingroup treatment, unaffected senders (i.e., senders sending the same amount 
irrespective of the second-order belief) identify less with their group than affected senders (Wil-
coxon ranksum, N=60, p<0.04). This is not the case in the outgroup treatment (Wilcoxon 
ranksum, N=60, p>.55).  
 
A fifth and rather unexpected finding is that the senders’ feeling of shared 
group identity seems to have vanished by the time they have completed their 
decisions in the game stage. In the posttest, I do not find any treatment differ-
ence between the senders’ perceived closeness towards their respective receiv-
ers. Indeed, the outgroup senders seem to feel slightly closer to their receivers 
(mean score: 2.56) than ingroup senders seem to do (mean score: 2.53). Given 
that the treatment manipulation led to normal levels of group identification 
and does induce a significant difference between ingroup and outgroup treat-
ment, the failure of the closeness measure to pick up a difference between the 
treatment groups ex post may merely mean that it is not a very reliable measure 
of group identity. However, it may also indicate that shared minimal group 
identity decays very quickly, stressing that I chose a very gentle intervention.  
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6. Discuss ion and Conc lus ion 
To the best of my knowledge, this experiment is the first to show that, in the 
realm of realistic beliefs, social closeness – implemented here as shared group 
identity – determines how strongly senders’ second-order beliefs influence the 
amounts sent in a dictator game. I used a minimal group paradigm to induce a 
shared identity and reinforced it slightly. The total intervention is extremenly 
faint. Therefore, the effect is likely to be a lot stronger in the field, where rela-
tionships are based on family ties, friendship, co-workership, and the like. Also 
being class mates in an MBA program (Reuben et al., 2009), exchanging a one 
page letter (Charness & Dufwenberg, 2006) or being parties to a promise aris-
ing in a computer chat (Vanberg, 2008) are protocols that are likely to induce 
stronger shared identity than my treatment manipulation. 
I further find that if senders and receivers are from the same group, those 
senders who previously stated that they identify strongly with the group are 
more likely to be affected by second-order beliefs. This further corroborates 
my main result that shared identity determines the effect of second-order be-
liefs on action. 
My results clarify that guilt aversion will make better predictions in contexts of 
social closeness (families, friendships, co-workers) than in anonymous contexts 
(anonymous market transactions). On the one hand, they reveal that experi-
ments in a very anonymous setting may be the wrong test bed to test theories 
of second-order belief-dependent preferences. On the other hand, my results 
suggest that theories on guilt aversion should spell out that social closeness is 
crucial for the effect of second-order beliefs on action.  
In my experiment, a general level effect of ingroup favoritism is absent. Hold-
ing second-order beliefs fixed, I cannot find ingroup favoritism for any single 
level of second-order beliefs. This is in line with what Güth et al. (2009) and 
Ockenfels & Werner (in press) have suggested: Ingroup favoritism possibly 
does depend on second-order beliefs, such that the difference in amounts sent 
ingroup and outgroup are due to a higher level of second-order beliefs in in-
group interactions. Also in line with Güth et al. (2009) and Ockenfels & Wer-
ner (in press), I show that shared group identity does indeed translate into ele-
vated expectations of receivers – which senders may well anticipate. But be-
yond Güth et al. (2009) and Ockenfels & Werner (in press), I also show in this 
experiment that their explanation may at least be incomplete. I show that 
shared group identity not only raises receivers’ expectations, but leads to a 
stronger influence of the senders’ second-order belief actions. Both effects 
together may just reinforce each other. However, according to my results, the 
increase in expectations required to trigger ingroup favoritism may be smaller 
than implied by Güth et al. (2009) and Ockenfels et al. (in press). In fact, my 
results suggest that ingroup favoritism independent of second-order belief re-
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mains possible in case of a strong shared identity. In case of very strong shared 
identity, ingroup favoritism could arise only through the stronger impact of a 
fixed level of second-order beliefs. This would mean that ingroup favoritism 
was possible under identical second-order beliefs ingroup and outgroup. Güth 
et al. (2009) and Ockenfels & Werner (in press) would not make this predic-
tion. My experiment, which only induced group identity very gently, could not 
test this prediction conclusively. But this test appears to be a promising avenue 
for future research. 
From my results it appears plausible that people hold a promise to a stranger 
because the promise creates a shared identity between the two, causing second-
order beliefs to induce action. In future research it should be tested whether 
promise keeping can be better predicted by a theory of guilt aversion amended 
along the lines described here or by a preference to hold a promise. Promises 
that activate guilt aversion by creating a relationship between the parties would 
be compatible with a theory of “lexicographic promise keeping” proposed by 
Ederer and Stremitzer (2014). 
The finding that people have a preference to conform to the expectations of 
someone who is socially close may have applications in the management of 
teams. Guilt aversion can help coordinate team members. Communicating 
expectations can incite team members who are socially close. At least in the 
realm of realistic expectations, the degree of social integration of a team can be 
used as a mediator to fine-tune the influence of mutual expectations. It seems 
like an interesting and promising avenue for future research to enrich the in-
vestigation of the impact of social closeness on guilt aversion by the impact of 
social status.  
Finally, my results suggest that it is worth working on a truly empathic utility 
function that does not merely include other agents’ payoffs into the utility 
function, but adds more elements of their utility. A theory of other-regarding 
reference-dependent preference with expectation-based reference points, along 
the lines of Köszegi and Rabin (2006), appears to be a promising starting 
point.  
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8. Appendix A: Exploratory  Resul t s  Regarding Unreal i s t i c  
Bel i e f s  
8.1 Predictions: 
For exaggerated beliefs, this study is exploratory. In this range, conflicting 
forces are likely, making it difficult to derive one clear-cut hypothesis. The first 
force may be guilt aversion in the traditional sense. Even in the realm of exag-
gerated beliefs, senders may increase their amounts sent in response to increas-
ing second-order beliefs. If beliefs are exaggerated, however, senders may also 
negatively condition their amounts sent on beliefs, “punishing” exaggerated 
beliefs. Senders may actually do so more, the more exaggerated the beliefs are. 
Regner and Harth (2010) found evidence that the more exaggerated beliefs are, 
the less trustees send in a trust game. But they explained their findings with 
reciprocity dominating guilt aversion in that domain. Theories of reciprocity do 
not – at least in their traditional form (Dufwenberg & Kirchsteiger, 2004; Falk 
& Fischbacher, 2006; Rabin, 1993) – apply to my design. The receiver does not 
act. So the sender cannot reciprocate on any kind or unkind action.  
However, the “punishment” of exaggerated beliefs could also be flat. This 
would mean senders do discount their amount sent if beliefs are exaggerated 
and would send the same low amount for all excaggerated beiefs. Finally the 
senders would have good reason just to ignore exaggerated beliefs. All these 
forces may interact with a shared group identity. But again the signs of these 
interaction effects seem unclear. There is evidence that participants tend to be 
more forgiving towards people who share their group identity (Chen & Li, 
2009, p. 445). But an exaggerated belief could also be interpreted as particularly 
presumptuous if it is stated from a group-mate meriting harsher “punishment”. 
 66 
8.2 Results 
The regression analysis set out in the main body of the paper does not change 
qualitatively when including the full range of second-order beliefs, (Random 
effects regression, N=120; β3=0.08, p=0.000, see below table 2, model 1). But it is 
obvious from plotting the average amounts sent against the whole range of 
second-order beliefs by treatment (Graph 1) that senders react differently to 
reasonable second-order beliefs than they react to exaggerated second-order 
beliefs. To explore the data in the realm of exagertated beliefs, I amend the 
original regressions by including a dummy for exaggerated beliefs I call “larg-
er50”. The dummy is equal to 1 for those amounts sent that are conditioned 
on the receiver’s expectation that the sender sends more than half of the pie. 
For amounts sent conditioned on the receiver expecting not more than half of 
the pie, the dummy is 0. β4 denotes the coefficient of this dummy. Including 
this dummy confirms the observation that senders reduce the amount sent 
once second-order beliefs start being exaggerated (Random effects regression, 
N=120; β4=-3.563, p=0.001). Adding an interaction effect of the larger50 
dummy with the ingroup dummy into this regression reveals that this reduc-
tion is not stronger in statistically significant terms if senders send to outgroup 
members (Random effects regression, N=120; β5=-0.346, p=0.875). Again, the re-
sults can also be shown using the Tobit random effects model also introduced 
in the main body of the paper.  
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Table 2 
All Data: second-order beliefs 0-100% 
Dependent variable: 
Amount sent 
Model 1: 
Linear 
regression 
Model 3: 
Linear 
regression 
Model 4: 
Linear 
regression 
Model 2: 
Tobit re-
gression 
Model 5: 
Tobit re-
gression 
Model 6: 
Tobit re-
gression 
Second-order belief 0.0129 
(0.0124) 
0.0615** 
(0.0195) 
0.063** 
(0.025) 
-0.0142 
(0.0221) 
0.0837* 
(0.0347) 
0.084+ 
(0.0437) 
Ingroup (dummy) -0.524 
(3.371) 
-0.524 
(3.370) 
-.445 
(3.407) 
-5.515 
(7.204) 
-5.572 
(7.200) 
-5.525 
(7.26) 
Ingroup x Second-
order belief 
0.0802*** 
(0.0175) 
0.0802*** 
(0.0174) 
0.075* 
(0.035) 
0.157*** 
(0.0316) 
0.158*** 
(0.0314) 
0.155* 
(0.0773) 
Larger50 (dummy)  -3.563** 
(1.105) 
-3.39* 
(1.563) 
 -7.185*** 
(1.982) 
-7.086* 
(2.816) 
Larger50 x ingroup 
1   0 
  -0.346 
(2.211) 
  -0.195 
(3.962) 
Random effects at 
participant level 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 12.42*** 
(2.384) 
11.61*** 
(2.396) 
11.57*** 
(2.409) 
-2.938 
(5.166) 
-4.578 
(5.183) 
-4.59 
(5.202) 
N 1320 1320 1320 1320 1320 1320 
Number of groups 120 120 120 120 120 120 
+=p<0.06 *=p<0.05; **=p<0.01; ***=p<0.001 
Standard errors in parenthesis 
 
 
Result 5: The effect of second-order beliefs is attenuated once the realm of exaggerated beliefs 
is reached (Random effects regression, N=120; β4=-3.39, p<.05).  
(Null) Result 6: This attenuation is not different between treatments (Random effects regres-
sion, N=120; β5=-0.346, p=.87). 
 
To look closer at whether and, if so, how senders condition amounts sent on 
exaggerated beliefs, I run the regressions explained in the main body of the 
paper with the data on exaggerated second-order beliefs.   
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Table 3 
Data for second-order beliefs above 50 up to 100% 
Dependent variable: 
Amount sent 
Model 1: 
Linear re-
gression 
Model 2: 
Tobit re-
gression 
Second-order belief 0.0005 
(0.02) 
0. 0005 
(0.02) 
Ingroup (dummy) 3.873 
(0.79) 
3.873 
(0.8) 
Ingroup x Second-
order belief 
0.026 
(0.76) 
0.026 
(0.76) 
Random effects at 
participant level 
Yes Yes 
Constant 12.9*** 
(3.73) 
12.9*** 
(3.75) 
N 600 600 
Number of groups 120 120 
*=p<0.05; **=p<0.01; ***=p<0.001 
Standard errors in parenthesis 
 
 
With these regressions, no significant effect can be shown. It appears that, in 
the realm of excessive second-order beliefs, second-order beliefs do not have 
any effect on the amount sent – independently of whether senders interact 
with ingroup or outgroup receivers. 
 
(Null) result 6: In the realm of exaggerated beliefs, no influence of second-order beliefs on 
action can be shown. That is true independently of whether senders interact with ingroup or 
outgroup receivers (Random effects regression, N=120; β1=0.0005, p>.983; β3=0.026, 
p>.45). 
8.3 Conclusion 
In the exploratory part of the experiment, I find that exaggerated second-order 
beliefs generally have an attenuated influence on the amount sent. The differ-
ence of attenuation is not statistically significant between treatments. Within 
the realm of exggagerated beliefs, second-order beliefs seem to have no effect 
on the amount sent, independent of the treatment.  
 69 
9. Appendix B: Instruc t ions in Engl i sh 
 
B.1. General Instructions (on Paper) 
 
Welcome to our experiment! 
 
If you read the following explanations carefully, you will be able to earn a sub-
stantial sum of money, depending on the decisions you take. It is therefore 
crucial that you read these explanations carefully. 
During the experiment there shall be absolutely no communication between 
participants. 
 
Any violation of this rule will lead to your exclusion from the experiment and 
from any payments. If you have any questions, please raise your hand. We will 
then come over to you. Please switch you mobile phone off and do not listen 
to music during the experiment. 
 
In any event, you will receive a lump sum of 4 € for taking part in the experi-
ment. During the experiment, all payoffs and earnings will be expressed in 
Talers. At the end of the experiment, you will be paid cash in Euro. You will 
receive from us the 4 € for your participation plus the sum of Talers you 
earned in the experiment, converted into Euros. One Taler converts to 0.11 €. 
Today's experiment will consist of three parts. Before each part, the experi-
menter will hand you printed instructions. Now you are about to be instructed 
on the first phase. When the first phase is over, you will receive paper instruc-
tions on the second phase of the experiment. 
B.2. Part 1 = Group Segregation Stage (Instructions on Paper) 
• All participants will now be allocated to one of two groups. The groups 
will remain constant over the whole experiment (that is, over all three 
parts of today’s experiment). 
• The groups will be formed depending on your preferences for one of 
two modern painters. 
• To form the two groups, everyone will be shown 5 pairs of paintings. 
Each pair consists of one painting by Klee and one by Kandinsky. You 
will not be told who painted which painting. For each pair, you will be 
asked to rate how much you like one painting vis-à-vis the other. 
• For indicating your preference, we ask you to use a slider bar. You can 
move the slider bar on a continuous scale between “I strongly prefer 
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painting L” to “I strongly prefer painting R” to indicate your prefer-
ence. The middle position shows that you like both paintings equally. 
• By moving the slider bar, you distribute ten points between the two 
paintings. The more you indicate that you like a painting, the more 
points are allocated to this painting and the less to the other (“I strong-
ly prefer painting L” means 10 points for painting L; “I like both paint-
ings equally” means 5 points for bot paintings; “I strongly prefer paint-
ing R” means 10 points for painting R). 
• The computer sums up all points you allocated to Klee and all points 
you allocated to Kandinsky. Then the half of the participants who allo-
cated the most points to Klee will form the Klee group. Accordingly, 
the other half will form the Kandinsky group. 
• As of the end of this stage, you will be informed about your group 
membership. 
• You can read your group membership from the upper left corner of 
your screen at any time during today’s experiment. 
• The groups will remain constant over all three stages of today’s exper-
iment. 
 
B.3. Part 2 
B.3.1. Group Task (Instructions on Paper)  
• You will approach this task together with the members of your group 
(Kandinsky or Klee). Each member will work independently, but the 
performance of all group members will be aggregated and constitutes a 
joint group performance. 
• The performance of your group will be compared with the perfor-
mance of the other group. 
• The group with the higher performance will receive a prize of 208 Ta-
lers at the end of the experiment, which will be distributed equally 
among the eight group members (26 Talers per member). The group 
with the lower performance receives no prize. If both groups have ex-
actly the same performance, the prize will be shared equally between 
the groups. 
• Your task is to identify letters at certain positions in a 15-page text. 
• Example: Identify the following letter: page 1, line 7, word 5, position 3. 
The correct solution to this example is marked in grey in the text you 
received – it is letter „C“. 
• Please indicate all letters as capitals.  
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• Overall you have four minutes to identify as many letters as possible. 
• After four minutes, the task ends and the number of correct solutions 
in your group will be compared with the number of correct solutions in 
the other group. 
• At the end of the experiment (after the third part), you will be in-
formed which group wins the price. 
• If you have read and understood the instructions, please click on “Pro-
ceed” on your computer screen.  
• As soon as all participants have clicked on “Proceed”, the group task 
will start. Please be ready! 
• Once you have completed this task, we will ask you to answer a short 
questionnaire, which will appear on your screen automatically. 
 
B.3.2a. Belief Elicitation (Only on Screen, Only for Receivers) 
Before we proceed with the third part of the experiment, we want you to guess 
the outcome of it. You will act in role B. In the experiment, you will be anon-
ymously paired with another person who has role A. The only thing you and 
the person you are paired with will know about each other is to what groups 
you have been assigned– Kandinsky or Klee. 
The person you are paired with will decide how to split 100 Talers between 
himself/herself and you. Every individual decision by such a person in role A 
will be anonymous towards both other participants and the experimenters. We 
want you to guess how much, on average, of the 100 Talers a person in your 
situation (a person in role B matched with a person of the same / different 
group in role A) will receive. Please enter your guess in the box below, stated 
in full Talers. Each participant whose guess is not more than 1 Taler off the 
true average amount will win 125 Talers extra, which will be paid out in the 
end together with whatever you earned during this experiment. 
 
B.3.2b. Questionnaire (Only on Screen, Only for Senders). 
You will now read some statements. These statements refer to the Klee [Kan-
dinsky] group, of which you are a member. Please read the respective state-
ment carefully and then indicate to which extent you agree with it. You can 
click anything between 1 (“I do not agree at all”) and 7 (“I absolutely agree”).  
Example scale: I do not agree at all. 1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5 - 6 - 7 I absolutely agree. 
1) I regard myself as a member of the Klee [Kandinsky] group. 
2) I am happy about being a member of the Klee [Kandinsky] group. 
3) I feel somehow connected to the members of the Klee [Kandinsky] group. 
4) I identify myself as a member of the Klee [Kandinsky] group. 
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B.4. Part 3 = Dictator Game 
• Each of you has been paired with another person in another role. You 
can read your role (“A” or “B”) on your screen. You will not be told 
who this other person is, neither during nor after the experiment. 
• All you will know about this person is what group he/she belongs to 
(Klee/Kandisnky). You can read your own group membership on the 
top left of your screen at any time. You can read the group member-
ship of the person you have been paired with from the top right of 
your screen at any time. 
• In this part of the experiment, every person who has role A will decide 
how to divide 100 Talers between himself/herself and the person in 
role B with whom he/she has been paired. This will work as follows. 
• 100 Talers each will be booked to the experimental accounts of every 
participant in role A. 
• Every participant in role B has guessed the outcome of this experiment 
to be in a case like his/hers: 
o If you and the person you have been paired with are from the 
same group, he/she guessed the average amount a participant 
in role B will receive if the participant in role A he/she is paired 
with is for same group. 
o If you and the person you have been paired with are from dif-
ferent groups, he/she guessed the average amount a participant 
in role B will receive if the participant in role A he/she is paired 
with is for a different group. 
• Note: This guess was made before these instructions were handed out 
(during the questionnaire at the end of the last part) and without the 
participant in role B knowing that the participant in role A he/she was 
paired with would be informed about the guess. Every person in role B 
whose guess is not more than 1 Talers off the true average will receive 
125 Talers to provide an incentive to guess accurately. 
• The participant in role A will now be asked what they would like to 
send if the receiver has guessed 0, 10, 20, 30, 40, 50, 60, 70, 80, 90, or 
100 Talers, respectively. Please fill in an answer for all these eleven cas-
es. 
• The computer will then put into effect the answer that was conditional 
on the belief, which is closest to the person B’s actual stated guess. So, 
if the person in role B guessed a participant in his situation would re-
ceive 4 Talers on average, the answer for 0 Talers would be put into ef-
fect. And if the person in role B guessed a participant in his situation 
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would receive 96 Talers on average, the answer for 100 Talers would 
be put into effect. 
• After the experiment you will be informed about 
o How much you earned in the second stage of the experiment 
(group competition and belief elicitation) 
o How much you earned in the third stage of the experiment 
(sender receiver game).  
• After completion of this last part of the experiment, we would ask you 
please to fill in a general questionnaire while we calculate your pay-
ments. Please step forward one by one in the order of your cabin num-
bers as soon as the experimenter declares the experiment to be over. 
B.5. Posttest 
In a posttest, participants were asked to indicate which of the pairs of circles 
best describes their relationship to the participant they have been paired with 
in the dictator game.  
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10. Appendix C: Instruc t ions in German 
Instruktionen auf Papier 
 
 
Allgemeine Erklärungen für die Teilnehmer 
 
 
 
Willkommen zu unserem Experiment! 
 
Wenn Sie die nachfolgenden Erklärungen genau lesen, dann können Sie - je 
nach Ihren Entscheidungen - eine nicht unbeträchtliche Geldsumme verdie-
nen. Es ist daher sehr wichtig, dass Sie diese Erklärungen genau durchlesen.  
 
Während des Experiments herrscht ein absolutes Kommunikationsverbot mit 
den anderen Teilnehmern. Die Nichtbeachtung dieser Regel führt zum Aus-
schluss vom Experiment und allen Zahlungen. Wenn Sie Fragen haben, stre-
cken Sie bitte Ihre Hand aus der Kabine. Wir kommen dann zu Ihnen. 
Bitte schalten Sie Ihr Handy aus und hören Sie keine Musik. 
 
Für Ihre Teilnahme am Experiment erhalten Sie auf jeden Fall eine Pauschale 
von 4 Euro. 
 
Während des Experiments sprechen wir nicht von Euro, sondern von „Ta-
lern“. Ihr gesamtes Einkommen wird also zunächst in Talern berechnet. Die 
von Ihnen während des Experiments erzielte Gesamtpunktzahl wird dann am 
Ende in Euro umgerechnet. Dabei gilt: 
 
1 Taler = 0.11 Euro 
 
Am Ende bekommen Sie von uns die 4 Euro Pauschale sowie die während des 
Experiments verdiente Anzahl an Talern bar in Euro ausbezahlt. 
 
Das heutige Experiment besteht aus drei Teilen. Vor jedem Teil werden Sie 
Instruktionen auf Papier erhalten. Nun wird Ihnen der erste Teil erklärt. Wenn 
der erste Teil vorüber ist, erhalten Sie die Instruktionen über den zweiten Teil 
auf Papier. Nach dem zweiten Teil erhalten Sie die Instruktionen für den drit-
ten Teil auf Papier 
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Ablauf des ersten Teils 
 
 
• Im ersten Teil des Experiments werden alle Teilnehmer einer von zwei 
Gruppen zugeteilt. Die Gruppen werden über das ganze Experiment, d.h. 
über alle drei Teile des Experiments, konstant bleiben.  
• Die Gruppen werden nach Ihrer Vorliebe für einen von zwei modernen 
Malern gebildet. 
• Um die Gruppen zu bilden, werden wir jedem von Ihnen 5 Paare von 
Gemälden zeigen. Jedes Paar wird aus je einem Bild von Klee und einem 
von Kandinsky bestehen. Sie werden nicht erfahren, welches Bild von wel-
chem Maler stammt. Für jedes Bilderpaar werden Sie gefragt, wie sehr sie 
das eine Bild im Vergleich zum anderen mögen. 
• Um Ihre Vorliebe anzugeben, werden wir Sie bitten, einen Schiebe-Regler 
auf dem Bildschirm zu nutzen. Sie können den Schiebe-Regler auf einer 
kontinuierlichen Skala zwischen „Mir gefällt Bild L viel besser“ bis „Mir 
gefällt Bild R viel besser“ bewegen. Die Position des Schiebe-Reglers genau 
in der Mitte zwischen diesen beiden Enden bedeutet, dass Sie die beiden 
Bilder gleich stark schätzen. 
• Indem Sie den Schiebe-Regler auf der Skala bewegen, verteilen Sie zehn 
Punkte auf die beiden Bilder. Je mehr sie ein Bild nach Ihrer Angabe mö-
gen, desto mehr Punkte werden diesem Bild und desto weniger Punkte 
werden dem anderen Bild zugeteilt  
Beispiel: „Mir gefällt Bild L viel besser“ bedeutet 10 Punkte für Bild L und 0 Punkte für Bild 
R; „Mir gefallen beide Bilder gleich“ bedeutet 5 Punkte für beide Bilder und „Mir gefällt Bild 
R viel besser“ bedeutet 0 Punkte für Bild L und 10 Punkte für Bild R. 
• Der Computer wird alle Punkte, die Sie den Bildern von Klee gegeben 
haben, aufsummieren. Ebenso wird er alle Punkte, die Sie den Bildern von 
Kandinsky gegeben haben, aufsummieren. Dann wird die Hälfte der Teil-
nehmer, die die meisten Punkte an Klee-Bilder gegeben haben, die Klee-
Gruppe bilden. Entsprechend wird die andere Hälfte der Teilnehmer die 
Kandinsky-Gruppe bilden. 
• Am Ende dieses Teils des Experiments wird Ihnen mitgeteilt, zu welcher 
Gruppe Sie gehören. 
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• In der oberen linken Ecke des Bildschirms werden Sie von nun an wäh-
rend des ganzen Experiments darüber informiert, zu welcher Gruppe Sie 
gehören.  
• Die Gruppen bleiben über alle drei Teile des heutigen Experiments unver-
ändert. 
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Ablauf des zweiten Teils 
 
 
• Die Aufgabe in diesem Teil werden Sie zusammen mit den anderen Mit-
gliedern Ihrer Gruppe (Klee bzw. Kandinsky) angehen. Jedes Gruppenmit-
glied wird unabhängig handeln, aber die Leistungen aller Mitglieder einer 
Gruppe werden zu einer gemeinsamen Gruppenleistung zusammenge-
nommen. 
• Die Leistung Ihrer Gruppe wird dann mit der Leistung der anderen Grup-
pe verglichen.  
• Die Gruppe mit der besseren Leistung wird einen Preis von 208 Talern 
gewinnen, der gleichmäßig auf alle acht Mitglieder der Gruppe aufgeteilt 
wird. Die Gruppe mit der schlechteren Leistung erhält nichts. Wenn die 
Leistung beider Gruppen gleich ist, wird der Preis zwischen beiden Grup-
pen geteilt.  
• Sie werden einen 15-seitigen Text erhalten und Ihre Aufgabe wird darin 
bestehen, Buchstaben an einer konkreten Position zu bestimmen.  
Beispiel: „Bestimmen Sie den folgenden Buchstaben: Seite 1, Zeile 7, Wort 5, Position 3.“ Die 
richtige Antwort zu diesem Beispiel ist in dem Text, den Sie erhalten haben, grau 
unterlegt – es ist der Buchstabe „C“. 
• Bitte geben Sie alle Buchstaben in Großbuchstaben an.  
• Insgesamt haben Sie 4 Minuten, um so viele Buchstaben zu identifizieren 
wie möglich. 
• Nach 4 Minuten endet die Aufgabe und die Anzahl richtiger Antworten in 
Ihrer Gruppe wird mit der Anzahl richtiger Antworten der anderen Grup-
pe verglichen.  
• Am Ende des Experiments (nach dem dritten Teil) werden Sie informiert, 
welche Gruppe die meisten richtigen Antworten gegeben und damit den 
Preis gewonnen hat.  
• Wenn Sie diese Instruktionen gelesen und verstanden haben, klicken Sie 
„Weiter“ auf Ihrem Bildschirm.  
• Sobald alle Teilnehmer „Weiter“ geklickt haben, wird die Aufgabe begin-
nen. Halten Sie sich bereit!  
• Wenn diese Aufgabe beendet ist, werden wir Sie bitten, einen kurzen Fra-
gebogen auszufüllen, der automatisch auf Ihrem Bildschirm erscheinen 
wird. 
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Ablauf des dritten Teils 
 
 
 
• Sie wurden am Ende des letzten Teils des Experiments zufällig entweder 
der Rolle „A“ oder der Rolle „B“ zugeordnet.  
• Welche der beiden Rollen Ihnen zugeteilt wurde, wird ihnen auf dem Bild-
schirm mitgeteilt, sobald der dritte Teil des Experiments beginnt.  
• Jeder von Ihnen wurde mit jeweils einer Person in einer anderen Rolle ge-
paart.  
• Sie werden weder während noch nach dem Experiment erfahren, wer die 
Person ist, mit der Sie gepaart wurden.  
• Alles, was Sie über diese Person wissen werden, ist, welcher Gruppe (Klee 
oder Kandinsky) sie angehört.  
• Sie können Ihre eigene Gruppenzugehörigkeit jederzeit von der linken 
oberen Ecke Ihres Bildschirms ablesen. Sie können die Gruppenzugehö-
rigkeit der Person, mit der Sie gepaart wurden, jederzeit von der rechten 
oberen Ecke Ihres Bildschirms ablesen.  
• In diesem Teil des Experiments wird jede Person in der Rolle „A“ ent-
scheiden, wie sie 100 Taler zwischen sich selbst und der Person, mit der sie 
gepaart ist, aufteilen wird. Dies wird wie folgt funktionieren.  
• 100 Taler werden jeweils auf das Konto jeder Person in Rolle „A“ gebucht.  
• Jeder Teilnehmer in der Rolle „B“ hat geschätzt, wie diese Aufteilung in 
einem Fall wie dem Ihren ausgehen wird: 
o Falls Sie und die mit Ihnen gepaarte Person aus der selben Gruppe sind, 
hat die Person in Rolle „B“, folgende Frage beantwortet: Wie viel wird 
eine Person in Rolle „B“ im Durchschnitt erhalten, wenn sie mit einer 
Person in Rolle „A“ gepaart wurde, die aus der selben Gruppe 
(Klee/Kandinsky) stammt wie sie selbst.  
o Falls Sie und die mit Ihnen gepaarte Person aus unterschiedlichen 
Gruppen stammen, hat die Person in Rolle „B“, folgende Frage beant-
wortet: Wie viel wird eine Person in Rolle „B“ im Durchschnitt erhal-
ten, wenn sie mit einer Person in Rolle „A“ gepaart wurde, die aus ei-
ner anderen Gruppe (Klee/Kandinsky) stammt als sie selbst.  
• Beachten Sie: Diese Schätzung hat die Person in Rolle „B“ gemacht, bevor 
diese Instruktionen ausgeteilt wurden (während der Fragebogenphase im 
letzten Teil des Experiments). Die Teilnehmer in Rolle „B“ wussten nicht, 
dass der Teilnehmer in Rolle „A“ über ihre Schätzung informiert wird. Je-
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de Person in Rolle „B“, deren Schätzung nicht mehr als einen Taler vom 
wirklichen Durchschnitt entfernt liegt, wird 125 Taler erhalten. Das sollte 
einen Anreiz bieten, eine zutreffende Schätzung abzugeben. 
• Die Teilnehmer in Rolle „A“ werden nun gefragt, welchen Betrag sie dem 
jeweiligen Teilnehmer in Rolle „B“ senden wollen, falls der Teilnehmer in 
Rolle „B“ 0, 10, 20, 30, 40, 50, 60, 70, 80, 90 bzw. 100 Taler geschätzt hat. 
Bitte antworten Sie für jeden dieser Fälle. 
• Der Computer wird dann die Antwort für den Fall umsetzen, der am 
nächsten an der wirklichen Schätzung der Person in Rolle „B“ liegt.  
Beispiel: Falls die Person in Rolle „B“ geschätzt hätte, dass eine Person in ihrer Situation im 
Durchschnitt vier Taler empfangen würde, würde der Computer die Antwort der Person in Rolle 
„A“ für den Fall „0 Taler“ umsetzen. Falls die Person in Rolle „B“ geschätzt hätte, dass eine 
Person in ihrer Situation im Durchschnitt 96 Taler erhalten würde, würde der Computer die 
Antwort der Person in Rolle „A“ für den Fall „100 Taler“ umsetzen  
• Hiernach stellen wir Ihnen noch eine Frage. 
• Danach werden Sie darüber informiert, 
o wie viel Sie im zweiten Teil des Experiments verdient haben (Grup-
penaufgabe und Schätzung)  
o wie viel Sie im dritten Teil des Experiments verdient haben (Sender-
Empfänger-Aufgabe)  
o wie viel Sie insgesamt verdient haben. 
Bitte beantworten Sie nach dem letzten Teil des Experiments noch einen all-
gemeinen Fragebogen, während wir Ihre Auszahlung berechnen. Bitte kom-
men Sie dann einzeln in der Reihenfolge Ihrer Kabinennummern zum Auszah-
lungstisch, wenn der Leiter des Experiments Sie dazu auffordert. 
 
Beliefabfrage (nur auf dem Bildschirm, nur für Empfänger) 
Bevor wir zur dritten Phase des Experiments kommen, möchten wir Sie bitten, 
das Ergebnis der dritten Phase vorherzusagen. 
Dazu erklären wir Ihnen schon hier, was in der dritten Phase des Experiments 
geschehen wird. 
Ihnen ist für die dritte Phase die Rolle des B-Spielers zugelost worden. Ferner 
wurden Sie für die dritte Phase schon zufällig einem anderen Teilnehmer in der 
Rolle A zugeordnet. Die einzige Information, die Sie über den anderen Teil-
nehmer haben werden, ist, ob dieser zur Klee- oder zur Kandinsky-Gruppe 
gehört. Ebenso wird er über Sie nur wissen, ob Sie zur Klee- oder Kandinsky-
Gruppe gehören. 
Sie gehören zur Kandinsky-Gruppe [Klee-Gruppe].  
Der Ihnen zugeteilte Teilnehmer in Rolle A gehört zur Kandinsky-Gruppe 
[Klee-Gruppe]. 
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Der Teilnehmer in Rolle A, dem Sie zugeordnet sind, wird darüber entschei-
den, wie 100 Taler zwischen Ihnen beiden aufgeteilt werden. 
Wir bitten Sie, zu schätzen, wie viel von den 100 Talern ein Teilnehmer in Rol-
le B im Durchschnitt von einem Teilnehmer in Rolle A erhalten wird, wenn er 
sich in einer Paarung wie der Ihren befindet (beide Teilnehmer gehören der 
selben Gruppe an [die beiden Teilnehmer gehören unterschiedlichen Gruppen 
an]). 
Jeder Teilnehmer, dessen Schätzung ausreichend präzise ist, erhält 125 Taler, 
die am Ende des Experiments zusammen mit dem Betrag ausgezahlt werden, 
den er während des Experiments verdient hat. Ausreichend präzise ist Ihre 
Schätzung, wenn sie nicht mehr als 1 Taler vom „wahren Durchschnittswert“ 
entfernt liegt. Der „wahre Durchschnittswert“ ist der durchschnittliche Betrag, 
den Teilnehmer in Rolle B in einer Paarung wie der Ihren (beide Teilnehmer 
gehören derselben Gruppe an [die beiden Teilnehmer gehören unterschiedli-
chen Gruppen an]) in dieser Session von Teilnehmern in Rolle A erhalten. 
Bitte geben Sie Ihre Schätzung in das Feld unter diesem Text ein. Sie können 
jeden Betrag zwischen 0 und 100 Talern angeben, der sich in ganzen Talern 
ausdrücken lässt. 
Ein Teilnehmer in Rolle B der - wie in Ihrem Fall – zur selben Gruppe gehört 
wie [zu einer anderen Gruppe gehört als] der Teilnehmer in Rolle A, der ihm 
zugeordnet ist, erhält im Durchschnitt ... Taler. 
 
Fragebogen auf dem Bildschirm für die Sender). 
Sie werden nun einige Aussagen lesen. Die Aussagen beziehen sich auf die 
Klee [Kandinsky] -Gruppe, der Sie angehören. Lesen Sie sich die jeweilige 
Aussage genau durch und klicken Sie an, wie sehr Sie ihr zustimmen oder nicht 
zustimmen. Dabei können Sie zwischen 1 "stimme überhaupt nicht zu" und 7 
"stimme absolut zu" wählen.  
Beispielskala: stimme überhaupt nicht zu 1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5 - 6 - 7 stimme voll zu 
1) Ich sehe mich selbst als Mitglied der Klee [Kandinsky]-Gruppe 
2) Ich bin froh darüber, zur Klee [Kandinsky]-Gruppe zu gehören. 
3) Ich fühle mich irgendwie den anderen Mitgliedern der Klee [Kandinsky]-
Gruppe verbunden. 
4) Ich identifiziere mich als Mitglied der Klee [Kandinsky]-Gruppe. 
Posttest 
Im Posttest wurden die Teilnehmer gebeten, das Kreispaar anzuklicken, das 
am ehesten ihre Beziehung zu dem mit ihnen für das Diktatorspiel gepaarten 
Teilnehmer beschrieb.  
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IV. Partnerships and Consortia: The Effect of Sharing 
Rules on Oligopolistic Pricing 
1. Introduct ion13 
Agents in economic models are typically modeled as monolithic decision mak-
ers. While this is a useful simplifying assumption, it is in contrast with the ob-
servation that many real world economic decisions are made by groups or 
teams. Boards of directors determine the behavior of firms, and self-monitored 
profit-sharing teams characterize many industries for artistic and professional 
services, e.g., lawyers, consultants, or music bands.  
Modeling economic agents as teams is important because team dynamics and 
decisions, and subsequently the outcomes of inter-team interactions and mar-
kets in which teams operate, can be crucially influences by the teams’ internal 
organization. In this paper we experimentally study how team’s internal organ-
ization, operationalized as the way profits are divided among team members, 
affects the unfolding of duopoly Bertrand competitions.  
Suppose that a state agency wishes to sue a construction company, claiming 
back aid granted for the construction of a power plant. The state decides to 
auction off the mandate in a public procurement auction, where the applicant 
who submits the lowest asking price wins the auction. Applicants need to bring 
in expertise in dispute resolution because it is a court case; the embeddedness 
of the case in the energy sector requires expertise in energy law; and finally the 
core of the case certainly lies in the law of state aid. Since such a wide array of 
qualifications is beyond the scope of any single lawyer, a team of lawyers sub-
mits a joint tender, competing against other teams, and the team with the low-
est asking price wins the project and is paid its asking price. 
A straightforward way to model the pricing decision in the above scenario is to 
assume that each expert in the team states a personal asking price and the joint 
bid is the sum of these asking prices. Clearly, team members have a joint inter-
est in winning the project by asking for prices that are lower, in sum, than 
those of the competitors. However, depending on the way profits are divided 
                                                
13 We thank Oliver Kirchkamp, Botond Köszegi, Christoph March, Ivan So-
raperra and Bert Willems for helpful comments on earlier versions of this pa-
per.  
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among members of the winning team, they can also have conflicting interests; 
given the public good flavor of low joint bids, if team members  receive their 
own personal bids when the team wins, then each one would prefer her team-
mates to bid low while bidding high herself to maximize her profits. 
We consider two ways of dividing profits among members of the winning team 
in a Bertrand price competition: (1) each member of the winning team receives 
her personal asking price; and (2) each member of the winning team receives 
the average personal asking prices in the team (an equal share of the team’s 
profit). It is clear that the internal conflict within the team is pronounced in (1) 
and absent in (2). Relating these two incentive structures to the example above 
and to real teams in the legal domain, two (stylized) types of competitors can 
apply to take the mandate: consortia and partnerships. Both consortia and partner-
ships are composed of a number of lawyers, each with one of the required 
specializations. In a consortium it is common that each lawyer fixes her own 
hourly rate, and is paid – in case the consortium gets the mandate – according 
to this rate. On the other hand, in partnerships the usual practice is that all 
partners agree on identical hourly rates for all partners, and some even place 
yearly profits in a pot to be distributed equally or at least at fixed ratios among 
all partners at the end of the year.  
We experimentally examine both homogeneous duopolies composed of either 
two consortia or two partnerships, and heterogeneous duopolies composed of 
one consortium and one partnership. Additionally, we vary the transparency of 
the profit sharing arrangements, i.e., whether team members have information 
about the profit sharing method of the other team or not. In summary, our 
results show that (1) Homogenous consortia markets yield substantially higher 
prices than homogeneous partnership markets, both when profit sharing ar-
rangements are transparent and when they are intransparent. (2) When profit 
sharing arrangements are transparent, prices in heterogeneous markets are as 
low as prices in homogenous partnership markets. (3) When profit sharing 
arrangements are intransparent, prices in heterogeneous markets are (almost) 
as high as prices in homogenous consortia markets. (4) Transparency of profit 
sharing arrangements leads to higher prices in homogeneous markets but to 
lower prices in heterogeneous markets. 
Our results can assist teams in forming preferences about their own profit 
sharing rule and transparency policy and about the types of markets they 
choose to compete in, as well as inform market regulators in the design of 
trading institutions (as all determinants of price levels are relevant for the effi-
cient distribution of goods) or in forecasting (tacit) collusion, which is usually 
 84 
thought of as being attained by coordination on prices, but may also be at-
tained by coordination on less competitive internal structures. 
In the next section we relate our work to existing literature. Then we present 
our experimental design and procedures. Subsequently we derive testable hy-
potheses. Section four presents the results of the experiment. Section five con-
cludes the paper and provides recommendations for market participants and 
policy makers. 
2. Related l i t erature  and current  contr ibut ion 
The current work mainly relates to two streams of literature: work on teams 
and their optimal organization; and (experimental) work on contests in eco-
nomics settings. In this section we briefly mention a number of key results 
from each stream, and explain how our work relates to, and expands upon, 
both. 
Alchian & Demsetz (1972) point out that in certain professions—law firms, 
for example—organizing production by establishing profit-sharing teams, ra-
ther than via central management, can increase production efficiency by cir-
cumventing the need to centrally monitor individual efforts.14 In a similar vein, 
profit-sharing among team members provides insurance against idiosyncratic 
shocks to human capital (Lang & Gordon, 1995) and helps committing to high 
quality when it cannot be easily assessed by customers (Levin & Tadelis, 2005). 
A related body of work deals with the way profits are shared. In particular, the 
commonly employed equal profit sharing rule has been shown to have both 
advantages and disadvantages: it provides optimal incentives for inequity 
averse team members to exert effort (Bartling & von Siemens, 2010), but fails 
to optimally insure team members against income risk (Wilson, 1968) and may 
hinder efficiency by inducing teams to remain too small and homogeneous 
(Farrell & Scotchmer, 1988; Kräkel & Steiner, 2001).  
For our purposes is it important to note that the literature on profit-sharing 
teams has focused on the problem of team production. Such teams, however, 
                                                
14 The literature cited in this paragraph uses the term “partnerships” to de-
scribe such profit sharing teams. It models the sharing rule as unaffected by 
price setting. In this paper we speak of “partnerships” as teams splitting profits 
according to a rule unaffected by price setting behavior of team members. In 
contrast, we use the term “consortia” for teams splitting profits according to 
ratios affected by price setting behavior of team members. 
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often compete with other teams for profits. Nonetheless, the literature has 
given little attention to the relation between teams’ internal structure (e.g., the 
specific way by which profits are shared) and the way that inter-team competi-
tion unfolds, and even less to situations where competing teams differ in their 
internal organization. 
Dechenaux, Kovenock, and Sheremeta (2012, p. 3) provide an extensive survey 
on experimental work on contests, which they define as situations in which 
“competing agents have the opportunity to expend scarce resources – such as 
effort, money, time, or troops – in order to affect the probabilities of winning 
prizes”. The vast majority of work mentioned in this survey considers agents as 
individual decision makers, examining contest features ranging from the num-
ber and heterogeneity of players, spillover and externalities, and length of play, 
to sabotage, collusion, communication, and alliance formation (to name a few).  
There is however, a small strand of literature on contests that considers 
groups, rather than individuals, as the competing agents. A prevailing result is 
that contests between groups can serve to increase efforts and mitigate within-
group free riding (Cason, Sheremeta, & Zhang, 2012; Leibbrandt & 
Sääksvuori, 2012; Nalbantian & Schotter, 1997; Sutter & Strassmair, 2009). 
Bornstein, Kugler, Budescu, & Selten (2008) and Abbink, Brandts, Herrmann, 
& Orzen (2010) compare contests between individuals to contests between 
groups. The later additionally examine asymmetric contests between individu-
als and groups. 
Very few papers examined the way competing groups are organized. Abbink et 
al. (2010) studied the effect of intra-group punishment in an inter-group 
Tullock contest. Bornstein & Gneezy (2002) and Bornstein et al. (2008) both 
compare inter-consortia to inter-partnership Bertrand price competition. These 
three papers compared symmetric contests/markets, where both groups are 
organized in the same way. Recent un-published work by Cason, Sheremeta, & 
Zhang (2014) is the only one we are aware of to experimentally explore an 
asymmetric contest between groups that differ in their internal organization, with 
intra-group communication available in one group but absent in the other.  
The two related papers by Bornstein & Gneezy (2002) and Bornstein et al. 
(2008) focus on how the presence of conflicting interests within groups affects 
the outcome of a Bertrand price competition by experimentally comparing 
competitions between partnerships, where intra-group conflict is absent, to 
competitions between consortia, where intra-group conflict prevails. Both pa-
pers find that competitions between partnerships yield lower prices than com-
petitions between consortia, convincingly demonstrating that the sharing rules 
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that govern profit distribution among members of the winning team matter 
and should be considered seriously by both market regulators and competing 
teams. 
We broaden the analysis of teams’ internal organization in inter-group contest, 
in particular their profit sharing rules, in two crucial dimensions. First, we al-
low for heterogeneity in profit-sharing rules. Our experimental contests are not 
composed only of symmetric pairs of consortia or partnerships, but can also by 
asymmetric, including one consortium and one partnership competing with 
each other. Second, the notion of heterogeneous competitions de-trivializes 
the epistemic nature of the contest, in the sense that it is no longer obvious 
that members of one team know how the other team is organized (i.e., whether 
the competitor is a consortium or a partnership). To the best of our knowledge 
we are the first to experimentally address the epistemic state of team members 
vis-à-vis a competing team, by examining how the (lack of) knowledge about 
the competitor’s sharing rule affects the outcome of the competition. 
2. Exper imental  des ign and procedure 
As experimental paradigm we use a Bertrand duopoly game abstracting from 
production and trade, in which each of the two competitors consists of a team 
of three players. The game was introduced by Dufwenberg and Gneezy (2000) 
for individual players, and modified as a team game by Bornstein and Gneezy 
(2002). In every period of the game, each member k  ∈  {1,2,3}  in team 
i  ∈  {1,2} simultaneously states an individual asking price Xik∈  {2,3,…,25}. The 
total asking price of team i is denoted by Xi (Xi= Xik3k=1 ). The team with the 
lower total asking price wins the competition; if the two total asking prices are 
equal there is a tie. 
There are two types of teams, differing by how profits are divided among the 
three team members. Under an individualistic consortium (C) structure, each 
team member is paid her individual asking price if the team wins, and half her 
asking price in case of a tie. Under an egalitarian partnership (P) structure each 
team member receives the average asking price if the team wins, and half the 
average asking price if there is a tie. In both sharing rule types members of the 
losing team receive nothing. The payoff of member k in team i is given by 
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for members of partnerships. 
Table 1 illustrates the experimental setup. We varied the composition of the 
market in terms of the competing teams’ sharing rules, and the transparency of 
these sharing rules. This results in two types of homogeneous markets where a 
consortium is matched with another consortium (CC), or a partnership is 
matched with another partnership (PP), and in heterogeneous markets where 
consortia are matched with partnerships (CP). Participants always had infor-
mation about the sharing rule type of their own team. In the transparency (t) 
treatments participants were also informed about the sharing rule of the com-
peting team; in the intransparency (i) treatments they were not.  
 
 transparent (t) intransparent (i) 
Homogeneous Markets 
Two consortia (CC) 
Two partnerships (PP) 
 
CCt (N=96; Nm=16) 
PPt (N=90; Nm=15) 
 
CCi (N=96; Nm=16) 
PPi (N=96; Nm=16) 
Heterogeneous Markets 
One consortia, one partnership (CP) 
 
CPt (N=96; Nm=16) 
 
CPi (N=96; Nm=16) 
Table 1: Experimental Treatments. N=number of participants; Nm=number of 
markets. 
The interaction was repeated for 120 announced periods. The team’s composi-
tion, sharing rule, and corresponding competitor were determined randomly 
before the first period and remained constant over all 120 periods. After every 
period participants received feedback about their own asking price, the total 
asking price of their team, the total asking price of the other team, their earn-
ings in the period, and their cumulative earnings. Before starting, paper instruc-
tions were distributed to all participants in a session. The instructions informed 
the participants about the two available sharing rules, the time horizon, and the 
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information they will receive on their computer screens during the experiment. 
The paper instructions for the “homogeneous” and “heterogeneous” treat-
ments were identical; the difference between the “transparent” and “intrans-
parent” treatments was only a single word.15 There was no possibility of com-
municating neither within teams nor between teams. The experiment was 
computerized using the software z-tree (Fischbacher, 2007) and participants 
were recruited from a pool of more than 5000 people using ORSEE (Greiner, 
2004). Overall, 570 participants took part in 24 experimental sessions at the 
Bonn EconLab. The average session lasted about 90 minutes and participants 
earned about €17 on average. Individual payoffs ranged from €3.50 to €47. 
3. Theore t i ca l  cons iderat ions and prev ious f indings 
3.1 Nash equilibrium 
The unique Nash equilibrium of the stage game is that all participants demand 
the lowest possible individual asking price, Xik=2. This is true regardless of the 
team’s sharing rule type (for a more detailed discussion see Bornstein et al., 
2008). Furthermore, the Nash equilibrium is not affected by the competitor’s 
sharing rule or by the knowledge thereof. Thus, the standard game theoretic 
prediction for the stage game is the same for all our treatments. Since the fact 
that the game will be played repeatedly for exactly 120 periods was made 
known to the participants, by backward induction it follows that the stage 
game equilibrium holds for each period of the repeated game as well. 
3.2 Previous results: individual adaptation in homogeneous 
markets 
Previous results, however, indicate that teams’ sharing rules influence behavior, 
even when they do not affect the Nash equilibrium. Both Bornstein and 
Gneezy (2002) and Bornstein et. al. (2008) found more tacit collusion (higher 
prices) in Consortia markets than in Partnership markets. 
Bornstein and Gneezy (2002) provide a compelling argument, based on a sim-
ple process of individual adaptation, to predict and explain this result. A slight-
ly altered version of their argument is as follows: suppose member k in team i 
is undecided between a pair of possible prices, Xik and Xik, with  Xik>Xik and 
∆=Xik-Xik. The decision’s implication on the team’s winning probability is 
similar whether it is a consortium or a partnership – the probability of winning 
                                                
15 See Appendix for the paper instructions. 
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is higher when the asking price is lower. However, consortia and partnerships 
differ in the way the choice between Xik and Xik affects the profit of the deci-
sion maker herself (member k in team i). Consortia provide a weaker incentive 
to bid the lower price (X
ik
): if the team wins when X
ik
 was chosen, member k 
earns ∆ less than what she would earn had she chosen Xik. In a partnership k’s 
earnings are decreased by only ∆/3. Thus, a team member’s inclination to low-
er her asking price, at a private cost to herself, in order to increase the team’s 
chances of winning is lower in consortia than in partnerships. Similarly, the 
temptation to increase personal profits at a cost to the team’s chance of win-
ning is higher in consortia than in partnerships. 
The above argument applies to our homogeneous markets as well, and does 
not seem to rely on the transparency of the sharing rules. Therefore we expect 
to find higher prices in homogeneous partnerships markets as compared to 
consortia markets, for both transparent and intransparent markets. 
Bornstein and Gneezy (2002) and Bornstein et. al. (2008) applied the individual 
adaptation argument outlined above to homogeneous markets, but it is rele-
vant to heterogeneous markets as well. Regardless of whether the competing 
team is a consortia or a partnership, members of partnerships have a stronger 
incentive to opt for lower prices, increasing their teams’ probability of winning. 
The resulting prediction is that partnerships will have a competitive edge over 
consortia when competing against each other in the same market – they will 
win the competition more often.  
Even if partnerships indeed win the competition more often, predicting price 
levels in heterogeneous markets is not obvious. Three scenarios come to mind:  
(1) low (partnership) prices: in an attempt to compete with partnerships, 
consortia will be forced to lower their asking prices to partnership 
levels, resulting in prices similar to those in homogeneous partnerships 
prices. 
(2) high (consortia) prices – partnerships will seize the opportunity to 
enjoy higher prices, and will increase their prices to consortia levels. 
(3) intermediate prices – both processes will take place simultaneously, 
resulting in prices that are higher than homogeneous partnerships 
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prices, lower than homogeneous consortia prices, but different from 
both. 
Learning models provide a possible source for deriving predictions in our set-
tings. There are two distinct families of learning models: stimulus learning on 
the one hand and belief based learning on the other. Stimulus learning is in-
spired by Thorndike’s “Law of Effect” (Thorndike, 1898) – the likelihood of 
repeating a specific choice rises after that choice has led to a good outcome. Its 
most prominent representative is the reinforcement learning model (Roth and 
Erev, 1995; Erev and Roth, 1998). Predictions derived from reinforcement 
learning were very much in line with the results of Bornstein and Gneezy 
(2002) and Bornstein et al. (2008). To apply reinforcement learning to our set-
up, we assume that before the first period participants are completely ignorant 
about which asking price to state. Every price in the feasible set 
Xik∈{2,3,…,25} is equally likely to be chosen. If the (randomly) chosen price 
yields a profit, the propensity of choosing the same price again increases, and 
the increase is proportional to the profit.16 
We derived the predictions of reinforcement learning by simulating the behav-
ior of 12600 virtual players in 2100 experimental markets. The simulations 
show that in homogeneous markets individual asking prices increase throughout 
the repeated interaction in consortia and decrease in partnerships. In heteroge-
neous markets the pattern is the same, but the difference between consortia 
and partnerships within the same (heterogeneous) market is smaller than the 
difference between the homogeneous markets. It follows that according to 
reinforcement learning, market prices in homogeneous consortium markets are 
higher than in homogeneous partnership markets, and that prices in heteroge-
neous markets lie in between (and are rather stable throughout the 120 peri-
ods).17 
                                                
16 We use the same parameters as Bornstein and Gneezy (2002) and Bornstein 
et al. (2008). Initially, every price between 2 and 25 has a weight of 10. After 
every period the profit earned in that period is added to the weight of the price 
played. For example: Subject i plays in a consortium. In the first period i ran-
domly chooses to bid 8, i's team wins, and i earns 8 points.The updated weight 
for choosing 8 in the second round is 18 for 8, and the other weights remain 
unchanged and equal 10. 
17 See Appendix B for more details. 
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Belief based learning presumes more sophisticated players than stimulus learn-
ing. Whereas in stimulus learning players only need to have memory, belief 
based models additionally assume that players are able to maximize their (ex-
pected) payoffs. The most prominent belief based learning model is fictitious 
play (Brown 1951): a player chooses the action that maximizes her expected 
payoffs based on her beliefs about the future actions of the other players. Be-
liefs about the other players’ future actions are derived from their past actions. 
Specifically, the more often player j has chosen action X in the past, the higher 
the probability that player i attaches to player j choosing X in the future. If, for 
instance player j choose action X in k out of t past periods, player i’s belief of j 
choosing X in the next period would be P=k/t. In the first period, there is no 
history of past actions, so players pick randomly from the set of feasible ac-
tions Xik∈{2,3,…,25}. As of the second period, players start best responding 
to the expected actions of the other players.18  
We simulated the behavior of 360 virtual participants in our experimental mar-
kets. Similar to reinforcement learning, fictitious play predicts prices in CCt to 
be high, in PPt to be low and in CPt to be in between. Counter to Reinforce-
ment learning it predicts that collusion is declining in all treatments over time, 
thus gradually approaching the Nash Equilibrium. Moreover it predicts that the 
influence of the other team’s sharing rule on an individual’s bidding is a lot 
stronger than it would be according to the prediction of reinforcement learn-
ing.19 
Both reinforcement learning and fictitious play are mute with respect to the 
effect of (in)transparency on behavior. To the best of our knowledge there are 
no learning models or game theoretic solution concepts that are sensitive to 
the knowledge players have about the payoff function of other players. In the 
absence of such models/solution concepts, a straight forward prediction is that 
tacit collusion on high prices is more likely to occur in transparent markets. 
This prediction is based on the intuition that (1) tacit collusion requires that 
members of each team accurately predict the behavior of members of the oth-
er team, and (2) such predictions are more accurate when there is more infor-
mation about the other team. 
  
                                                
18 If there is more than one best responding action, each is equally likely to be 
picked. 
19 See Appendix C for more details. 
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4. Results 
We first report treatment effects on average market prices and subsequently 
consider individual learning behavior. 
4.1 Treatment Effects 
 
Figure 1: Mean market prices in transparent (left) and intransparent (right) 
markets 
Market prices denote the total asking prices of the winning teams in every period. For better 
visibility, the 120 periods are pooled into 12 blocks of 10 periods each. CCt has 96 subjects (16 
markets), PPt 90 (15), CPt 96 (16), CCi 96 (16), PPi 96 (16), and CPi 96 (16). 
 
Result  1.  Prices are higher in homogeneous consortium markets than in homogeneous part-
nership markets, both with and without transparency.. 
The large difference between the CCt and the PPt treatment in the left panel of 
Figure 1 (Mann-Whitney, p<0.001, N=31) confirms the previous findings of 
Bornstein and Gneezy (2002) and Bornstein et al. (2008). As can be seen in the 
right panel of Figure 1, the effect is equally pronounced when when the other 
team’s sharing rule is unknown (CCi and PPi; Mann-Whitney, p<0.001, 
N=32). This shows that the differences in market prices between consortia 
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
M
ark
et 
Pr
ice
s
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Block
CCt PPt CPt
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
M
ark
et 
Pr
ice
s
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Block
CCi PPi CPi
 93 
markets and partnership markets do not depend on the knowledge of the 
competitor’s sharing rule. 
Result  2.  When sharing rules are transparent, prices in heterogeneous markets are as low 
as in homogeneous partnership markets. 
As can be seen in the left panel of Figure 1, price levels in CPt markets are 
virtually identical to those in PPt markets (Mann-Whitney, p>0.87, N=32), and 
significantly lower than prices in CCt markets (Mann-Whitney, p < 0.0005, 
N=32). 
Result  3.  When sharing rules are not transparent, prices in heterogeneous markets are 
(almost) as high as in homogeneous consortia markets. 
As can be seen in the right paned of Figure 1, price levels in CPi markets are 
higher than those in PPi markets (Mann-Whitney, p < 0.001, N=32), and not 
significantly different from prices in CCi markets (Mann-Whitney, p = 0.152, 
N=32). 
Result  4.  Transparency leads (a) to higher prices in homogeneous markets but (b) to lower 
prices in heterogeneous markets.  
When both competitors in the market have the same sharing rule, prices are 
higher when sharing rules are transparent. This is the case for consortia mar-
kets (Mann-Whitney, p<0.05, N=32) and partnerships alike (Mann-Whitney, 
p<0.05, N=31). However, the opposite happens when competitors have dif-
ferent sharing rules. In this case, prices are lower when sharing rules are trans-
parent (Mann-Whitney, p<0.05, N=32). 
Result  5 . Partnerships have an advantage over consortia in heterogeneous markets – they 
ask for less, win more often and accumulate more wealth. 
When facing each other in heterogeneous markets partnerships ask for lower 
prices than consortia in both transparent and intransparent markets, but the 
differences are not significant (Mann-Whitney, p=0.407, N=32; p=0.14, 
N=32; transparent and intransparent markets, respectively). Still, partnerships 
win more often (Wilcoxon signed rank: p = 0.007, p=0.0008; transparent  and 
intransparent markets, respectively), and this tendency increases over time – 
the (spearman) correlation between the (10-period) block and the winning 
proportion is 0.14 (p=0.057) for transparent markets and 0.17 (p=0.016) for 
intransparent markets. When they do win the competition, consortia do so at 
higher prices than partnerships in transparent markets (p=0.03), but the differ-
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ence is not enough to offset the lower frequency of winning, and partnerships 
earn more (Mann-Whitney, p=0.046, N=32). When incentive structures are 
intransparent winning prices of consortia and partnerships are similar (p=0.98) 
and partnerships (obviously) earn more (Mann-Whitney, p=0.0004, N=32). 
4.3. Learning 
Result  7 . There are no differences between the treatments in period 1. 
The observed differences between our treatments can be a result of partici-
pants’ prior beliefs and expectations about the market they are operating in, 
learning and adaptation during the repeated interactions, or both. If prior be-
liefs and expectations play a role in shaping the behavioral differences between 
the various treatments, at least some differences should be observed already in 
the very first period. This, however, is not the case. Asking prices in the first 
period are not different between the treatments (Kruskal-Wallis: p=0.83), indi-
cating that learning and adaptation, and not prior beliefs and expectations, are 
the source of the behavioral differences between the treatments. 
When we further compare the learning dynamics from the two learning models 
with our findings it turns out that the lower degree of sophistication notwith-
standing, reinforcement learning fares a little better than fictitious play.  
Fictitious play predicted a falling trend for both forms of homogeneous mar-
kets and for the heterogeneous markets. Reinforcement learning predicted a 
falling trend for homogeneous markets of partnerships and for heterogeneous 
markets. The rate of the decreasing trend was predicted to be smaller in heter-
ogeneous markets than in homogeneous markets of partnerships.  For homo-
geneous markets of consortia reinforcement learning predicted a rising trend – 
at least for the first 120 rounds. In fact a simulation of 10,000 rounds reveals 
that ultimately individual asking prices start to fall even in the homogeneous 
markets of consortia.  
Our findings show that the two learning models are right in their prediction 
that prices display a falling trend in homogeneous markets of partnerships un-
der intransparency. Market prices in homogeneous markets of partnerships 
clearly fall under intransparency. Under transparency, however, a falling trend 
is not clearly visible from the graph. In the four other treatments we observe a 
clear endround effect in the last block of rounds where collusion gets harder to 
sustain because the backward induction logic gets more salient as the end of 
the game approaches. Until that endround effect we observe a relatively stable 
level of prices in the heterogeneous treatments and an increasing trend in the 
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homogeneous markets of consortia. Both is predicted by reinforcement learn-
ing while it is not predicted by fictitious play.  
5. Discuss ion 
In this paper we have experimentally investigated the effects of heterogeneity 
and transparency in sharing rules on behavior in Bertrand duopoly markets 
where each competitor in the market is a 3-person team. Our main result is 
that the outcome of heterogeneous markets crucially depends on the availabil-
ity of information about the competing team’s sharing rule type. When sharing 
rules are transparent, heterogeneity leads to low market prices, similar to those 
of homogeneous partnership markets. When sharing rule types are intranspar-
ent, heterogeneity leads to high prices, near those of homogeneous consortium 
markets. This pattern of results is not predicted by any of the models we con-
sidered – Nash, reinforcement learning, or fictitious play. 
In homogeneous markets, prices were higher when sharing rules were trans-
parent than when they were intransparent, suggesting that knowing that the 
partner is similar makes it easier to tacitly collude. Within each transparency 
condition prices were higher when both competitors were consortia than when 
they were both partnerships. These results replicate those obtained by Born-
stein and Gneezy (2002) and Bornstein et. al. (2008), and add to their robust-
ness by showing that also they hold in our settings as well: a finite repeated 
game between fixed groups. 
With respect to heterogeneous markets, we expected prices to lie in between 
prices of the two relevant (in terms of transparency) homogeneous markets. It 
was not clear, however, if prices will converge towards the lower price levels of 
homogeneous partnership competitions, or towards the higher prices levels of 
homogeneous consortium competitions. Interestingly, the answer crucially 
depends on the transparency of sharing rule types: When sharing rules are 
transparent consortia lower their prices to the level of partnerships, and when 
sharing rule types are intransparent it is the partnerships that adapt prices up-
ward to consortia levels. 
Differences in the salience of within- and between-team conflicts among con-
sortia in each of the transparency conditions could be an explanation for this 
somewhat surprising result. Members of partnerships face only a between-team 
conflict between their team and the competing team. Within-team conflict is 
eliminated by the equal division of profits between team-members. Members 
of consortia face both types of conflict, which have opposing behavioral impli-
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cations. Whereas in the between-team conflict it is best to ask for a low price 
in order to outbid the other team and win the price competition, in the within-
team conflict one is tempted to ask for a high price in order to reap a higher 
profit should the team win. 
When members of a consortium are not aware of the competing team’s shar-
ing rule (intransparency), they pay more attention to the internal conflict within 
their own team, which implies high individual asking prices, and focus less on 
competing with the other team, which implies low individual asking prices, as 
compared to the case when they are aware of the competing team’s sharing 
rule type (transparency). Such behavior enables members of the competing 
partnership to increase their own asking prices to just below those of the con-
sortium, such that they still win the majority of the competitions, but at a high-
er price, and thus increase their earnings. Under transparency the between-
team conflict becomes more salient, so consortia members are driven to lower 
their individual asking prices in order to successfully compete with the other 
team, and the result is a market with low (partnership level) prices. 
Our results are informative to both regulators and market participants. We 
clearly identify two factors which affect prices in a non-obvious way: heteroge-
neity and transparency of the sharing rules. Awareness of such factors is of 
obvious importance to regulators. For example, prices in our experiment are 
highest in homogeneous transparent consortia markets, indicating that such 
markets are particularly prone to tacit collusion; market regulators might want 
to pay special attention to markets with similar characteristics. Another exam-
ple is the design of public procurement auctions. According to our results, 
prices can be reduced by inviting only partnerships (and not consortia) to take 
part in the auction. If the market is necessarily heterogeneous (includes both 
partnerships and consortia), the designer can consider forcing all competitors 
to reveal their sharing rule type, since our results indicate that in heterogeneous 
markets prices are lower with transparency.  
Our results also offer important insights for market participants. Which shar-
ing rule type should they employ? Should they reveal it to their competitors? 
What kind of market should the team compete in? Suppose that two teams 
compete in a Bertrand duopoly similar to the one in our experiment, that they 
can decide at the outset on a sharing rule for the team, and that that sharing 
rule will remain in effect throughout the repeated interaction. The meta-game 
played between the teams at the initial sharing rule type decision – using our 
results to predict the outcome of the repeated price competition – is described 
in Table 2. The numbers in each cell are the mean cumulative earnings of sin-
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gle team members of the respective teams. For example, if sharing rules are 
transparent and both teams select to be consortia, each member of both teams 
is expected to earn 790. If sharing rules are intransparent and one team choos-
es to be a consortium and the other to be a partnerships, each member of the 
consortium is expected to earn 480, and each member of the partnership is 
expected to earn 760.  
The resulting meta-games are critically influenced by the presence or absence 
of transparency. When sharing rules are transparent the resulting meta-game is 
a stag hunt game (i.e., assurance or coordination game). This game has two 
pure strategy Nash equilibria – either both players choose to divide profits as 
consortia or both choose to be partnerships, with the (Consortia, Consortia) 
equilibrium being both payoff (790>530) and risk (790+460>590+530) domi-
nant. The payoffs of the meta-game when sharing rules are intransparent cor-
respond to a chicken game, with two non-symmetric equilibria, where one 
team is a partnership and the other is a consortium (i.e., the market is hetere-
genous). 
How can the above analysis inform market participants? The attractiveness and 
high profits of the (Consortia, Consortia) equilibrium in the transparent case, 
as opposed to the conflictual nature of the chicken game in the intransparent 
case, suggests that they should prefer to operate in markets with transparent 
sharing rules, and that once they do, they should prefer consortia-like sharing 
rules, reasonably expecting that the opposing team will also choose to be a 
consortium. If the market is intransparent there is a serious coordination prob-
lem, and it is not easy to make a recommendation, as both options (consortium 
or partnership) can yield either high or low outcomes, depending on the oppo-
nent’s choice. Another decision a team might be required to make is in which 
type of market to compete (transparent or intransparent) in case the team’s 
sharing rule is fixed. The answer to this question crucially depends on the dis-
tribution of the two sharing rules across the different markets, but generally it 
is clear that, regardless of one’s own sharing rule, competing with a consortium 
is preferable to competing with a partnership. 
In our experiment we assumed that the transparency or intransparency of the 
sharing rules is a characteristic of the market, and accordingly both teams in 
each market are always in the same transparency condition. In real world mar-
kets it is reasonable to assume that a team can decide whether to make its shar-
ing rule transparent or not, irrespective of the decision of the other team. A 
question that we cannot answer with our data is whether it makes sense for a 
team to unilaterally change its transparency policy, as this can result in asym-
 98 
metry with respect to transparency of sharing rule types, which we did not 
examine. 
The internal organization of the decision making unit is often overlooked in 
the study of economics decisions. Here we went beyond the small body of 
previous work, which has established that the internal organization can be very 
important in shaping the market outcome, and showed that heterogeneity and 
transparency of sharing rule types not only matter, but interact in an interest-
ing, non-trivial way. Our discussion of the two meta-games that result from the 
two transparency conditions and the implications of our results to regulators, 
and especially to market participants, suggest that an interesting avenue for 
further research is to allow for teams’ sharing rules and transparency policies to 
be endogenous, rather than exogenously pre-determined as in our experiment. 
Another route for further studies is to increase the number of competitors in 
the market. As long as only one competitor wins the competition, it seems 
reasonable to predict that the existence of at least two partnerships in the same 
market will lead to low prices (as in homogeneous partnership markets) regard-
less of the number of Consortia in the market and of the transparency condi-
tion, because the inter-partnerships competition will drag prices down. Finally, 
it would also be of much interest to examine the effects of communication, 
both within and between teams, on the unfolding of market prices in the dif-
ferent combinations of sharing rules and transparency that we have considered. 
 
 
Transparent Consortium Partnership  Intranspar. Consortium Partnership 
Consortium 
 790 
790 
 590 
460 
 
Consortium 
 710 
710 
 760 
480 
Partnership 
 460 
590 
 530 
530 
 
Partnership 
 480 
760 
 400 
400 
Table 2: Meta Game in Choosing the Nature of the Sharing Rule Endogenously: Values are 
average cumulative earnings of a team member in the relevant condition over 120 periods. Bold 
frames indicate the Nash equilibria. 
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7. Appendix A: Paper Instruc t ions 
General instructions for participants 
Welcome to our experiment! 
If you read the following explanations carefully, you will be able to earn a sub-
stantial sum of money, depending on the decisions you make. It is therefore 
crucial that you read these explanations carefully.  
During the experiment there shall be absolutely no communication between 
participants. Any violation of this rule means you will be excluded from the 
experiment and from any payments. If you have any questions, please raise 
your hand. We will then come over to you. 
In any event, you will receive a lump sum of 2 euro for taking part in the ex-
periment. 
During the experiment we will not calculate in euro, but instead in points. 
Your total income is therefore initially calculated in points. The total number 
of points you accumulate in the course of the experiment will be transferred 
into euro at the end, at a rate of 
35 points = 1 euro. 
At the end you will receive from us the 2 euro plus the cash sum, in euro, 
based on the number of points you have earned. 
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Experiment procedure 
The experiment consists of 120 periods. 
Prior to the first period, the 24 participants are randomly divided into 8 
groups. Each group has 3 members. The same 3 members hence remain in 
the same group for the entire 120 periods. In addition, each group is randomly 
assigned to another group. The other group that is assigned to yours also re-
mains unchanged for the entire 120 periods. Since the experiment is complete-
ly anonymous, you have no possibility of finding out who belongs to your 
group and who belongs to the other group.  
Before the first period begins, the computer will randomly allocate one of two 
possible distribution keys to every group (we will explain below in further 
detail what these distribution keys look like). The distribution key remains the 
same for all periods. 
At the beginning of each period, you may demand any number of points be-
tween 2 and 25 (individual asking price). As soon as all participants have 
stated their individual asking prices, the computer will add up your group’s 3 
individual asking prices and calculate the total asking price of your group. 
Similarly, the computer will also add up the other group’s 3 individual asking 
prices and calculate the other group’s total asking price. The computer will 
then compare the total asking price of your group to the total asking price of 
the other group. 
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Distr ibut ion key A:  
1. If the total asking price of your group is lower than the total asking 
price of the other group, then each member of your group receives 
exactly the number of points he or she demanded (individual asking 
price). 
2. If the total asking price of your group is higher than the total asking 
price of the other group, then each member of your group receives 
exactly 0 points. 
3. If the total asking price of your group is equal to the total asking 
price of the other group, then each member of your group receives 
exactly half the points he or she demanded (half of the individual 
asking price). 
Distr ibut ion key B:  
1. If the total asking price of your group is lower than the total asking 
price of the other group, then each member of your group receives 
exactly one-third (1/3) of the total asking price (total asking price 
divided by 3). In other words, the total asking price of your group is 
evenly distributed among all 3 group members. 
2. If the total asking price of your group is higher than the total asking 
price of the other group, then each member of your group receives 
exactly 0 points. 
3. If the total asking price of your group is equal to the total asking 
price of the other group, then each member of your group receives 
exactly one-sixth (1/6) of the total asking price (total asking price 
divided by 6). In other words, the total asking price of your group is 
initially halved and then evenly distributed among all 3 group members. 
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The following table summarizes the two distribution keys once again: 
 
 
 
Distr ibut ion  key  A Dis tr ibut ion  key  B  
 
1. The total asking price 
of your group is lower 
than the total asking 
price of the other group. 
 
 
You receive exactly your 
individual asking price. 
 
You receive 1/3 of your 
group’s total asking 
price. 
 
2. The total asking price 
of your group is higher 
than the total asking 
price of the other group. 
 
 
You receive nothing. 
 
You receive nothing. 
 
3. The total asking price 
of your group is equal 
to the total asking price 
of the other group. 
 
 
You receive exactly half 
of your individual asking 
price. 
 
You receive 1/6 of your 
group’s total asking 
price. 
You will be informed, on your computer screen, which distribution key your 
group has and [but not]20 which distribution key the other group has. As men-
tioned above, during the entire 120 periods, the distribution key always remains 
the same. 
                                                
20  “and” vs. “but not” is the only difference between the “transparent” 
condition and the “intransparent” condition. 
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At the end of each period, you will be given information on: 
(a) your individual asking price 
(b) your group’s total asking price 
(c) the other group’s total asking price 
(d) the number of points earned by you in this period 
(e) the total number of points earned by you up to now, including 
this period. 
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8. Appendix B: Reinforcement Learning 
Figure B1 shows the simulated development of individual asking prices (right) 
over time by treatment under the assumptions of reinforcement learning. In 
contrast to the Nash solution, reinforcement learning predicts a positive 
amount of collusion in the market. Reinforcement learning predicts prices in 
CC to be high, in PP to be low and in CP to be in between. Members of consor-
tia teams are predicted to ask higher prices than members of partnership teams. 
The model predicts the different transparency conditions to have no effect 
whatsoever. These predictions are independent of the transparency condition 
why. 
 
Figure B1: Left: Market Prices by Treatment as Predicted by Reinforcement 
Learning. Right: Individual Asking Prices as Predicted by Reinforcement 
Learning. 
Market prices denote the total asking prices ΣkXik of the winning teams in every period. We 
simulated 12000 artificial individuals in 2000 markets. Because the simulation is insensitive to 
transparency we drop the indication “t” for transparency and “i” for intransparency. C(CP) 
indicates a consortium in a heterogeneous market. And C(CC) a consortium in a homogene-
ous market. 
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9. Appendix C: f i c t i t ious p lay 
Figure C1 shows the simulated development of market prices (left) and indi-
vidual asking prices (right) over time by treatment under the assumptions of 
fictitious play. Again, we summarize the 120 periods into 12 blocks of 10 peri-
ods each. Similar to reinforcement learning it predicts prices in CC to be high, 
in PP to be low and in CP to be in between. Counter to Reinforcement learn-
ing it predicts that collusion is declining in all treatments over time. Moreover, 
it predicts that not only the sharing rule type of one’s own team influences the 
individual asking prices but also that of the competing team. Members of con-
sortia teams are predicted to ask higher prices when competing against another 
consortium than when competing against a partnership and members of part-
nership teams are predicted to ask lower prices when competing against another 
partnership than when competing against a consortium (figure C1, right). The 
model predicts the different transparency conditions to have no effect whatso-
ever. 
 
Figure C1. Left: Market Prices by Treatments as Predicted by Fictitious Play. Right: 
Individual Asking Prices as Predicted by Fictitious Play. 
Market prices denote the total asking prices ΣkXik of the winning teams in every period. The 
120 periods are pooled into 12 blocks of 10 periods each. We simulated 360 artificial individ-
uals. Because the simulation is insensitive to transparency we drop the indication “t” for 
transparency and “i” for intransparency. C(CP) indicates a consortium in a heterogeneous 
market. And C(CC) a consortium in a homogeneous market. 
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10. Appendix D: Data Structure  o f  the  Exper iment 
 
Table D1 gives an overview of the data collected in the experiment.  
 
 
 
 
  
Partici-
pants Competitors Markets Periods 
CCt 96 32 16 120 
PPt 90 30 15 120 
CPt 96 32 16 120 
CCi 96 32 16 120 
PPi 96 32 16 120 
CPi 96 32 16 120 
Table D1. Data Structure of the Experiment 
Note: Every competitor is a team of 3 participants. Every market 
consists of 2 matched teams. 
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V. General Summary and Discussion 
 
With regard to chapter II we conclude that loyalty rebates lead to non-rational 
buying behavior, amounting to an additional psychological switching cost that 
can cause substantial financial losses for consumers. This effect increases the 
potential of loyalty rebates to be used as a tool to foreclose markets and pro-
vides an argument for a more restrictive position towards loyalty rebates under 
consumer protection law. Previous arguments and rulings concerning the regu-
lation of loyalty rebates under antitrust law both in the EU and in the US were 
mainly based on the assumption of rational buying. Stickiness effects add to 
these existing problems. Therefore the potential danger of loyalty rebates has 
been underestimated. The demonstrated stickiness effect backs the role psy-
chological effects already play in European antitrust law today. It generally 
supports the greater scrutiny loyalty rebates have recently been subject to both 
in the EU and the US. 
 
To the best of my knowledge, the experiment in chapter III is the first to 
show that in the realm of realistic beliefs social closeness – implemented here 
as shared group identity – determines how strongly senders’ second order be-
liefs influence the amounts sent in a dictator game. I used a minimal group 
paradigm to induce a shared identity and reinforced it slightly. The total inter-
vention is extremely faint. Therefore, the effect is likely to be a lot stronger in 
the field, where relationships are based on family ties, friendship, co-
workership, and the like. Also being class mates in an MBA program (Reuben 
et al., 2009), exchanging a one page free text letter (Gary Charness & 
Dufwenberg, 2006) or being parties to a promise arising in a computer chat 
(Vanberg, 2008) are protocols that are likely to induce stronger shared identity 
than my treatment manipulation. 
My results clarify that guilt aversion will make better predictions in contexts of 
social closeness (families, friendships, co-workers) than in anonymous contexts 
(anonymous market transactions). On the one hand, they reveal that experi-
ments in a very anonymous setting may be the wrong test bed to test theories 
of second order belief dependent preferences. On the other, my results suggest 
that theories on guilt aversion should spell out that social closeness is crucial 
for the effect of second order beliefs on action.  
While so far different authors had proposed elevated second order beliefs in 
ingroup interactions as a cause for ingroup favoritism (Güth et al., 2009; 
Ockenfels & Werner, n.d.), I show in this experiment that their explanation 
may at least be incomplete. Shared group identity may translate into elevated 
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second order beliefs but I show that it leads to a stronger influence of these 
beliefs. Both effects together may just reinforce each other. But according to 
my results ingroup favoritism could also arise under identical second order 
beliefs ingroup and outgroup simply because these identical second order be-
liefs influence action more strongly ingroup than outgroup. 
From my results it appears plausible that people hold a promise to a stranger 
because the promise creates a shared identity between the two, causing second 
order beliefs to induce action. In future research, the explanation of promise 
keeping on the grounds a theory of guilt aversion amended along these lines 
should be tested against the explanation that people have a preference to hold a 
promise. Promises that activate guilt aversion by creating a relationship be-
tween the parties would be compatible with a theory of “lexicographic promise 
keeping” proposed by Ederer and Stremitzer (2014). 
The finding that people have a preference to conform to the expectations of 
someone who is socially close may have applications in the management of 
teams. Guilt aversion can help to coordinate team members. Communicating 
expectations can incite team members who are socially close. And it seems that 
communicating exaggerated expectations does not backfire in well-integrated 
teams. At least in the realm of realistic expectations the degree of social inte-
gration of a team can be used as a mediator to fine tune the influence of mutu-
al expectations. It seems like an interesting and promising avenue for future 
research to enrich the investigation of the impact of social closeness on guilt 
aversion by the impact of social status.  
Finally, my results suggest that it is worth working on a truly empathic utility 
function that does not merely include other agents’ payoffs into the utility 
function but adds more elements of their utility. A theory of other regarding 
reference dependent preference with expectation based reference points along 
the lines of Köszegi and Rabin (2006) appears to be a promising starting point. 
 
In chapter IV we studied a Bertrand duopoly market of teams of three. Teams 
could share their profits equally (partnership) or according to the individual 
asking prices of team members (consortium). We varied market composition 
(two partnerships; two consortia; one partnership and one consortium) and the 
market transparency with respect to the opponent team’s way of sharing prof-
its. To predict the level of winning prices in the experimental markets we de-
rived Hypotheses from Nash Equilibrium, Reinforcement Learning and Ficti-
tious Play.  
Our results suggest that the variables we vary (market composition and trans-
parency) are highly relevant in price competition between teams. Our results 
also suggest that participants learn over time because in the first round there is 
no difference between treatments and these differences only evolve over time 
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but the learning models (reinforcement learning and a variant of belief learn-
ing, i.e. fictitious play) perform poorly in predicting the effects of our two ma-
nipulations.  
Our most striking and maybe most surprising finding is the contrast between 
our result 3 and our result 4. When incentive structures are transparent, prices 
in heterogeneous markets are as low as in homogeneous partnership markets. 
But when incentive structures are intransparent, prices in heterogeneous mar-
kets are (almost) as high as in homogeneous consortia markets. The second of 
these two results was not predicted by any of the models applied. Ex post we 
explain this finding by the salience of conflict. In transparent markets the de-
tailed information a player has about the other team highlights the conflict 
between teams driving down prices. In partnerships on intransparent markets, 
most information available concerns the conflict within the team. If players 
concentrate on the intra team conflict this drives prices up, because the intra 
team conflict lets low asking prices of a team appear as something like a public 
good.  
On top of our own findings we corroborate the finding of Bornstein et al. 
(2002, 2008) by replicating their finding that prices in homogeneous markets of 
partnerships are lower than prices on homogeneous markets of consortia in a 
new setting.  
Our findings will be of high importance both to managers trying to find ways 
to sustain high prices as well as to regulators aiming at keeping prices low. The 
endogenous strategic use of the variables we exogenously manipulate in this 
study opens up many avenues for further research. 
 
The three studies of this dissertation illustrate that law and economics is a truly 
interdisciplinary field in which both disciplines mutually inspire each other. 
Study one showed that certainly law turns to economics methodology to an-
swer legal questions. But more importantly studies two and three illustrate that 
legal expertise can make a difference for economic research, too.  
This dissertation is proof that interdisciplinary research is not only crucial to 
generate mutual understanding but that there remains creativity in interdisci-
plinary research. Possibly, none of the results would have been generated either 
without seeing the legal question or without thorough knowledge of legal tradi-
tions of thought or practice. Certainly law alone did not offer any methodology 
to answer the questions raised in this dissertation. On the other hand econom-
ics did not seem to provide the perspective to generate the hypotheses tested. 
This illustrates that interdisciplinary research is not only a process of connect-
ing knowledge already generated but is indeed an important means of generat-
ing new knowledge.  
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VI. Zusammenfassung in Deutscher Sprache 
 
Diese Dissertation illustriert Perspektiven, die einen wirklichen Austausch von 
Rechtswissenschaften und experimenteller Wirtschaftsforschung erlauben. Die 
Illustration geschieht in drei je eigenständigen Forschungsartikeln. Traditionell 
wird die Disziplin der Rechtsökonomik als seine Disziplin verstanden, die 
(mikro)ökonomische, meist theoretische Ansätze nutzt, um Rechtsfragen zu 
beantworten. Rechtsfragen in diesem Sinne können Rechtspolitische oder 
wirklich dogmatische Fragen der Rechtsauslegung sein. Die drei Kapitel dieser 
Dissertation zeigen, dass der Transfer zwischen Rechtswissenschaft und öko-
nomischer Forschung nicht derart einseitig ist, sonder die Möglichkeit einer 
wirklich wechselseitigen Inspiration besteht. Eine Inspirationsrichtung besteht 
in der Beantwortung genuine Juristischer Fragen durch ökonomische Metho-
den (Kapitel 1). In die andere Richtung kann jedoch auch Jahrhundertealte 
juristische Intuition die Hypothesenbildung in ökonomischer Forschung beein-
flussen (Kapitel 2) der schlicht die Praxisnähe der Rechtswissenschaften helfen 
wichtige Variablen zu erkennen, die strategische Interaktion beeinflussen (Ka-
pitel 3).  
 
Wettbewerbspolitik verlässt sich üblicherweise auf die Annahme des rational 
agierenden Konsumenten, obwohl andere Verhaltensmodelle typischerweise 
Konsumentenverhalten besser vorhersagen. In drei Experimenten, die ich in 
Kapitel 3 berichte, untersuchen wir theoretisch und experimentell den Einfluss 
von sogenannten Zielrabatten auf das Entscheidungsverhalten von Menschen. 
Dabei stützen wir uns auf das alternative Verhaltensmodell der Cumulative 
Prospect Theory (CPT). CPT sagt vorher, dass Zielrabatte Konsumenten 
dadurch schädigen können, dass sie verhindern, dass Konsumenten in rationa-
le Weise vom Rabattanbieter zu einem Konkurrenten wechseln. In den Expe-
rimenten entschieden die Probanden zunächst, ob sie an einem stilisierten Ra-
battsystem teilnehmen wollten. Es war unsicher, ob sie die Rabattbedingung 
(den Kauf einer bestimmten Mindestmenge) erreichen können würden. Zielra-
batte reduzierten die Wahrscheinlichkeit erheblich, dass die Teilnehmer zu 
einer Außenoption mit einem höheren Erwartungswert wechseln würden. Wir 
schließen daraus, dass Zielrabatte Konsumenten zu erheblichem Schaden ge-
reichen können und möglicherweise ein unterschätztes Potential haben, Märkte 
ineffizient zu verschließen. Unser Befund begründet daher zusätzliche Argu-
mente warum marktbeherrschenden Unternehmen die Zielrabatte nutzen ihren 
Markt monopolisieren könnten oder ihre Marktmacht missbrauchen. Ebenfalls 
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folgen aus unserem Befund Bedenken gegen Zielrabatte aus Gründen des Ver-
braucherschutzes. 
 
 
In dem Laborexperiment, das ich in Kapitel 2 berichte, teste ich, ob guilt aver-
sion, d.h. eine Präferenz dafür, die Erwartungen anderer Menschen zu erfüllen, 
sich dann starker auswirkt wenn die Agenten einander sozial nah stehen. Ich 
induziere zwei verschiedene Gruppenidentitäten in Teilnehmern und teile die 
Teilnehmer dann zufällig einem von zwei Versuchsbedingungen zu: Sender 
spielen entweder ein Diktatorspiel mit einem Empfänger aus ihrer eigenen 
Gruppe (Ingroup-Bedingung) oder mit einem einem Empfänger aus der ande-
ren Gruppe (outgroup-Bedingung). Ich lasse die Sender in Abhängigkeit von 
ihren second-order beliefs entscheiden wie viel Geld sie an die Empfänger 
senden wollen. Ich finde, dass es im Bereich realistischer beliefs (d.h. der Sen-
der erwartet, dass der Empfänger erwartet, dass der Sender nicht mehr als die 
Hälfte des zu verteilenden Geldes sendet) einen positive Einfluss der second 
order beliefs auf die Höhe des gesendeten Betrags gibt. Dieser Einfluss ist im 
ingroup-Bedingung starker als in der outgroup-Bedingung. In beiden Bedin-
gungen reagieren ungefähr die Hälfte der Sender überhaupt nicht auf second 
order beliefs. In der ingroup-Bedingung identifizieren sich die Sender, die nicht 
auf die second order bleifs reagieren weniger mit ihrer eigenen Gruppe. Das 
gilt nicht für die outgroup-Bedingung.  
 
Im dritten Kapitel untersuchen wir einen Bertrand-Duopol-Markt im Labor. In 
diesem Markt wird jeder der beiden Wettbewerber als ein Team aus je drei 
Personen modelliert. Jedes Teammitglied nennt einen eigenen Angebotspreis. 
Die drei so genannten Preise eines Teams werden aufsummiert und bilden den 
Angebotspreis des betreffenden  Teams. Das Team mit dem niedrigeren An-
gebotspreis gewinnt den Wettbewerb in der betreffenden Runde. Die Wettbe-
werber können eine von zwei Formen haben. In Konsortien erhält jedes Team-
mitglied, wenn sein Team gewinnt, den von ihm genannten Angebotspreis; in 
Partnerschaften erhält jedes Mitglied, wenn sei Team gewinnt, den durchschnittli-
chen Preis, den die Mitglieder dieses Teams genannt haben. Wir variieren die 
Marktzusammensetzung und die Transparenz bezüglich der Teilungsregel des 
anderen Teams. Unsere Ergebnisse zeigen: (1) Homogene Märkte aus Konsor-
tien generieren substantiell  höhere Preise als homogene Märkte, die nur aus 
Partnerschaften bestehen. Das gilt sowohl unter Transparenz als auch unter 
Intransparenz. (2) In transparenten Märkten generieren heterogene Märkte so 
niedrige Preise wie homogene Märkte aus Partnerschaften. (3) In intransparen-
ten Märkten generieren heterogene Märkte dagegen fast so hohe Preise wie 
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homogene Märkte aus Konsortien. (4) Transparenz führt in homogenen Märk-
ten zu höheren Preisen. In heterogenen Märkten dagegen führt Transparenz zu 
niedrigeren Preisen. 
 
 
Die drei Studien, die in dieser Dissertation berichtet wurden, illustrieren, dass 
Law and Economics ein wirklich interdisziplinäres Forschungsfeld ist, in dem 
sich die beiden Disziplinen gegenseitig beeinflussen. Das erste Kapitel hat ge-
zeigt, dass der traditionelle Ansatz, nach dem man genuine Juristische Fragen 
mit der Hilfe ökonomischer Methoden beantwortet auch unter den Erweite-
rungen der Experimentalökonomik fruchtbringend wirkt. Vielleicht noch wich-
tiger ist, dass die beiden Kapitel zwei und drei illustrieren, dass Rechtswissen-
schaftliches Wissen auch für ökonomische Fragestellungen neune Lösungen 
zuführen kann. 
Diese Dissertation ist ein Beleg, dass interdisziplinäre Forschung nicht nur 
wichtig ist, um gegenseitiges Verstehen unterschiedlicher – hier sozialwissen-
schaftlicher – Disziplinen zu generieren, sondern dass interdisziplinäre For-
schung eine eigene Quelle wissenschaftlicher Kreativität darstellt. Möglicher-
weise wäre keines der hier berichteten ökonomischen Forschungsergebnisse 
erzielt worden, ohne die gründliche Kenntnis juristischer Fragestellungen, ju-
ristischer Tradition und juristischer Praxis. Ökonomie allein schien nicht den 
Blick auf die Probleme bereit zu halten um die hier getesteten Hypothesen zu 
generieren. Zweifellos konnten andererseits juristische Methoden allein die hier 
untersuchten Fragen nicht beantworten. Dies alles zeigt, dass interdisziplinäre 
Forschung nicht nu rein Mittel ist Wissen zu verknüpfen, sondern ein Weg 
neues Wissen zu generieren.  
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